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Very interesting comment Ken. If I understand you correctly, you seem to suggest that part of our ability to project is conditioned to the notion of human mortality and our ephemeral condition. What makes this a strong philosophical question, especially considering design and project as fundamentally a thinking about the future in someways. If im not wrong, another question that seems implicit in this comment is that part of our human ability to project (and to think, act, etc) depends on our embodied connection with the world. (and externalism versions to Philosophy of mind and computationalism). This reminds me of the Movarec's paradox, and his historical influence on artificial inteligence thinking about how important are the bodies (and therefore Sensimotor apparatus, etc.) for the development of machines that may seem or simulate the behavior of human beings in efficient way. As Moravec said: "it is comparatively easy to make computers exhibit adult level performance on intelligence tests or playing checkers, and difficult or impossible to give them the skills of a one-year-old when it comes to perception and mobility." Paradigms about manipulating symbols are historically faced by the philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences, which can be traced back since Craik, Alan Turing (and turing's Machine) until the present, with new theories, that include the Chinese Room Experiment, among others. Thanks for share Marcio Rocha On Sun, Jun 19, 2011 at 6:03 AM, Ken Friedman < [log in to unmask]> wrote: > Dear All, > > Before Terry responds to my last post, I'm going to preempt the question of > mechanical entities making genuine design decisions with a simple argument. > > Any genuine design decision requires judgment. This depends on phronesis, > the exercise of applied wisdom based on experience, ethical distinctions, > and embodied knowledge. Putting this another way, for the "designerly" > aspect of many design decision we address and rely on the hermeneutical > quality of decisions that engage the embodied faculties that one can find in > human beings and perhaps in some other animals that develop the repertoire > of understandings that emerge from living through time in an experiential > and historically contingent life world. In humans, this gives rise to the > critical faculties and sensibilities that allow us to decide on or to > determine the preferred future states that are the goal of design decisions. > Among the conditions for developing this foundation for judgment, we have > the senses, and the empathic ability to engage in symbolic and social > interaction of a kind that machines will never be able to replicate until > they can replicate the feeling and consequences of emotional and sensible > engagement in the world of those whom designers serve when we design. > > Machines and automated systems can take on many tasks formerly requiring > human skill and intelligence. This means that machines and automated systems > can take over some specific design tasks, performing specified activities as > the mechanical amanuenses of designers. > > Design and design decisions, including certain forms of creativity and > generative thinking, are another matter. These require judgment. I do not > see how machines or automated systems can take on the characteristics and > responsibilities of embodied judgment. To do this, they would need to take > on the bodies and mortality of human subjects. > > The entire trope of the judgmental automaton rests on the fact that these > entities cannot think or judge as we do because they lack the qualities that > make us human. From the Golem and Frankenstein's Monster to Asimov's robots > and the Terminator, the differences between these imagined creatures and > human beings shed light on what it is that makes us human. > > The ability to design is one of the qualities that makes us human. Without > rehearsing a full argument for design as a way of knowing different to and > comparable to the sciences, the humanities, and the creative arts, I'd argue > that the capacity to design is not likely to be replaced by machines. That's > like saying a computing machine can do mathematics, as contrasted with > saying that a computing machine can perform mathematical operations. > Mathematical operations can be completely described in algorithmic form and > computers can perform them. Doing mathematics requires philosophy and > judgment, something computers do not yet possess and likely never will. So > it is with the difference between performing many of the operations > associated with design and doing design. One involves identifying and > applying algorithms. The other requires choosing and working toward > preferred future states on behalf of a client or in service of a goal. > > Yours, > > Ken > > Professor Ken Friedman, PhD, DSc (hc), FDRS | University Distinguished > Professor | Dean, Faculty of Design | Swinburne University of Technology | > Melbourne, Australia | [log in to unmask] | Ph: +61 3 9214 > 6078 | Faculty www.swinburne.edu.au/design > -- Marcio Rocha Transtechnology Research University of Plymouth, UK http://trans-techresearch.net/researchers/marcio-rocha +0 7553 614185 Federal University of Brazil Visual Arts Faculty Graphic design Department www.fav.ufg.br www.ufg.br