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Hi Ken,

 One of the positions in making theory is to base it on empirical evidence.
That is, regardless of how much it may not be how we think things  should
be, we make heory based on what is empirically there and then focus on
conceptualising it  and represented frugally  (Occam) in a 'necessary and
sufficient' manner.

Some of the recent discussion  relating to humans and knowing/knowledge
seems to be along the path of assuming  the theory outcome and then fitting
the argument and justification to suit. To those who do not think the same
way, this justification  often appears to be  in a circulatory manner in the
style of logical tautologies.  That is, of  logical argument phrased in ways
to make negation 'unsatisfiable'. One of this style of recent underlying
arguments seems to be something like:

1.  It appears Design might be best defined as a human activity because it
involves human agents' knowledge and their knowing.
2.  ' Using the verb "knowing" is helpful when we want to keep an 'active
being' in the picture, a being that knows'
3.  Design therefore must be defined as a wholly human activity because it
depends on the knowing of a human active being.

Instead, as a thought experiment at least,  how about dropping the idea that
it is humans that design and that knowledge/knowing is any part of the
theory? Could you still make a comprehensive  theory of design that would
fully represent all aspects of what happens?

An alternative  theory development path that avoids presuming humanistic,
knowledge-based assumptions about design-related activities might go
something like:

1. Design could be theorised about in many ways involving humans, machines,
information, other animals and anything else that there is evidence that
design-related activity depends on.
2. 'Knowledge' and 'knowing' have been proposed as elements of defining
design. Are they appropriate, essential (necessary and sufficient), usefully
explanatory and predictive or are they unduly restrictive, unhelpful or
misleading to finding a sound theory base?
3. Would other concepts provide a theoretically more representative and
predictive basis for activities involved in creating designs?
4. How can we best decide between the different possibilities of conceptual
foundations for making theories about design-related activities?
5. etc. . . 

Like Tim, during the 1990s I built on  the Newell Knowledge level path. It
makes lots of sense but/and also fits sweetly, perhaps too sweetly and
inter-dependently,  with ICT en-cultured models of computer architecture,
information management, network information flows, robotics and AI. 

Moving on from Newell, the new evidence from cognitive neuro-science offers
different kinds of insights into design and humanness and a better
conceptual starting point for creating Design theory. Cognitive
neuro-science offers other ways of seeing what it is to be human and the
physiology of how humans emote,  feel and come to creative ideas. It  points
in a different direction to the folk- psychology of academic theories of
knowledge and knowing (Plato, Socrates and Nonaka - personally I feel Ibn
Sina and Ibn Khaldun go better down this track anyway). Using recent
insights from neuro-science  points away from having 'knowledge' as
'entities' with a 'knower'  that become a kind of emoting bounded- rational
processor  of 'knowledge' (which to me seems way too robotlike and inhuman).
The evidence from neuro-science is increasingly pointing to a  path that
goes towards being much more detailed about those activities that are
rather currently lumped under  'knowing' and 'being a knower' and 'having
knowledge'. To get there in a coherent theory of design seems to require
letting go of the concepts of 'knowledge' and 'knower' as being too general
and unspecific.   I realise this latter claim  is not as well justified in
this email as it could be, but the email is long enough as it is.

Best wishes,
Terry

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-----Original Message-----
From: PhD-Design - This list is for discussion of PhD studies and related
research in Design [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ken
Friedman
Sent: Thursday, 15 November 2012 8:39 PM
To: Dr Terence Love
Subject: Re: Meta-Language and Terminology

Dear Kari,

Thanks for reminding me about Blackler. The sources on which he drew were
also useful.

Using the verb "knowing" is helpful when we want to keep an active being in
the picture, a being that knows. At the same time, the noun "knowledge" is
also useful The noun "knowledge" represents what a knowing being knows when
knowledge is embodied within the being. The contrast to this use of the word
"knowledge" with the word "information," a word that describes disembodied
representations of knowledge.

This is a key point in Plato's Phaedrus. Socrates sees knowledge as an
active mental process - knowing, in Blackler's terms. Socrates opposes
writing as a dangerous illusion because it represents knowledge in an
inactive form. Writing is inactive knowledge, mere information that
"pretends to establish outside the mind what in reality can only be in the
mind . . . writing reifies, it turns mental processes into manufactured
things" (Rose 1992: 62).

Perhaps that's too decisive a perspective, but it captures a Socratic
understanding: the knowing being is the only one who can truly know.
Information has valuable uses, but the debate in Phaedrus offers a powerful
comment on the intersection ofknowing, doing, and being.

Yours,

Ken

Professor Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished
Professor | Swinburne University of Technology | Melbourne, Australia |
[log in to unmask] | Phone +61 3 9214 6102 |
http://www.swinburne.edu.au/design

--

Reference

Rose, Steven. 1992. The Making of Memory: From Molecules to Mind. New York:
Anchor Doubleday.

--

Kari Kuutti wrote:

-snip-

knowledge is indeed an overloaded and easily misused word, and information
would have been a more accurate term. We computer people are especially
prone towards reification of knowledge - that has been plaguing the
knowledge management field since its inception. The issue is treated very
well in Frank Blackler's classic paper on knowledge management, where he
ends up in suggesting that we should drop the term "knowledge" and use
"knowing" instead - to not to lose the knowing actor from our sight.

Blackler, Frank (1995) Knowledge, knowledge work and organizations: an
overview and interpretation. Organization Studies vol 16 no 6, pp. 1021-1046

http://pure.au.dk/portal-asb-student/files/825/Bilag_6_-_Knowledge__knowledg
e_work_and_organizations.pdf

-snip-




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