> -----Original Message-----
> From: This list is for those interested in Data Protection issues
> [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ian Welton
> Sent: 06 January 2011 12:21
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: Passwords question
>
> Yes RIPA does. The discussions on the legal blogs focused on the
> viability of presenting any 'forgotten' defence. (Notwithstanding
> medical evidence of a memory disorder). Those discussions questioned
> any ability to be able to maintain an effective 'sorry I have
> forgotten' defence. They should be available via a search using factors
> contained in the link provided. (Having been focusing on financial and
> academic worlds over the last year I did not myself save all the
> links.)
>
> One has to accept the juries findings could probably be based
> upon softer information available within the courtroom. One of the odd
> things is that I myself deliberately do put in a password intending not
> to remember it when occasionally finally closing electronic accounts
> down, and I also forgot some passwords when first obtaining and
> learning how to use PGP and utilising long passwords. (I found memory
> management differs between long and short passwords) So it is difficult
> to believe I am the only person who follows such a practice or has
> experienced that type of forgetfulness.
I can reassure you there are at least two of us ;)
> Any other responses from the
> list will be interesting as the questions remain valid.
If you're talking about businesses encrypting the master copy of their data and relying on a single person remembering the key then I'd have thought that business continuity was a bigger risk than a RIPA Part III challenge. But the right solutions to that include enterprise encryption systems that do key management properly, providing multiple routes to decrypt the data, for example by a two (or more) key emergency recovery process. If the concern is staff using their own encryption tools on their own data then I'd suggest either a policy that prohibits that, or else mandates regular checks that they can decrypt it and, if not, immediate deletion of the files (which are scrap anyway, since the person can no longer decrypt them).
> I do find it
> interesting that nobody has yet raised the issue of access to a persons
> passwords not being acceptable because of the levels of access that
> provides, or that other access mechanisms are generally available. (To
> enable legal procedures only requires read access.) All of which leaves
> open the interpretation that passwords, whilst being a part of
> security, are being perceived as more of an accountability mechanism
> than a security one. (I am deliberately disregarding situations where
> they may be widely shared anyway.)
I very much agree that all of those (including accountability) are problems with shared *login* passwords (though a pragmatic approach will quickly spot that those with access to the backup copy of the passwords may be sysadmins who can easily break into users' accounts anyway). But for *encryption* passwords there is also the problem, if they are shared, that the unfortunate person who might be able to access to the backup copy can easily be accused of having *created* the encrypted file. If someone else has stored material on my system that is likely to come to the attention of a RIPA Part III request then I'd rather not be able to decrypt it, thanks!
> For info, if it is useful to
> anybody, this case does provide a particularly good case study
> illustrating many different facets of the privacy paradigm.
I agree the scenario is a good one for thinking about the balance of security threats (I use it in my own courses!), though there are sufficient peculiarities around the specific case that I'm not sure I'd cite it directly. But questions of whether it is better to have material destroyed than divulged (which is the assessment that should lead to a decision to encrypt) and how to manage access thereafter, are well worth exploring, and a lot more complex than the simple slogan of "use encryption" might lead you to believe. They almost always come down to key management, which is a human/policy issue, rather than a technological one, though technology can help.
Cheers
Andrew
> Ian W
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Andrew Cormack [mailto:Andrew.
> [log in to unmask]]
> Sent: 05 January 2011 17:43
> To: Ian Welton; data-
> [log in to unmask]
> Subject: RE: Passwords question
>
>
> Ian
> RIPA
> part III definitely allows forgetfulness as a defence (s53(3)). However
> the blog suggests that the question in this case was actually whether
> it was plausible that someone would use such an unmemorable password
> (40-50 *random* characters, the blog suggests) and not write it down.
> The jury appear to have concluded that it wasn’t plausible, therefore
> there must be a written copy somewhere that the defendant was refusing
> to disclose. So the defendant failed to "adduce sufficient evidence to
> raise an issue" of whether he was still in possession of the (written)
> password.
>
> There are ways of generating memorable passwords of that
> length that don't need to be written down (the passphrase for my
> digital signature is of that order), but using a random number
> generator doesn't seem to be one of them.
>
> Andrew
>
> --
> Andrew Cormack,
> Chief Regulatory Adviser, JANET(UK)
> Lumen House, Library Avenue,
> Harwell, Didcot. OX11 0SG UK
> Phone: +44 (0) 1235 822302
> Blog: http://webmedia.company.ja.net/edlabblogs/regulatory-
> developments/
>
> JANET, the UK's education and research network
>
> JANET(UK) is a
> trading name of The JNT Association, a company limited by guarantee
> which is registered in England under No. 2881024 and whose Registered
> Office is at Lumen House, Library Avenue, Harwell Science and
> Innovation Campus, Didcot, Oxfordshire. OX11 0SG
>
>
> > -----Original
> Message-----
> > From: This list is for those interested in Data
> Protection issues
> > [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf
> Of Ian Welton
> > Sent: 05 January 2011 17:11
> > To: data-
> [log in to unmask]
> > Subject: Re: Passwords question
> >
> > The
> issue started as a discussion over ethical reporting and the
> > ethics
> of organisational press releases, so most of the
> >
> coverage/discussions pertained to those areas, with legal blogs also
> >
> debating if forgetfulness could be an acceptable defence.
> >
> > It was
> conjectured that
> > some of the issue for the courts was the strength of
> encryption.
> >
> > A
> > reasonably full media write up was:-
> > http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2010/10/police-drage-
> > password-sex
> >
> > A Happy New Year to all.
> >
> > Ian W
>
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