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Dear Chuck,

I think I’m understanding what you are saying.

What you wrote seems to be addressing a different target. Instead of making the theoretical argument to explain, I’ll try to do it with an allegory. 

Imagine (or remember) old-style pre-digital product or architectural design with hand drawn paper drawings in sets that together made up each design. They were kept in plan cabinets. The drawings had the detail of the project, the drawing number, the drawing set of which they were part, amendment numbers and dates, standards, special notes (my favourite ‘remove all burrs’), projection type, manufacturing and material info, etc. 

Much of this meta-level information about the drawings is in the title block and other structures including conventions, standards, and structural/parametric relations between drawing elements. 
We use this meta and structural information to check, locate and validate drawings.

For example, if you found a drawing on the floor, the details in the title block show which drawing set/design the drawing was from. 

Another example, if the total width of windows specified for a flat wall is more than the length of the wall, there is usually an error. 

Another example: if you found a car driver’s seat drawn upside down in a general assembly drawing, you would know there was an error. 

Another example, if a general assembly drawing or site plan showed items for which there were no drawings the design is incomplete.

Ways of using meta and structural information to check for errors and completeness are independent of the detailed design content such as the style of window, the colour of the driver’s seat, the type of car, the style of architecture etc.

Thus, you can distinguish between:

1.	The product or building as built and used. 
2.	The drawings that together made the design for the product or building to be built 
3.	The meta-information and structures of the drawings 

This distinction between the above three has a parallel in definitions:

1.	The product/building as built <==> the subject of the definition in the real world (e.g. real designers doing real designs). (Of interest to the reader of design theory).
2.	The written description of the product/building (the drawings that together make up the design that fully and completely describes the product/building to be built) <==> the definition in words that fully and completely describes the entity that is being defined. (Of interest to design researcher using 
3.	The meta-information about the drawings <==> the meta-level and structural information about the definition.

In both case, it is item 3) that is the focus – this contrasts with discourses that focus on the actual content of the design, i.e. the shape and style of the building or product.

You can do many tests and much validations of a design through the meta and structural -information of the drawings. To restate, in doing this, you do not need to know the details of what is drawn or designed.

Similarly, for definitions, it is possible to do a meta-analysis of the structure of the definition, to test the validity or completeness of a definition without knowing the details of the meanings to which the definition refers 

A meta-analysis of a definition can indicate whether it contains the necessary structure to be a definition. Again, this does not require information about the detail of the meaning of the definition.

The third item in each list is of interest to managers rather than practitioners. In the case of the meta-information about drawings it is the design manager. In the case of meta-information about definitions, it is of interest to those managing the validity of research.

Now, back to your post.

There are different groups of individuals associated with each of the above three different foci above. In order:

1.	Users
2.	Designers/researcher/manufacturers
3.	Design/research manager

What you described in your post relates to conceptualising the internal processes relating to thinking and emoting that each does about the foci of interest to them, and how they process the properties of objects to make sense of them. In essence, it is the analysis of the internalised properties of objects.

This is different from analysis of the properties of the objects themselves as externalised (literally as ‘objects’).

What I described refers to crude logical tests on the externalised properties that can be structured outside the internalised models. 

I can see that understanding how these externalised tests are processed internally and subjectively is addressed by your theory framing. I suggest though that the externalised testing of the definitions as invalid or incomplete does not require theorising in that manner. It would however, be useful to understanding how fallacies, partial statements, allegories and metaphors and informal definitions become interpreted as if they were formal, comprehensive and complete definitions.

Warm regards,
Terence

---
Dr Terence Love
PhD(UWA), BA(Hons) Engin. PGCEd, FDRS, PMACM, MISI
Love Services Pty Ltd
PO Box 226, Quinns Rocks
Western Australia 6030
Tel: +61 (0)4 3497 5848
[log in to unmask] 
www.loveservices.com.au 
--



-----Original Message-----
From: [log in to unmask] [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of CHARLES BURNETTE
Sent: Thursday, 21 January 2016 2:32 AM
To: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related research in Design <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: [SPAM] Re: Definitions: testing structure rather than meaning

Terry,
A very interesting post that will take time to fully digest. But here is a start.

A Theory of Design thinking holds that every human expression has meaning generated in a context under the interpretive influence of memory.  . The circumstances that generate this expression and its interpretation are established by information coming from the body, brain, and environment.  These signals establish a spatio-temporal structure interpreted in milliseconds through interaction with memory. The point here is that a structured and meaningful expression is generated before a conceptual analysis and linguistic definition can occur. Such an analysis depends on the prior existence of a meaningful expression. To become memorable and useful this expression must have been generated through the interpretation of incoming signals interacting with similar memories. 

Closure (boundedness) must exist to some degree if objects of thought in memory are to be recognized, mapped, identified, and recalled but this boundary can be arbitrary, loose, or tight as it depends on how the object is generated and adapted and edited later to serve a purpose. I’ll try to examine these thoughts in terms of your list of definitions and see where they lead. My intuitive bias is that both structure and meaning are harder to pin down and delimit in language unless the context and circumstances are overly defined and veritably unusable.  I apply the same rubric to a definition as to define a purposeful thought. If it has information about a specific situation that fits an Intent regarding it, relevant objects of thought, a conceptual model to organize them, an expression that can appropriately communicate the intended meaning and affect, the capacity to execute a plan of action, evaluate its outcome in terms of its intent, and learn from, adapt, and apply experiential knowledge then that’s definition enough for any object of thought or thought.

Or, so I believe,
Chuck
 
> On Jan 20, 2016, at 8:24 AM, Terence Love <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> 
> Hello,
> 
> 
> 
> Here is the first of three emails on definitions of design.
> 
> 
> 
> Definitions have two aspects:
> 
> 
> 
> *         Structure
> 
> 
> 
> *         Meaning
> 
> 
> 
> One of the puzzling things for me in the discussions to date. I have 
> been describing why the structure of definitions of design shows that 
> they fail as definitions. Responses have been primarily about meaning.
> 
> 
> 
> The validity of a definition depends primarily on its structure. 
> 
> 
> 
> The meaning of a definition depends on its structure.
> 
> 
> 
> For definitions, structure comes first, meaning can be allocated later.
> 
> 
> 
> For testing the validity of a definition, if its structure does not 
> fit the needs of what is required of a definition, then the definition 
> fails, regardless of any meanings in it.
> 
> 
> 
> Testing the validity of the structure of a statement that claims to be 
> a definition is the first step rather than looking at its meaning.
> 
> 
> 
> The structural requirements of any definition include:
> 
> 
> 
> 1.       The definition must describe a complete and continuous boundary in
> the realm of abstract concepts
> 
> 2.       This boundary must wholly contain some concepts and wholly exclude
> all other concepts
> 
> 3.       The definition must be wholly in the realm of theoretical concepts.
> For a definition, everything including physical and subjective 
> phenomena are addressed as abstract concepts.
> 
> 4.       The definition describes the boundary in such a way as to include
> only those concepts that are to be included and to exclude those 
> concepts that are to be excluded
> 
> 5.       The boundary defined in the definition must circumnavigate the
> boundaries of all concepts that are bounded in the definition
> 
> 6.       The boundary defined in definition must not cross the boundary of
> any concepts that are bounded in the definition.
> 
> 7.       The definition must be fixed in time i.e. the definition must
> remain consistent. In theory but extremely rarely in practice, a 
> definition could define a boundary that changed in time, although the 
> prescription of the definition of that boundary must remain fixed in 
> time. I know of no definition of design that attempts a dynamic boundary definition.
> 
> 8.       The terminology used in the definition must be unambiguous.
> 
> 9.       Where there is the possibility alternative meanings could be
> inferred from the definition, then the structure of the definition 
> must additionally include clauses that remove any ambiguities.
> 
> 10.   The boundary described in a definition must both include complete
> concepts and exclude complete concepts and the sum of the included 
> concepts and excluded concepts must be the universe of concepts.
> 
> 11.   The structure and meanings of the definition must not fail any of the
> tests for fallacies.
> 
> 12.   Any boundary defined in the definition must be singular. I.e. there
> must be only one of each type of boundary.
> 
> 13.   The boundary described by the definition must be of a necessary and
> sufficient nature. That is the elements of the description of the 
> boundary must all be necessary to defining whatever is defined, and 
> the elements of the description of the boundary must be sufficient to 
> include the concepts to be included and exclude those that are to be excluded.
> 
> 14.   There must not be contradiction between concepts included or excluded.
> For example, the definition of X is that it only exists as a sound and 
> is coloured blue.
> 
> 15.   Any form a definition must define exactly the same boundaries are any
> other form of the same definition.
> 
> 16.   The boundary defined must not include everything as it then no longer
> functions as a definition
> 
> 17.   The definition must not be tautological
> 
> The choice of concepts (i.e. the meaning of the definition) to be 
> included or excluded (i.e. the meaning of the definition) can occur 
> later. This choice of concepts is the meaning rather than the 
> structure of the definition.
> 
> 
> 
> The following are three examples of statements that fail structurally 
> as definitions.
> 
> 
> 
> Take, for example, the statement that a cat is an animal with four legs.
> Does this satisfy the structural requirements of being a definition as 
> listed above? The boundary surrounds the concepts of 'animal' and 
> 'four legged'. There are, however, other four legged animals than 
> cats, so the definition can be seen to fail on one hand because it is 
> insufficient, and on the other hand because to define 'cat' requires 
> that the boundary of the definition of 'cat' must  to cut across the 
> boundary of the concept of 'four legged' in some unspecified way.
> 
> 
> 
> Another example of a class of statements that structurally fail as 
> definitions are ones of the form, 'Design includes..' These 
> definitions fail structurally because the do not define a continuous 
> boundary that explicitly includes certain concepts and excludes 
> others. Without a fully defined boundary there is no definition.
> 
> 
> 
> A third example of a class of statements that structurally fail as 
> definitions are ones of the form, 'Design is what designers do.' This 
> form of statement fails structurally as a definition because the 
> boundary is incomplete and crosses conceptual boundaries. On one hand 
> it fails because effectively design would include everything that 
> designers do  and designers do many things that would not be included  
> in design activity (trim their toenails, watch television, sweep 
> floors.etc.). On the other hand, it fails because others who would be 
> not regarded as designers or doing design would be included because 
> they do many of the same activities that designers, and many of these 
> would not be regarded as being design activity. Third, it fails 
> because it crosses a conceptual boundary. Four, it fails because of 
> the implied tautology that 'Design is what designers do and what designers do is design'.
> 
> 
> 
> Without even beginning to explore the meanings included in any 
> definition of design, it is possible to test whether the statements 
> claimed to be a definition of design can actually function structurally as a definition.
> 
> It is on these grounds that I have been commenting on whether what is 
> claimed as definitions of design can function as definitions. First is 
> the test whether a statement claimed as a definition of design can 
> validly define anything or not. Any meanings contained in the 
> statements claimed as definitions are entirely secondary.
> 
> 
> 
> In the next of these three emails on definitions, I'll focus on the 
> statements that Simon and Merriam Webster claim as definitions of design.
> 
> 
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> Terence
> 
> 
> 
> ---
> 
> Dr Terence Love
> 
> PhD(UWA), BA(Hons) Engin. PGCEd, FDRS, PMACM, MISI
> 
> Love Services Pty Ltd
> 
> PO Box 226, Quinns Rocks
> 
> Western Australia 6030
> 
> Tel: +61 (0)4 3497 5848
> 
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]> [log in to unmask]
> 
> www.loveservices.com.au <http://www.loveservices.com.au>
> 
> --
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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