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On Mar 17, 2014, at 4:52 AM, roger malina <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > my own take on this- and there is a huge literature and debate out there-is > that there is no way to define a conceptually clear boundary between living and > non living- that there are variations in degree and not in kind of > various characteristics- and systems that > have more of these characteristics exhibit more complex living behaviours I would agree, and this is the reason I believe thinking about behavior instead of process is important. If we think process, it’s easy to think of code as “other,” as purely machinic, and therefore something non-human (even inhuman). If we think behavior, we are less susceptible in that we think performance and outcomes. It’s the “dog ate my homework!” phenomenon. By “othering” technology we can absolve ourselves and shift responsibility. It’s an unnecessary binarization of a more complex relationship. As you say, a difference of "degree, and not in kind." This is where, I think, Bernard Stiegler’s thoughts are worthwhile. Technology is a prosthetic, allowing for the “inorganic organization of memory,” but we are simultaneously the “neuronal” support for technology. I think Andrés Vaccari summarizes the paradox well: “The essence of the human, it seems, is the technical; which is paradoxically the other of the human: the non-human, the manufactured, unnatural, artificial; the inhuman even.” —The machine is simultaneously our essence. http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_17/article_08.shtml I have little doubt that simulations will one day show thought and affect. I would think that’s devastatingly scary for those who see machines purely as other, and perhaps less so for those who see them as essentially “us.” So, in response to Victoria's question, yes. To perform is not the sole province of humans, IMO. Jack On Mar 17, 2014, at 4:52 AM, roger malina <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > Ken victoria > > I would like to rebound on the question 'can non humans perform' with a broader > question 'is performance a characteristic of living organisms" and differ a bit > > my own take on this- and there is a huge literature and debate out there-is > that there is no way to define a conceptually clear boundary between living and > non living- that there are variations in degree and not in kind of > various characteristics- and systems that > have more of these characteristics exhibit more complex living behaviours - i > would cite some of stuart kauffman's writing > > ( note the boundary between human and non-human is clearer) > > which gets me to code as performance > > as many have written= the area computer based simulation has become > a very important strategy in science- where simulations often acquire the > status of hypotheses or even theory ( eg climate change, cosmology)- > and assumes a basic > idea that the universe is 'computable" > > in this frame- i want to argue that the codes of simulations do 'perform' > and of course the whole field of artificial life art explores this ( the VIDA > competition is 15 years old this year- a teenager ! > http://www.fundacion.telefonica.com/es/arte_cultura/vida/index.htm ) > > ken argues: > It is my view that thought and affect are elements of performance. > For this reason, my take on the issue is machines or inanimate artefacts > cannot perform, though we can program them to engage in activities > that we may construe as performance. > > > with the argument that 'thought and affect' are elements of performance and that > code cannot have these properties > > I wonder ! some of the personal robots that are being developed i > would think are beginning > to show 'affect' with personalised relationships with one particular > human and some simulation > systems are at least 'self reflexive' in a third order cybernetics sense > > david parry has an article on the ethics of code > > http://www.outsidethetext.com/articles/EthicsofCode.pdf > > which explores some of the points > > he states: > Clearly there is some slippage and overlap in terms here. For, from one angle > narrative is just one aspect of simulation. A dramatic re-enactment > or a staged > play is meant to simulate an event that is not present. From this perspective, > narrative is but a subset of simulation. But it is equally important > to distinguish > between these two representational modes, especially given the particular > prevalence simulations are taking in our digital world. The view that the world > is simulatable given enough computational power is a world metaphor which > is rapidly replacing the notion that one learns of the world through narration > and linear representation. > > roger malina > > > > ---------- Forwarded message ---------- > From: Ken Friedman <[log in to unmask]> > Date: Sun, Mar 16, 2014 at 2:10 AM > Subject: [NEW-MEDIA-CURATING] Can non-human entities perform? > To: [log in to unmask] > > > Dear Victoria, > > Reading your interesting post, I thought it might be interesting to > venture a brief note on the question, "Can non-human entities > perform?" > > If we look at this in philosophical terms, there are two ways to > consider it. One is to ask what kinds of entities can think or intend. > The other is to ask what kinds of entities possess agency, the > capacity to decide or purposefully pursue self-willed goals. My take > on it is that many kinds of non-human entities do these. > > Mary Catherine Bateson (1972: 104-120) relates an interesting story of > a horse learning. Many who live with intelligent dogs have the sense > that dogs can think, reason, and draw logical inferences of a kind > that we would call "theorising" were human beings to draw these > inferences and articulate them in written or spoken narrative. This is > certainly the case for many non-human primates. In the same way, I'd > argue that horses, dogs, and other non-human thinking entities can > perform purposely in response to others or to the environment, and do > so outside the bounds of instinctual activity. > > My experience of living with four dogs over a lifetime is that they > have all been thoughtful, though I don't believe that dogs think as we > think, and they don't usually think about the same things -- except at > dinner time, when all animals, human and non-human focus on food. It > is difficult to say how much or how often dogs think about themselves, > though I observe that dogs seem to have a sense of self and some > measure of self-awareness. All of my canine friends were playful, > though they differed in their interest in representing thinking or > play in a way that was specifically communicative or performative. > > Whether non-human entities can perform in the same way that humans > perform or for the same reasons is another matter. They cannot state > their views on this issue. > > It is my view that thought and affect are elements of performance. For > this reason, my take on the issue is machines or inanimate artefacts > cannot perform, though we can program them to engage in activities > that we may construe as performance. > > Best regards, > > Ken > > Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished Professor > | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia | > University email > [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Private > email [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]> | Mobile > +61 404 830 462 | Academia Page > http://swinburne.academia.edu/KenFriedman > > Guest Professor | College of Design and Innovation | Tongji University > | Shanghai, China ||| Adjunct Professor | School of Creative Arts | > James Cook University | Townsville, Australia > > References > > Bateson, Mary Catherine. 1972. Our Own Metaphor. A Personal Account of > a Conference on the Effects of Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation. > New York: Knopf. > > > -