Ian
I think we're in pretty close agreement :)
> -----Original Message-----
> From: This list is for those interested in Data Protection issues
> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ian Welton
> Sent: 07 January 2011 11:35
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Passwords question
>
> On 07 January 2011 at 07:21 Andrew Cormack said:
>
> > I can reassure you
> there are at least two of us ;)
>
> There will undoubtedly be more, which
> created the puzzlement.
>
> > If you're talking about businesses
> encrypting the master copy of their data...
>
> It seems we are confusing
> encryption with password management and access control. I am speaking
> mainly of the later irrespective of encryption use, but used the former
> for examples. I see the deletion of data no longer required is nothing
> more than good data management practice. Having secondary access to the
> passwords on the other hand raises the issues you outline in your next
> paragraph
>
> > I very much agree that all of those... If someone else
> has stored material on my system that is likely to come to the
> attention of a RIPA Part III request then I'd rather not be able to
> decrypt it, thanks!
>
> My experience has shown that many system
> administrators only adopt that stance in that type of personally
> threatening circumstance. The nature of the role otherwise frequently
> indicates access is gained/granted and occasionally misused.
It shouldn't be. My views on how sysadmin powers ought to be used are on the web, and endorsed by UCISA, the representative body for university and college IT directors. See http://www.ja.net/development/legal-and-regulatory/regulated-activities/charter-for-system-administrators.html. A number of universities now have something based on that in their employment contracts for that type of post, and I understand the document has also been promoted within SOCITM.
> > I agree
> the scenario is a good one for thinking about the balance of security
> threats...
>
> I myself was thinking of the many privacy issues which are
> clearly illustrated by the case including the values and perceptions
> which resulted in the manipulation of the media, (the original press
> release.) Our own different perspectives presented during this
> discussion illustrate some of the richness of the content.
>
> I disagree
> that they all come down to the issue of key management. A complex set
> of issues prior to and separate from that have created this situation
> and associated continuing developments surrounding the wider areas of
> accountability/responsibility and proof/prove. Unfortunately this is
> something which in my opinion the legal system currently finds itself
> bound to continue progressing and that is of interest to me in some
> social contexts of my privacy research, hence this email thread which
> from some perspectives has been answered more by silence than
> contributions.
Sorry, my fault for phrasing my point badly. What I meant to say was that I think the great majority of these issues are non-technical.
And I very much agree that the legal system sometimes struggles to cope. Hardly surprising as I, despite past jobs as both sysadmin and head of a security team, often have to think carefully what can be inferred from given evidence, and what can't! (Incidentally all the specific issues around RIPA Part III were rehearsed exhaustively both when the Act was passed and when that part was enabled, so it wasn't for lack of trying that the law didn't end up better than it is). Good to hear that there are people trying to help make things better.
Cheers
Andrew
>
> Ian W
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: This list is
> for those interested in Data Protection issues [mailto:data-
> [log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Andrew Cormack
> Sent: 07 January
> 2011 07:21
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [data-
> protection] Passwords question
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From:
> This list is for those interested in Data Protection issues
> > [mailto:
> [log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ian Welton
> > Sent: 06
> January 2011 12:21
> > To: [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: Re:
> Passwords question
> >
> > Yes RIPA does. The discussions on the legal
> blogs focused on the
> > viability of presenting any 'forgotten'
> defence. (Notwithstanding
> > medical evidence of a memory disorder).
> Those discussions questioned
> > any ability to be able to maintain an
> effective 'sorry I have
> > forgotten' defence. They should be available
> via a search using
> > factors contained in the link provided. (Having
> been focusing on
> > financial and academic worlds over the last year I
> did not myself save
> > all the
> > links.)
> >
> > One has to accept the
> juries findings could probably be based upon
> > softer information
> available within the courtroom. One of the odd
> > things is that I
> myself deliberately do put in a password intending
> > not to remember
> it when occasionally finally closing electronic
> > accounts down, and I
> also forgot some passwords when first obtaining
> > and learning how to
> use PGP and utilising long passwords. (I found
> > memory management
> differs between long and short passwords) So it is
> > difficult to
> believe I am the only person who follows such a practice
> > or has
> experienced that type of forgetfulness.
>
> I can reassure you there are
> at least two of us ;)
>
> > Any other responses from the
> > list will be
> interesting as the questions remain valid.
>
> If you're talking about
> businesses encrypting the master copy of their data and relying on a
> single person remembering the key then I'd have thought that business
> continuity was a bigger risk than a RIPA Part III challenge. But the
> right solutions to that include enterprise encryption systems that do
> key management properly, providing multiple routes to decrypt the data,
> for example by a two (or more) key emergency recovery process. If the
> concern is staff using their own encryption tools on their own data
> then I'd suggest either a policy that prohibits that, or else mandates
> regular checks that they can decrypt it and, if not, immediate deletion
> of the files (which are scrap anyway, since the person can no longer
> decrypt them).
>
> > I do find it
> > interesting that nobody has yet raised
> the issue of access to a
> > persons passwords not being acceptable
> because of the levels of access
> > that provides, or that other access
> mechanisms are generally
> > available. (To enable legal procedures only
> requires read access.) All
> > of which leaves open the interpretation
> that passwords, whilst being a
> > part of security, are being perceived
> as more of an accountability
> > mechanism than a security one. (I am
> deliberately disregarding
> > situations where they may be widely shared
> anyway.)
>
> I very much agree that all of those (including
> accountability) are problems with shared *login* passwords (though a
> pragmatic approach will quickly spot that those with access to the
> backup copy of the passwords may be sysadmins who can easily break into
> users' accounts anyway). But for *encryption* passwords there is also
> the problem, if they are shared, that the unfortunate person who might
> be able to access to the backup copy can easily be accused of having
> *created* the encrypted file. If someone else has stored material on my
> system that is likely to come to the attention of a RIPA Part III
> request then I'd rather not be able to decrypt it, thanks!
>
> > For info,
> if it is useful to
> > anybody, this case does provide a particularly
> good case study
> > illustrating many different facets of the privacy
> paradigm.
>
> I agree the scenario is a good one for thinking about the
> balance of security threats (I use it in my own courses!), though there
> are sufficient peculiarities around the specific case that I'm not sure
> I'd cite it directly. But questions of whether it is better to have
> material destroyed than divulged (which is the assessment that should
> lead to a decision to encrypt) and how to manage access thereafter, are
> well worth exploring, and a lot more complex than the simple slogan of
> "use encryption" might lead you to believe. They almost always come
> down to key management, which is a human/policy issue, rather than a
> technological one, though technology can help.
>
> Cheers
> Andrew
>
> > Ian W
>
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Andrew
> Cormack [mailto:Andrew.
> > [log in to unmask]]
> > Sent: 05 January 2011 17:43
>
> > To: Ian Welton; data-
> > [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: RE:
> Passwords question
> >
> >
> > Ian
> > RIPA
> > part III definitely allows
> forgetfulness as a defence (s53(3)).
> > However the blog suggests that
> the question in this case was actually
> > whether it was plausible that
> someone would use such an unmemorable
> > password (40-50 *random*
> characters, the blog suggests) and not write
> > it down. The jury
> appear to have concluded that it wasn’t plausible,
> > therefore there
> must be a written copy somewhere that the defendant
> > was refusing to
> disclose. So the defendant failed to "adduce
> > sufficient evidence to
> raise an issue" of whether he was still in
> > possession of the
> (written) password.
> >
> > There are ways of generating memorable
> passwords of that length that
> > don't need to be written down (the
> passphrase for my digital signature
> > is of that order), but using a
> random number generator doesn't seem to
> > be one of them.
> >
> > Andrew
>
> >
> > --
> > Andrew Cormack,
> > Chief Regulatory Adviser, JANET(UK)
> > Lumen
> House, Library Avenue,
> > Harwell, Didcot. OX11 0SG UK
> > Phone: +44 (0)
> 1235 822302
> > Blog: http://webmedia.company.ja.net/edlabblogs/regulatory->
> developments/
> >
> > JANET, the UK's education and research network
> >
> >
> JANET(UK) is a
> > trading name of The JNT Association, a company limited
> by guarantee
> > which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and
> whose Registered
> > Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell
> Science and
> > Innovation Campus, Didcot, Oxfordshire. OX11 0SG
> >
> >
> >
> > -----Original
> > Message-----
> > > From: This list is for those
> interested in Data
> > Protection issues
> > > [mailto:data-
> [log in to unmask]] On Behalf
> > Of Ian Welton
> > > Sent: 05
> January 2011 17:11
> > > To: data-
> > [log in to unmask]
> > >
> Subject: Re: Passwords question
> > >
> > > The
> > issue started as a
> discussion over ethical reporting and the
> > > ethics
> > of
> organisational press releases, so most of the
> > >
> >
> coverage/discussions pertained to those areas, with legal blogs also
> >
> >
> > debating if forgetfulness could be an acceptable defence.
> > >
> > >
> It was
> > conjectured that
> > > some of the issue for the courts was the
> strength of
> > encryption.
> > >
> > > A
> > > reasonably full media write up
> was:-
> > > http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/10/police-
> drage-
> > > password-sex
> > >
> > > A Happy New Year to all.
> > >
> > > Ian W
>
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