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Dear Chuck and all, My apologies, the previous was a partially edited version. Terry == Dear Chuck, I think I’m understanding what you are saying. What you wrote seems to be addressing a different target. Instead of making the theoretical argument to explain, I’ll try to do it with an allegory. Imagine (or remember) old-style pre-digital product or architectural design with hand drawn paper drawings in sets that together made up each design. They were kept in plan cabinets. The drawings had the detail of the project, the drawing number, the drawing set of which they were part, amendment numbers and dates, standards, special notes (my favourite ‘remove all burrs’), projection type, manufacturing and material info, etc. Much of this meta-level information about the drawings is in the title block and other structures including conventions, standards, and structural/parametric relations between drawing elements. We use this meta and structural information to check, locate and validate drawings. For example, if you found a drawing on the floor, the details in the title block show which drawing set/design the drawing was from. Another example, if the total width of windows specified for a flat wall is more than the length of the wall, there is usually an error. Another example: if you found a car driver’s seat drawn upside down in a general assembly drawing, you would know there was an error. Another example, if a general assembly drawing or site plan showed items for which there were no drawings the design is incomplete. Ways of using meta and structural information to check for errors and completeness are independent of the detailed design content such as the style of window, the colour of the driver’s seat, the type of car, the style of architecture etc. Thus, you can distinguish between: 1. The product or building as built and used. 2. The drawings that together made the design for the product or building to be built 3. The meta-information and structures of the drawings This distinction between the above three has a parallel in definitions: 1. The product/building as built <==> the subject of the definition in the real world (e.g. real designers doing real designs). 2. The written description of the product/building (the drawings that together make up the design that fully and completely describes the product/building to be built) <==> the definition in words that fully and completely describes the entity that is being defined. 3. The meta-information about the drawings <==> the meta-level and structural information about the definition. In both case, it is item 3) that is the focus. This contrasts with discourses that focus on the actual content of the design, i.e. the shape and style of the building or product. You can do many tests and much validations of a design through the meta and structural -information of the drawings. To restate, in doing this, you do not need to know the details of what is drawn or designed. Similarly, for definitions, it is possible to do a meta-analysis of the structure of the definition, to test the validity or completeness of a definition without knowing the details of the meanings to which the definition refers A meta-analysis of a definition can indicate whether it contains the necessary structure to be a definition. Again, this does not require information about the detail of the meaning of the definition. The third item in each list is of interest to managers rather than practitioners. In the case of the meta-information about drawings it is the design manager. In the case of meta-information about definitions, it is of interest to those managing the validity of research. Now, back to your post. There are different groups of individuals associated with each of the above three different foci above. In order: 1. Users 2. Designers/researcher/manufacturers 3. Design/research manager What you described in your post relates to conceptualising the internal processes relating to thinking and emoting that each does about the foci of interest to them, and how they process the properties of objects to make sense of them. In essence, it is the analysis of the internalised properties of objects. This is different from analysis of the properties of the objects themselves as externalised (literally as ‘objects’). What I described instead refers to crude logical tests on the externalised properties that can be structured outside the internalised models. Regardless, these meta-level and structural also identify failures of definitions. Unless these cruder tests are satisfied, then the definitions are not valid as definitions regardless of any form of definatory meanings embodied in the statements. I can see that understanding how these externalised tests are processed internally and subjectively is addressed by your theory framing. I suggest though that the externalised testing of the definitions as invalid or incomplete does not require theorising in that manner. It would however, be useful to understanding how fallacies, partial statements, allegories and metaphors and informal definitions become interpreted as if they were formal, comprehensive and complete definitions. Warm regards, Terence --- Dr Terence Love Love Services Pty Ltd PO Box 226, Quinns Rocks Western Australia 6030 Tel: +61 (0)4 3497 5848 [log in to unmask] www.loveservices.com.au -- -----Original Message----- From: [log in to unmask] [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of CHARLES BURNETTE Sent: Thursday, 21 January 2016 2:32 AM To: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related research in Design <[log in to unmask]> Subject: [SPAM] Re: Definitions: testing structure rather than meaning Terry, A very interesting post that will take time to fully digest. But here is a start. A Theory of Design thinking holds that every human expression has meaning generated in a context under the interpretive influence of memory. . The circumstances that generate this expression and its interpretation are established by information coming from the body, brain, and environment. These signals establish a spatio-temporal structure interpreted in milliseconds through interaction with memory. The point here is that a structured and meaningful expression is generated before a conceptual analysis and linguistic definition can occur. Such an analysis depends on the prior existence of a meaningful expression. To become memorable and useful this expression must have been generated through the interpretation of incoming signals interacting with similar memories. Closure (boundedness) must exist to some degree if objects of thought in memory are to be recognized, mapped, identified, and recalled but this boundary can be arbitrary, loose, or tight as it depends on how the object is generated and adapted and edited later to serve a purpose. I’ll try to examine these thoughts in terms of your list of definitions and see where they lead. My intuitive bias is that both structure and meaning are harder to pin down and delimit in language unless the context and circumstances are overly defined and veritably unusable. I apply the same rubric to a definition as to define a purposeful thought. If it has information about a specific situation that fits an Intent regarding it, relevant objects of thought, a conceptual model to organize them, an expression that can appropriately communicate the intended meaning and affect, the capacity to execute a plan of action, evaluate its outcome in terms of its intent, and learn from, adapt, and apply experiential knowledge then that’s definition enough for any object of thought or thought. Or, so I believe, Chuck ----------------------------------------------------------------- PhD-Design mailing list <[log in to unmask]> Discussion of PhD studies and related research in Design Subscribe or Unsubscribe at https://www.jiscmail.ac.uk/phd-design -----------------------------------------------------------------