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Hi Roger. I have to take issue with the formulation here in this particular thread, with the understanding that in such a forum rapid formulations include necessary shorthand and assume a lot of background knowledge. Particularly, I think you are reinforcing and reifying one single idea by describing the idea as if it were a binary opposition, when you state, <snip> > prevalence simulations are taking in our digital world. The view that the world > is simulatable given enough computational power is a world metaphor which > is rapidly replacing the notion that one learns of the world through narration > and linear representation. </snip> First, I think the idea the some whole world is simulatable is problematic (I understand you are describing a general view and not your own.) Here is a link... http://arstechnica.com/science/2012/01/bowerbirds-woo-mates-with-a-lot-of-effort-and-a-little-illusion/ The link describes a bird's performative interaction with its environment. It is taking place within a human-built environment. Does the bird's performative expressivity lie in creating a simulation or a narration? Is it a narration of affect or a plain old lie? If the bird's expressivity is in interaction with its environment then the simulation may have to eliminate its conditions as a parameter. There is an art to constructing scientific simulations which must be selective about what parameters to include in s computation...and a bower-bird that creates optical illusions may be too much an outlier for a useful simulation. Let me chirp... But a computation is about a problem to be solved! The bird itself has a problem to solve! He computes through an "architectural" design that both conceals and reveals...and that tells a story about him! i have to be brief here, but I would also recommend the more recent insights of Stuart Kaufmann in his essay..."Evolution beyond Newton, Darwin, and entailing law: the origin if complexity in the evolving biosphere". published in book, *Emergence and the Arrow of Time* (also available as a video presentation on Vimeo.com or youTube) If I understand his thesis about "radical emergence", it is very close to the concepts developed by Manuel DeLanda...The creation of biosphere niches cannot be predicted. sorry this is so rushed....maybe better elaboration later. Barbara On Mar 17, 2014, at 4:52 AM, roger malina <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Ken victoria > > I would like to rebound on the question 'can non humans perform' with a broader > question 'is performance a characteristic of living organisms" and differ a bit > > my own take on this- and there is a huge literature and debate out there-is > that there is no way to define a conceptually clear boundary between living and > non living- that there are variations in degree and not in kind of > various characteristics- and systems that > have more of these characteristics exhibit more complex living behaviours - i > would cite some of stuart kauffman's writing > > ( note the boundary between human and non-human is clearer) > > which gets me to code as performance > > as many have written= the area computer based simulation has become > a very important strategy in science- where simulations often acquire the > status of hypotheses or even theory ( eg climate change, cosmology)- > and assumes a basic > idea that the universe is 'computable" > > in this frame- i want to argue that the codes of simulations do 'perform' > and of course the whole field of artificial life art explores this ( the VIDA > competition is 15 years old this year- a teenager ! > http://www.fundacion.telefonica.com/es/arte_cultura/vida/index.htm ) > > ken argues: > It is my view that thought and affect are elements of performance. > For this reason, my take on the issue is machines or inanimate artefacts > cannot perform, though we can program them to engage in activities > that we may construe as performance. > > > with the argument that 'thought and affect' are elements of performance and that > code cannot have these properties > > I wonder ! some of the personal robots that are being developed i > would think are beginning > to show 'affect' with personalised relationships with one particular > human and some simulation > systems are at least 'self reflexive' in a third order cybernetics sense > > david parry has an article on the ethics of code > > http://www.outsidethetext.com/articles/EthicsofCode.pdf > > which explores some of the points > > he states: > Clearly there is some slippage and overlap in terms here. For, from one angle > narrative is just one aspect of simulation. A dramatic re-enactment > or a staged > play is meant to simulate an event that is not present. From this perspective, > narrative is but a subset of simulation. But it is equally important > to distinguish > between these two representational modes, especially given the particular > prevalence simulations are taking in our digital world. The view that the world > is simulatable given enough computational power is a world metaphor which > is rapidly replacing the notion that one learns of the world through narration > and linear representation. > > roger malina > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Ken Friedman <[log in to unmask]> > Date: Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 2:10 AM > Subject: [NEW-MEDIA-CURATING] Can non-human entities perform? > To: [log in to unmask] > > > Dear Victoria, > > Reading your interesting post, I thought it might be interesting to > venture a brief note on the question, "Can non-human entities > perform?" > > If we look at this in philosophical terms, there are two ways to > consider it. One is to ask what kinds of entities can think or intend. > The other is to ask what kinds of entities possess agency, the > capacity to decide or purposefully pursue self-willed goals. My take > on it is that many kinds of non-human entities do these. > > Mary Catherine Bateson (1972: 104-120) relates an interesting story of > a horse learning. Many who live with intelligent dogs have the sense > that dogs can think, reason, and draw logical inferences of a kind > that we would call "theorising" were human beings to draw these > inferences and articulate them in written or spoken narrative. This is > certainly the case for many non-human primates. In the same way, I'd > argue that horses, dogs, and other non-human thinking entities can > perform purposely in response to others or to the environment, and do > so outside the bounds of instinctual activity. > > My experience of living with four dogs over a lifetime is that they > have all been thoughtful, though I don't believe that dogs think as we > think, and they don't usually think about the same things -- except at > dinner time, when all animals, human and non-human focus on food. It > is difficult to say how much or how often dogs think about themselves, > though I observe that dogs seem to have a sense of self and some > measure of self-awareness. All of my canine friends were playful, > though they differed in their interest in representing thinking or > play in a way that was specifically communicative or performative. > > Whether non-human entities can perform in the same way that humans > perform or for the same reasons is another matter. They cannot state > their views on this issue. > > It is my view that thought and affect are elements of performance. For > this reason, my take on the issue is machines or inanimate artefacts > cannot perform, though we can program them to engage in activities > that we may construe as performance. > > Best regards, > > Ken > > Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished Professor > | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia | > University email > [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Private > email [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Mobile > +61 404 830 462 | Academia Page > http://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman > > Guest Professor | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University > | Shanghai, China ||| Adjunct Professor | School of Creative Arts | > James Cook University | Townsville, Australia > > References > > Bateson, Mary Catherine. 1972. Our Own Metaphor. A Personal Account of > a Conference on the Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation. > New York: Knopf. > > > -