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University of Toronto Law Journal Volume 61, Number 2 /2011 is now available
at 

http://utpjournals.metapress.com/content/h6874wxn1186/

 

Special Issue: Understanding Law on its Own Terms: Essays on the Occasion of
Ernest Weinrib's Killam Prize

This issue contains: 

 

Editor's Note

Arthur Ripstein        

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.i

 

Ernie's Three Worlds

Bruce Chapman        

 

This article is the text of an introductory address presented at the Faculty
of Law on 23 October 2009 in celebration of Professor Ernest Weinrib's
receiving the 2009 Killam Prize, Canada's most distinguished annual award
for outstanding scholarly achievement. It offers a very personal
interpretation of the contributions that Weinrib has made to private-law
scholarship over the last thirty years and is organized around three closely
related questions that he has addressed in his work: What is a theory? What
is a theory of law? and What is a theory of private law? His answers to
these different questions land Weinrib in three different worlds - the world
of the university, the world of the law school, and the world of legal
practice - but it is Weinrib's special contribution as a legal philosopher
to have brought all three much closer together.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.179

 

Private Law And Public Right

Ernest J Weinrib      

 

In Kant's philosophy of law "public right" refers to the condition in which
public institutions guarantee rights. This lecture deals with the
relationship between public right and the rights of private law. In
accordance with corrective justice, private law links the parties to a
transaction bilaterally, so that they are subject to correlatively
structured bases of liability. In contrast, public right is omnilateral,
linking everyone to everyone else. Two normative ideas inform public right:
publicness (that public institutions secure everyone's rights on the basis
of reasons that can be known and acknowledged by all) and systematicity
(that the norms and institutions of law form a systematic whole). In
standard cases public right makes no difference to a private law controversy
except to add the dimensions of publicness and systematicity. In some
circumstances, however, public right alters the principle on which a court
resolves a controversy, without, however, changing the structure and content
of the private-law right itself. Kant himself pointed out that publicness
can have this effect, as he illustrated in his discussion of market overt.
Systematicity operates similarly, sometimes extending and sometimes
narrowing the effect of the plaintiff's right. For instance, the tort of
inducing breach of contract expands the effect of the promisee's right by
securing it against everyone. On the other hand, the privilege to preserve
property, exemplified in the controversial case of Vincent v Lake Erie,
narrows the effect of the plaintiff's right by subjecting it to conditions
that justify its infringement. The effect of public right is to make right
holders reciprocally determining participants in the legal system, thereby
transforming private law into a community of rights.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.191

 

Formalism In Music And Law

Allan Beever  

 

Though apparently dead and buried for decades, formalist approaches to law
appear to be gaining ground within the academy. This advance, however, has
been strongly resisted by proponents of the alternative, functionalist,
view. To many of them, formalism seems open to devastating, and indeed
obvious, criticisms. In this article, I argue that these criticisms are
without force, as they are based on misunderstandings concerning the
formalist project. I demonstrate this by comparison with formalist
approaches to another subject matter: music. In that area, too, formalism
initially faced considerable challenge, but it survived to become the
dominant view. It is submitted that the popular criticisms of formalism
examined herein are no barrier to a similar outcome for formalism with
respect to law. In that way, this article is intended as a defence and
celebration of the path-breaking work of Ernest Weinrib.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.213

 

The Idea Of Consideration

Peter Benson  

 

No doctrine of the common law of contract has been longer settled or more
carefully developed than consideration. Yet none has proved more intractable
to theoretical justification. This article suggests that the problem is not
with consideration but rather with the theories that defend or challenge it,
theories not equipped to explain the doctrine because they invoke functions
and purposes that do not belong to the specific kind of relation that
consideration necessarily establishes. In contrast with current approaches,
the article argues that consideration is not a control device that, for
various policy reasons, negatively excludes certain prima facie enforceable
promises. Rather, it is constitutive of a kind of interaction that is the
only basis on which parties may reasonably be held to have undertaken fully
contractual obligations enforceable by expectation remedies. The article
sets out the main features of the promise for consideration relation; then
seeks to explain the juridical meaning and role of this relation; and
finally brings out the contrast with reliance.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.241

 

Private Law And Kantian Right

Alan Brudner  

 

In The Idea of Private Law, Ernest Weinrib sought to rescue private law's
autonomy from functionalism's reduction of private law to an instrument of
the public interest. The twin ideas he employed for this purpose were
corrective justice and Kantian Right. According to Weinrib, corrective
justice provides private law's unifying structure, while Kantian Right
supplies its normative content. In this essay, I argue that Kantian Right
cannot be the normative complement to the corrective-justice form of private
law because, with the exception of trespass to the person, private law
vanishes in Kantian Right. I argue that there is no possibility for an
autonomous private law in Kantian Right and that there is, indeed, a logical
progression from Kantian Right to the very functionalism that Weinrib
opposes.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.279

 

Legal Positivism As An Idea About Morality

Martin Stone  

 

I ask what a proper critical target for 'legal positivism' might be. I argue
that utilitarian moral theory, and more generally fully directive moral
theories, are unacknowledged motivations for legal positivism. Contemporary
debate about 'the nature of law' is, historically speaking, much more of a
footnote to utilitarianism than has been recognized.

 
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DOI: 10.3138/utlj.61.2.313

 

  _____  

 

The University of Toronto Law Journal, founded in 1935, is the oldest
university law journal in Canada. It continues to represent the broad and
visionary approach to legal scholarship which was initially announced by
W.P.M. Kennedy, the first editor of the Journal, when he ventured the hope
that its publication would foster a knowledge of comparative laws 'not
merely as substantive or adjectival systems, but as expressions of organized
human life, of ordered progress, and of social justice.' 

 

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