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Hi All – I was just wanting to add a bit more Dewey stuff to a great
discussion with fantastic posts

The “logical version of pragmatism” (Dewey, Essays in Experimental Logic,
1916, p. 331) that Dewey espoused (and which we often employ in support of
models of experiential learning) was also complemented by his notion of
“esthetic experience” (Dewey, Art as Experience, 1934, p. 274), which we
rarely hear mentioned in discourses associated with experiential
learning/education.

“Esthetic experience is experience in its integrity. Had not the term ‘pure’
been so often abused in philosophic literature, had it not been so often
employed to suggest that there is something alloyed, impure, in the very
nature of experience and to denote something beyond experience, we might say
that esthetic experience is pure experience. For it is experience freed from
the forces that impede and confuse its development as experience; freed,
that is, from factors that subordinate an experience as it is directly had
to something beyond itself. To esthetic experience, then, the philosopher
must go to understand what experience is” (Art as experience, p. 274).

Aesthetic experience, experience directly had, “immediate” experience, was a
central problem for Dewey in his philosophizing. Such experience was
characterized not by reflective thinking, but by affective or “qualitative
thinking” (Qualitative thought, 1930, p. 18) - i.e., thinking as feeling, or
feeling as a form of thinking (“non-reflective”  thinking [Essays in
Experimental Logic, 1916, p. 137fn]). If we take Dewey’s “general features
of reflective experience” (Democracy and Education, 1916, p. 176), which
expressed his logical version of pragmatism (and supports models of
experiential learning), we can glimpse how steps 1 and 5 are concerned with
emergence of a problem within aesthetic experience, and return to aesthetic
experience. Dewey’s sense of a situation is important here.

“They are (i) perplexity, confusion, doubt, due to the fact that one is
implicated in an incomplete situation whose full character is not yet
determined; (ii) a conjectural anticipation – a tentative interpretation of
the given elements, attributing to them a tendency to effect certain
consequences; (iii) a careful survey (examination, inspection, exploration,
analysis) of all attainable consideration which will define and clarify the
problem in hand; (iv) a consequent elaboration of the tentative hypothesis
to make it more precise and more consistent, because squaring with a wider
range of facts; (v) taking one stand upon the projected hypothesis as a plan
of action which is applied to the existing state of affairs: doing something
overtly to bring about the anticipated result, and thereby testing the
hypothesis” (Democracy and education, p. 176).

So the process is not linear as A to B, but circular as A to A’, anchored in
aesthetic experience (A). Dewey grappled with this notion of aesthetic
experience but was hampered by a linear sense of time. A linear sense of
time renders immediate experience as ineffable; “the immediacy of experience
is ineffable” (Experience and nature, p. 73), as any reflective thinking
(analysis) of it is always analysis of something in the past. In other
words, immediate experience is not immediately accessible if time is only
thought as linear. However a non-linear, non-processual sense of time, time
as understood phenomenologically by Heidegger, does enable further thinking,
qualitative thinking (phenomenological), of aesthetic experience, of
being-there (Dasein). In this sense Dasein is aesthetic experience. It is
not non-linear in the sense of being complex (as this is still a
cause-effect way of thinking as in reflective experience) but rather as
simple – the simple aesthetic unity of our being-there as we go about our
lives every day (before and after any need for problem solving). Heidegger
acknowledged that the simple is the most difficult.

In education, Dewey’s aesthetic experience was expressed in his notions of
occupation and interest, which he had difficulty communicating because they
were perceived to be vocational education as we know it today, or interest
as sugar coating and pandering. But this is not what he meant (as we know).
Vocational education was education as preparation, anathema to Dewey’s
understanding of education. Yet Dewey espoused “education through
occupations” (Democracy and education, p. 361) as how education should be
conducted. If we think of experiential education in this way, as anchored in
an interest as occupation, aesthetic experience, from within which the
problems that participants (as those engaged in an occupation – “the
experience”) encounter emerge, then this may help us to better understand
what it is we do. Learning is then phenomenological building of be-ing
(aesthetic experience), as well as construction of knowledge (reflective
experience). Both are held together in communion in the phenomenon of
experience: phenomenology and pragmatism; aesthetic experience and
reflective (scientific) experience.

Anyway, I’ve rambled on a bit; hope it makes some sense. But I think it is
important to note that discourses of experiential learning/education really
only scratch the surface of Dewey’s philosophizing.

Cheers

John Quay



On 8/9/10 8:56 PM, "Roger Greenaway" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

> Hi outres,
> 
> I think I have been a little inconsistent in this thread.
> * Yes I do think linear process models are over-rated and over-used (and I
> think Kolb himself says so too, but the best I can do on this point is spread
> a rumour - which I know is not good scholarship :-[, so I'd love to know if
> anyone can quote chapter and verse on this). I think I have been consistent in
> questioning linear process models.
> * But I have been a bit ambivalent about whether the vacuum or questions left
> behind should be just that, or whether it would be interesting/useful to look
> at what the relevant theoretical landscape would look like if we were to rely
> significantly less on such models - and then to be deliberately creative with
> what we see. 
> On the one hand it seems negative (and even irresponsible) to criticise
> without offering an alternative. But on the other hand it seems a bit arrogant
> (and possibly missing the point) to try making a model or new arrangement of
> existing models. I confess to being more comfortable in critical mode than I
> am in creative mode (especially if there is a reasonable chance that searching
> the literature will reveal that someone has been there before and that a good
> alternative already exists). And while confessing, I should add that when a
> question arouses such interest on outres, this process becomes a lazy (but
> very stimulating) way of 'searching the literature'.
> 
> So it was a delight to discover Jason's 'Experience, Reflect, Critique: The
> End of the „Learning Cycles‰ Era'. Thank you Jayson. And here I can quote.
> Jayson writes: "the pattern of „experience-reflect-learn‰ might be considered
> an ideology of experiential learning rather than a philosophy or a theory of
> experiential learning. In its time, this framework served a useful purpose.
> However, given changes in knowledge, research methods, participant
> populations, societal trends, and educational goals, it might now be
> influencing research and practice in unhelpful ways." Jayson tackles the issue
> from many perspectives. I would add.
> * The issue of the one track mind. Learning is a multilinear process and (I
> believe) our brains are multilinear processors. Intuitive leaps, flashes of
> insight, aha moments (frequently reported in OAE) seem to challenge the value
> of representing learning as a linear (or even multilinear) process.
> Implication: review/reflection that is purely cognitive is like trying to play
> a round of golf with just a putter.
> * The issue of learning vs. development. For some reason the concepts of
> 'learning' and 'development' tend to be represented by different kinds of
> model. The clearest example of this is in Kolb's 1984 book where he uses a
> tiered cone to represent development. Such representations are by no means
> immune from criticism, but maybe 'development theory' is more applicable than
> 'learning theory' in OAE where the focus is typically on personal and social
> development. 
> * The issue of how we name 'learners'. Robyn suggests questioning how we
> construct learners and  learning in outdoor and experiential education. Maybe
> referring to them differently (eg as 'person', 'actor' or 'participant') would
> lead to different and more holistic kinds of theorising?
> * The issue of the optimal balance between 'experience' and
> 'reflection/processing'. Pfeiffer and Jones have said that it is "axiomatic"
> that the processing stages of the experiential learning cycle "are even more
> important than the experiencing phase". They even urge facilitators to be
> careful that the activity "does not generate excess data". Now, climbing a
> mountain or descending whitewater would surely be just the kind of experiences
> which would "generate excess data"! There is clearly an enormous difference
> between a way of working which advocates keeping experiences down to a
> reviewable size, and a way of working which is founded upon a philosophy of
> adventure.  (Echoes of Jayson's suggestion that the learning cycle might be
> more ideology than theory - perhaps the learning cycle and OAE are 'strange
> bedfellows'?) 
> Robyn draws our attention to the 'bits in between':  [when] 'talking to
> students about what they think will stay with them from their experiences it
> often seems to be  the bits in between'. This is very similar to what I found
> in my research with managers taking part in outdoor programmes. But it is not
> clear to me whether this provides an opportunity to step away from models and
> theories because they cannot (or do not yet) capture what really matters - or
> whether further enquiry into the 'bits in between' is itself a process of
> model-making?
> 
> Roger
> 
> Roger Greenaway
> Reviewing Skills Training
> < http://reviewing.co.uk <http://reviewing.co.uk/> >


-- 
John Quay
Lecturer
Melbourne Graduate School of Education
The University of Melbourne
VIC, 3010, Australia
T: +61 3 8344 8533 / M: 0438 048 955 / F: +61 3 8344  8515
E: [log in to unmask]
http://www.edfac.unimelb.edu.au/profile/John.Quay
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