Absolutely Brian. And I thank Paul for his recognition that the process isn’t about defining every moment and facet of the change, but learning along a dynamic path. I also think Alastair is right to remind us of the dehumanising impacts of violence.
My reading of Chris Hedges book is happening at a time I am working part-time in an academic environment on climate change issues and the work is hopelessly pointless and anti-intellectual in it’s naïve and depoliticised approach to climate change. I know this quite idiotic conceptualisation of the problem is not unique to the department I work in. I have been involved in getting climate change on to the sociology agenda and again, it is an absolutely laughable mess. All academic activity in this area seems predicated on denial of the self-evident truths about power relations. Chris Hedges says what was once an intellectual class which posed some challenges to power has in the 20th century retreated into the pursuit of comfort and material reward and abandoned any allegiance to ‘the people’.
Alongside that I can absolutely see that the response to climate change will be geo-engineering, thereby removing the last vestiges of a political dimension to the debate.
I guess I am just airing frustrations here, rather than offering any solutions. It is just having worked hard to pursue this debate within academia, I am now faced with the realisation that the university is no different than any other corporate actor and so does not offer any (a) solution to the political trajectory of our times or (b) offer any means of earning money doing what I believe in.
Chris
From: Brian Orr [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: 13 March 2013 15:26
To: Christopher Shaw
Cc: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Distribution of carbon emissions in the UK: Implications for domestic energy policy
Christopher,
I do not think we should flinch from using the term 'class war'. The richest 1% are waging the most draconian class war 'ever' in terms of the sheer numbers of poor people around the globe who are being trampled underfoot, literally in many instances, or deprived of their livelihoods in others, by the corporations running on the back of investments of those who prefer to do their trampling one step removed. And leading the pack are the fossil fuel barons who completely disregard the momentous consequences of taking us to the very edge of 'planetary survivability' in the interest of whom? Their share-holders?
The indigenous indians of Canada reacted to the recent 'edict'* of the most right-wing government of the 'Western' democracies by declaring, in effect, "enough was enough", and succeeded in facing down their government. Would the indians have considered they were involved in a form of class war?
*The 'edict' was that the historical founding treaty between said indians and the Europian settlers be torn up to allow Canadian tar-sands to be exploited.
Whether we're talking about the 'classic' class war that Marx wrote so much about is an open question, but undoubtedly 'capitalism' is a major component here and the 'neo-cons' are having nearly all their own way. If we think the ballot-box will
be the answer to our problems think again. Until we have a majority of totally honest politicians who can see their way past the deeply tragic sham that lies in the focus on economic growth, democracy is a dead duck.
"They" are in the process of destroying mankind's future, even if for the most part not intentionally. But through the steadfast pursuit of their own selfish interests they are succeeding anyway.
Teddy Goldsmith once said that if he had been asked to come up with a system that would destroy the planet in the shortest possible time, he thinks he would have come up with capitalism.
Regards,
Brian
On 13 Mar 2013, at 14:10, Christopher Shaw <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
OK, there seems some merit in your proposition. But the elites are fighting a class war and will kill, imprison and/or destroy anything or anyone who threatens their privilege. If someone were to frame their social change agenda in terms of ‘class justice’ they would be denigrated by the media, if they weren’t ignored entirely, as fighting a class war. Every retreat from that engagement is a victory for the neo-liberal paradigm. JRF, in framing the situation in the manner they do, say, ‘this far, and no further’.
Confession – I have not found a way of framing my work in terms of class war and fear in so doing what little traction I might gain would evaporate instantly. I am conflicted, between the paths of truth and justice, and the path, not of power and privilege, but comfort and some social status. I am therefore the problem. Do I give up this path, go and work as a shelf stacker in Tesco and in my spare time conduct class war from behind my keyboard?
Chris
From: Alastair McIntosh [mailto:mail@AlastairMcIntosh.com]
Sent: 13 March 2013 13:46
To: 'Christopher Shaw'; [log in to unmask]
Subject: RE: Distribution of carbon emissions in the UK: Implications for domestic energy policy
But does it have to be “class war”? Why the violent metaphor? Whose agenda does it serve? It only makes those of us who see class as a pressing issue sound like extremists .
How about “class justice”? How can we put class on the agenda without sounding like headbangers?
A
From: Discussion list for the Crisis Forum [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Christopher Shaw
Sent: 13 March 2013 13:43
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: Distribution of carbon emissions in the UK: Implications for domestic energy policy
Chris Hedges, in his Pulitzer Prize winning book ‘Death of the Liberal class’ argues it is necessary to use the language of class war in our efforts to build a more just and fair world. I regret such language is absent from this report.
It is difficult to treat credibly the claim such language should be avoided so as not to alienate the public from engagement with climate policy.
Chris
From: Discussion list for the Crisis Forum [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of George Marshall
Sent: 13 March 2013 12:11
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: FW: Distribution of carbon emissions in the UK: Implications for domestic energy policy
A very interesting report. We know there is a very strong correlation between income and emissions but it is striking to see it mapped out, especially in regards to cars and international travel. I am convinced that the relationship between flying and income (combined with the lack of any potential for technological salvation) is one of the main reasons that flights are consistently marginalised from discussions about climate change and policy except for some strange deckchair shuffling emissions trading which, we are told, now means that it doesn’t make any difference whether we choose to floy or not
George
13 March 2013
How are carbon emissions distributed across households in Great Britain and what are the implications for energy and climate change policy?
The UK Government has a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050. In addition, there are statutory targets to ensure that no household is in fuel poverty by 2016. To ensure policies are both fair and effective, it is fundamental that we understand how current and proposed policy approaches to meeting these targets are likely to impact differentially on domestic energy consumers.
This project uses advanced modelling techniques to look at:
· the distribution of carbon emissions – from energy consumed in the home and through personal travel by car, public transport and aviation – across households in Great Britain;
· the impact of existing Government energy and climate policies on consumer energy bills and household emissions in England;
· the potential for an alternative approach to reducing emissions in the domestic sector through a wide-scale retrofit of the housing stock. More detail is available in a separate paper The distribution of household CO2 emissions in Great Britain by the same team.
This study examines the distribution of carbon emissions across households in Great Britain and implications for energy and climate change policy. It assesses the fairness and effectiveness of policies to reduce domestic emissions and explores an alternative approach.
· Household carbon emissions in Great Britain are strongly related to income: the richest 10 per cent of households emit three times that of the poorest 10 per cent from energy use in the home and personal travel.
· Current policies to reduce household carbon emissions have inequitable impacts: the average impact on household energy bills in England in 2020 is a 7 per cent reduction for the poorest 10 per cent and a 12 per cent reduction for the richest 10 per cent. This represents a triple injustice: the lowest income households pay more, benefit less from policies and are responsible for the least emissions.
· Anticipated decline in household energy bills in 2020 relates, in part, to potentially optimistic savings from improvements in product efficiency (i.e. appliances and lighting). If these are not realised, household energy bills in 2020 could rise by 4 per cent on average.
· The Feed-in Tariff (FIT) stands out as highly regressive: 12 per cent of households, with an average annual income of £62,389, are expected to benefit from FIT by 2020, by around £360 per year, but this is funded from all household energy bills and non-domestic customers who do not benefit.
· Current policies are expected to deliver a 45-million-tonne reduction in carbon dioxide emissions. Further emissions reductions are required after 2020 to meet targets.
· An alternative scenario to improving England’s housing stock gives a potential reduction of around 77 million tonnes. Low-income households would receive measures free, funded through taxation, carbon pricing mechanisms, means testing Winter Fuel Payments, and a Green Deal charge on wealthier households.
The UK Government has a target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80 per cent on 1990 levels by 2050. In addition, there are statutory targets to ensure that no household is in fuel poverty by 2016. An understanding of how current and proposed policy approaches to meeting these targets are likely to impact differentially on domestic energy consumers is fundamental in ensuring policies are designed to be both fair and effective.
In terms of understanding fairness, it is important to take the pre-existing distribution of emissions into account. This is highly correlated with household income: the richest 10 per cent of households emit twice that of the poorest 10 per cent from energy consumed in the home. If emissions from personal travel (including private vehicle, public transport and aviation) are included, this differential increases even further: the richest 10 per cent of households emit 16 per cent of all emissions, while the poorest 10 per cent emit only 5 per cent of the total.
Several factors influence the distributional impacts of a policy, or group of policies. These include the overall implementation costs, which types of household are most likely to benefit, and the way in which the costs are recovered (e.g. per unit of energy, per customer, via taxation, etc.). Figure 1 (see pdf document) illustrates the income distribution of the impact of current Government policy on English household energy bills in 2020. This gives three average energy bills for each income decile: (1) in the absence of carbon reduction policies; (2) with current Government policies to reduce emissions, with the exception of product policy (i.e. excluding assumed improvements in energy efficiency standards of appliances); (3) with current Government policies to reduce emissions, including product policy.
Overall this shows that bills are expected to decline on average if Government assumptions about policy performance are correct i.e. product policy and Green Deal take-up. On a realistic set of assumptions about product policy, Government policies are most likely to benefit those households contributing most to emissions. This is because they are expected to have higher take-up rates of renewable energy measures and are less likely to use electricity to heat their homes. Electricity carries a higher proportion of the future policy costs and is a more predominant heating fuel in lower-income households.
When modelled independently of each other (one policy at a time) the impact and notably regressive nature of certain policies becomes more apparent. For example, households benefiting directly from FIT – some 12 per cent in the scenario modelled in this study – are notably higher income (36 per cent of the top income decile) and see an average saving of £359 on their annual energy bill in 2020. However, the remaining 88 per cent of the population pay for the policy at an average cost of £10 a year on their 2020 energy bill.
This study analysed the effectiveness of policy in terms of the extent to which it is expected to deliver the carbon reductions required by Government and Climate Change Committee targets. The table below sets out the results for current policy with and without assumptions regarding product policy. This shows that current policies are expected to meet 2020 targets only if assumptions regarding policy impacts, particularly product policy, are borne out. If not, there will be an approximately 8-million-tonne carbon dioxide (MtCO2) shortfall.
The study then asked the question ‘What would a fully-funded, fair and effective policy to reduce carbon emissions from household fuel use look like?’ An alternative policy scenario approach was modelled, to incorporate a wide-scale retrofit of the English housing stock, with optimum combinations of housing energy performance measures deployed, whilst avoiding the regressive distributional impacts of the current approach to policy cost recovery.
Table 1 shows that the optimisation of housing improvements results in total carbon reductions of 60 per cent on 1990 levels, which equates to around 77 million tonnes by 2030 (the modelled year for policy completion). This is significantly more than the savings expected from existing policies by 2020. However, cost recovery for such an ambitious and capital intensive policy needs to be carefully designed to avoid regressive impacts. A combination of revenue sources were explored including income tax, upstream carbon pricing mechanisms, savings from means testing of the Winter Fuel Payment and a Green Deal charge on the bills of wealthier households i.e. income deciles 5 and above. The programme achieves a progressive overall result as low income households receive free measures and householders who receive measures last do not face a significant rise in energy costs to pay for the benefits experienced by others. The programme requires a significant investment of £293 billion between 2012 and 2030 (the equivalent of around £17 billion per year) with 39 per cent being raised by Green Deal finance and the remainder from income tax and other sources; however, this translates to 150,000 new jobs and fuel bill savings of over £1.52 billion in 2020 alone.
In 2010, official Government figures estimated there were 3.5 million households in fuel poverty in England. This could rise to 4.9 million by 2020 without any energy interventions; however, if Government policy performs as they expect, this could be reduced to 3 million in 2020. Adopting the alternative scenario for retrofitting the housing stock could reduce fuel poverty to 2.8 million in 2020 (part way through the roll-out of measures) with a further reduction to 2.4 million by 2030 (when the works are complete). Under the proposed Hills Review definition of fuel poverty, a household is fuel poor if it has a low income and faces high energy costs i.e. above the median for all households. As a result, fuel poverty numbers vary less between the different scenarios. The new headcount measure has been criticised by fuel poverty experts due to a lack of responsiveness to fuel prices and a median cost threshold that is too high i.e. it may lead to an underestimation of the real experience of fuel poverty.
Current approaches to reducing household emissions appear to be less than fair in terms of the income distribution of their costs and benefits, and unlikely to deliver the required emissions reductions. This injustice is accentuated by the fact that richer households emit more than their ‘share’ of carbon but contribute less than their share to the policy costs of cutting emissions. Despite falling short of the 80 per cent reduction on 1990 emissions required by 2050, this study shows that a deeper programme of retrofit can achieve significantly higher savings than those expected from current Government policy i.e. 60 per cent compared to 41 per cent by 2030. This retrofit would cost around £293 billion, which could be raised from a combination of taxation, carbon revenues and a Green Deal charge on the bills of wealthier households, with progressive results.
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