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Hi Susan and all
Not impossible to address at individual intervention level. But I think we
can use history to throw some light on the crisis of of healthcare.

*Learning from blood letting*



‘In the aftermath of the French Revolution, François Joseph Victor
Broussais (1772-1838), a Parisian doctor and a Jacobin, claimed that all
fevers had the same origin: they were manifestations of the inflammation of
organs. Accordingly, leeches were applied on the surface of the body
corresponding to the inflamed organ and the resultant bloodletting was
deemed to be an efficient treatment. For example, the chest of a patient
suspected of having pneumonitis was covered with a multitude of leeches.
Broussais's theories were highly regarded by contemporary French
physicians. His influence can be assessed using an economic measure: in
1833 alone, France imported 42 million leeches for medical use. (Ackerknecht
EH. Medicine at the Paris Hospital, 1794-1848. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1967, p62 cited in Morabia, 2006, p158)





A strong critic of Broussais was Louis, described as  a pre-formal
epidemiologist, who challenged blood letting and, after comparing mortality
in early and late blood letting,  recommended restricting its use to only
the most severe cases (of pneumonitis).



‘What did Louis find when he compared the evolution of the disease among
the two groups of carefully selected patients he had assembled? He found
that the duration of disease was an average of 3 days shorter in those who
had been bled early compared with those who had been bled late. However,
`three sevenths' (i.e., 44 %) of the patients who had been bled early died
compared to `only one fourth' (i.e., 25 %) of those bled late, a result
that Louis remarked was `startling and apparently absurd'.’ (Louis PCA.
Researches On The Effects Of Bloodletting In Some Inflammatory Diseases.
Boston: Hilliard, Gray, 1836 p9 cited in Morabia, 2006, p160)





Brouissais was one of the first to suggest that disease is simply an
exaggeration of the normal, a manifestation of increased irritability, in
other words an inevitable part of life itself, and qualitatively
indistinuishable from life. In addition, Broussais was also a massive fan
of blood letting, but, and this is significant, only as a treatment for
people who were already symptomatic, as in ill, or suffering from
disease (Broussais
and Cooper, 1831).



Broussais’ theory about life and its continuity with disease, was probably
quite a profound truth about life itself (as noted by the famous French
philosopher Canguilhem, (Canguilhem, 1966), but Hacking notes that Auguste
Comte (1798-1857) the French philosopher/sociologist hijacked this idea and
accredited Broussais for inspiring his foundational ‘positivism’ (Hacking,
1990).



Comte’s positivism was the effort to identify features of social deviancy
amongst the population so that they may be corrected and returned to
‘normal’, a normative normal, the desirable state of compliance with social
order. This positivism instituted logical empiricism’s delusion that it can
identify the point of threshold (the definite, diagnostic, finite
observation, or test result) that can differentiate the pathological from
the normal (see Canguilhem).



The implications for us?



Well, blood-letting was for symptomatic disease.  And, at that time, I
don’t think capitalism had reached the neoliberal, and universalised, stage
where even symptoms have become an apparently worthwhile or even profitable
commodity for the sufferer.



Today, we have population-based modes of anticipatory care for the
*asymptomatic*. Not all of these forms of care are necessarily
significantly harmful, e.g. childhood immunisations, though even these
programmes do cause concern.



So, below I have suggested some features of anticipatory modes of care that
are a form of crisis for health care today.



The interventions that are emerging with ever greater intensity in the
paradoxical crisis for EBHC:



1.     Are applied to an unsuspecting, asymptomatic, and uncomplaining
population

2.     Diagnose: a) new disease categories (e.g. social anxiety disorder),
b) discovers covert disease (e.g breast cancer screening), c) captures
‘new’ symptoms (e.g campaigns for people with cough to be screened, or
lowering thresholds for GPs to refer for suspected cancer), or d) new risk
(e.g. lowering risk threshold for treatment with Statins)

3.     Promise cure or salvation from death

4.     ‘Inculcate vulnerability’, fear, and invokes ‘the specter of death’

5.     Harm ‘some’ without any benefit (over-diagnosis)

6.     Cause harm that limits the individuals potential for living life,
(including personal financial toxicity, in privately funded care)

7.     Limit funding for, or diverts funding from, other more cost
effective services in budget limited public health services



If these apply, e.g breast cancer screening, Statins for primary
prevention, and lowering thresholds for GP referrals of symptoms for cancer
investigations, then:



1.     The empiricism that claims to be able to make these diagnostic
claims should not be believed

2.     Market/State sponsored and enabled public health policy should be
strongly distrusted

3.     We should know that the patient clinician decision-making processes
demanded couldn’t be democratic, no matter how much transparency or
information is provided (because over-diagnosis is unexperienceable and
therefore unimaginable, and devalued, at the personal level).

4.     Efforts to highlight the harms (e.g. by emphasising the scale of
over-diagnosis) are valuable, but alone are not enough, and if isolated may
just encourage belief in empiricism’s wilder delusions



Finally, then, so blood-letting was bad.   It rationale assumed that
disease, (after Broussais), was due to an excess of life’s normal state of
excitation or inflammation, but blood letting, eventually, could be shown
to increase mortality, and it was aimed, at least, at people who were
already suffering in the present, and in fear of their life.



Our contemporary crisis is a bit different, the underlying paradigm is
political, and is capitalism, especially neoliberalism, and the belief in
surplus, longevity, through exchanges with technology and expertise.
Neoliberalism uses empiricism to pathologise the asymptomatic in
increasingly productive ways. Our sense of ourselves in capitalism is
transformed to desire to be the patient who needs treatment, to be saved.
The anticipatory health care paradigm is that disease can always be
identified as a finite observation in even asymptomatic silent life, as
pathological.  This is its major misrecognition of the truth of the body
(Canguilhem), and it is applied to the well, uncomplaining, silent
majority.


Owen









Broussais, J. & Cooper, W. (1831) *On Irritation and Insanity*. Columbia:
SJM Morris.

Canguilhem, G. (1966) *The Normal and the Pathological*. New York: Zone
Books.

Hacking, I. (1990) The normal state. In *The Taming of Chance*: Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 160-169.

Morabia, A. (2006) Pierre-Charles-Alexandre Louis and the evaluation of
bloodletting. *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, 99(3): 3.




On Sat, Aug 5, 2017 at 11:21 AM, Bewley, Susan <[log in to unmask]>
wrote:

> Thank you very much owen for making our task clearer, and for helping me
> think about our local issue of the UK Age-X trial (the largest rct in
> history that keeps growing, now planning 6m participants, with no real
> research question at its heart and to which women are not asked to give
> fully informed consent).
>
> Given what you say, is it impossible to address this at the individual
> level, and/or can we draw upon history to find common themes/approaches? Is
> ALL (or most) screening a modern form of "blood-letting" based on utterly
> wrong paradigms - a painful purge with magical promise whereby the
> inconvenient facts of inefficacy and damage are ignored.  And, if so, can
> we be hopeful of finding a way forward in the rigourous academic study of
> defunct practices such as the use leeches to balance the humours?
>
> until the next profitable fantasy.....
>
> Susan Bewley  MA MD FRCOG
> Professor of Complex Obstetrics, Kings College London
> c/o Women's Health Academic Centre
> 10th floor North Wing, St Thomas' Hospital
> Westminster Bridge Rd
> London SE1 7EH
>
> Tel 020 7188 4138
> Fax 020 7188 1227
> Mob 07984 907 548
> Websites: http://kcl.academia.edu/susanbewley
> http://www.kcl.ac.uk/schools/medicine/research/hscr/staff/bewley.html
>
> P Please consider the environment before printing this e-mail!
> ------------------------------
> *From:* Evidence based health (EBH) <[log in to unmask]>
> on behalf of Owen Dempsey <[log in to unmask]>
> *Sent:* 24 July 2017 09:21:50
> *To:* [log in to unmask]
> *Subject:* Re: Rationality theories and decision making...
>
>
> Interesting paper. Just some quick draft thoughts
>
>
> As far as I understand it the paper and the theories always assume a
> certain conception of the human being. For your paper it seems as though
> this  individual is always able to know his or her own mind as if he is a
> stable unitary identity - as if he or she has a stable and fully aware
> sense of self, and does not fool him or herself by not knowing
> (disbelieving) things he actually knows.
>
>
> This is an alternative  perspective that thinks of the human being as
> intrinsically always struggling with a sense of self, identity, and so has
> a habit of 'latching on' to beliefs that provide a sense of meaning and
> stability (e.g. religion, but also any secular obsession can suffice: work,
> sport, other hobbies, and of course buying and selling, etc.) This is in
> contrast to the common concept of the rational human as Descartes' cogito,
> and its faith in its ability to know through science etc.  So this
> non-stable and, in a sense, divided subject does have a propensity to fool
> him or herself by not believing things he or she actually knows if it
> enables him or her to make meaning and construct a stable (ish) sense of
> self.
>
>
> Today many contemporary philosophers and thinkers out there think that
> capitalism provides the fantasy for this concept of the human being, and
> individual person,  to latch onto. The fantasy that surplus can be
> generated as long as we progressively innovate and exchange goods  in the
> free market. And this surplus, magically generated in exchange, includes
> surplus life, longevity. The individual is seduced by the promise of
> life-wealth through technologies that 'save life'.
>
>
> This fantasy enables us to know things 'very well' but to behave 'as if'
> they don't exist. Belief and knowledge, faith and reason, are divided.
>
>
> And it is suggested that this fantasy is supported by the irrationality
> (madness) at the core of the cogito, its megalomaniacal belief in its own
> all-knowing powers.
>
>
> So we need theories of irrational belief meaning making theory that takes
> the divided non-cogito subject as it's basis:
>
>
> Here is an example of what a I mean - it's a bit long so only delve if
> inspired:
>
>
> Take breast cancer screening and the issue of overdiagnosis:
>
>
> Choice, meaning and belief
>
>
> Overdiagnosis, as knowledge is 'true' but rendered meaningless
> (unbelievable) for decision makers under positivist and neoliberal
> capitalist pressures.
>
>
> It is  'evident', as in the Latin, e-videre, made to appear, but only as a
> ghostly phantom object, only through a mathematical negativity - the
> failure of screened diagnoses to be matched by cancer 'presentations' in a
> non-screened population, which only secondarily enables the deduction of
> an apparent excess of cancer diagnoses diffusely spread across a screened
> population.
>
>
> As an object overdiagnosis  is uniquely abstract, it cannot be defined as
> an individual object, it is a non-attributable event and  cannot be
> experienced as such by any identifiable person, it is not directly
> observable. Or in Descartes' words it is not 'clearly seen'.
>
>
> So for a positivist like (one of its protagonists) the philosopher, in the
> 1940s,  Rudolf Carnap, it is 'empirically meaningless'.
>
>
>
> The positivist rationality (version of what truth is) means overdiagnosis,
> as  abstract does not 'exist', as such, and therefore can only be
> 'tolerated' (Carnap) as a potential source of further useful ideas, but has
> no meaning or power to influence practical decision making at policy level.
>
>
> Liberalism lends a hand here by ensuring we are apparently free to govern
> ourselves in the name of national longevity and so  any socialist
> governmental tendencies are taboo.
>
>
> The state/expert/screening programme director etc. says we have clarity,
> we  'have a figure' for overdiagnosis so women have 'fair' information and
> can make a balanced. But this is disingenuous and politically/economically
> motivated, where Machiavelli's 'effective truth' is in the 'desired result'
> limited, by a specific (neoliberal positivist) gaze, to 'saving lives from
> cancer'.
>
>
> Instead:
>
>
> The woman's fear of death is evoked by screening invitations, just as, at
> the same time, her certainty of death, her certainty of mortality, is
> removed by the promise of salvation (the cure, and surplus life,  through
> early diagnosis), at the same time she is expected to face her mortality by
> being asked to consider and  imagine the screening process is faulty and to
> imagine experiencing something (overdiagnosis). To imagine, in other words,
> the combined pointless loss of her breast and a cancerful life, an event
> that is not actually experienceable by any individual. For her, fear
> mongering yet seductive establishment marketing pressures, as well as its
> unimaginable nature,  transforms overdiagnosis into an increasingly
> meaningless concept, which loses its power to resist the forces of
> capitalism, the screening cascade and dogma. This does not make for fair
> decision making.
>
>
> Therefore screening asymptomatic women for breast cancer is intrinsically
> exploitative because the decision making process can never be fair or
> balanced. The decision to have a screening programme is classically
> liberal, and capitalist, and positivist so can ignore overdiagnosis even as
> it says it has 'a figure'  for it.
>
>
> The irrationality is in empirical sciences assumption that it can pinpoint
> the threshold for disease in the asymptomatic person and the exploitation
> is in  the ruthless enslavement and destruction of women's bodies to
> maintain capitalist growth and expert power.
>
>
> The patient exposed to screening has symptoms dragged from her and is
> coerced into believing, the capitalist fantasy, and  in the salvatory
> powers of the cancer industry and into becoming just so much raw material.
>
>
> The rationality of positivism and of a liberalism founded on and
> maintained by a fear of death becomes a necropolitics of healthcare.
>
>
> The patient and doctor are intrinsically susceptible to capitalism's
> fantasy of the possibility of limitless acquisition of surplus life through
> the repetitive exchange of medical interventions. This is because we are at
> core always struggling with finding a sense of stable identity. Our
> identity is provided through making meanings and is always in flux. We
> should try to bear this in mind when we are implementing population based
> interventions that prey on our susceptibility to fantasy and belief.
>
>
> Owen
>
>
>
>
>
>>
>>
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>
>
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