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The research on belief vs fact that was described in a recent news release from University of Buffalo (New York, USA) might be useful, though it doesn't deal specifically with EBM -- they used a political topic to explore "motivated reasoning" -- but I feel this key statement from the news release applies equally well to the application of EBM:
 
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"Our data shows substantial support for a cognitive theory known as 'motivated
reasoning,' which suggests that rather than search rationally for
information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular belief,
people actually seek out information that confirms what they already
believe.

"In fact," he says, "for the most part people completely ignore
contrary information.
<<
 
Full text of the news release, with URL to the original, appears below.
 
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STUDY DEMONSTRATES HOW WE SUPPORT OUR FALSE BELIEFS

A belief in link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11 is a case in point;
false beliefs stirred by current health care debate may be another


Release date: Friday, August 21, 2009
Contact: Patricia Donovan, [log in to unmask]
Phone: 716-645-4602
Fax: 716-645-3765

BUFFALO, N.Y. -- In a study published in the most recent issue of the
journal Sociological Inquiry, sociologists from four major research
institutions focus on one of the most curious aspects of the 2004
presidential election: the strength and resilience of the belief among
many Americans that Saddam Hussein was linked to the terrorist attacks
of 9/11.

Although this belief influenced the 2004 election, they claim it did
not result from pro-Bush propaganda, but from an urgent need by many
Americans to seek justification for a war already in progress.

The findings may illuminate reasons why some people form false beliefs
about the pros and cons of health-care reform or regarding President
Obama's citizenship, for example.  

The study, "There Must Be a Reason: Osama, Saddam and Inferred
Justification" calls such unsubstantiated beliefs "a serious challenge
to democratic theory and practice" and considers how and why it was
maintained by so many voters for so long in the absence of supporting
evidence. 

Co-author Steven Hoffman, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor of
sociology at the University at Buffalo, says, "Our data shows
substantial support for a cognitive theory known as 'motivated
reasoning,' which suggests that rather than search rationally for
information that either confirms or disconfirms a particular belief,
people actually seek out information that confirms what they already
believe.

"In fact," he says, "for the most part people completely ignore
contrary information.

"The study demonstrates voters' ability to develop elaborate
rationalizations based on faulty information," he explains.

While numerous scholars have blamed a campaign of false information and
innuendo from the Bush administration, this study argues that the
primary cause of misperception in the 9/11-Saddam Hussein case was not
the presence or absence of accurate data but a respondent's desire to
believe in particular kinds of information.

"The argument here is that people get deeply attached to their
beliefs," Hoffman says.

"We form emotional attachments that get wrapped up in our personal
identity and sense of morality, irrespective of the facts of the
matter. The problem is that this notion of 'motivated reasoning' has
only been supported with experimental results in artificial settings.
We decided it was time to see if it held up when you talk to actual
voters in their homes, workplaces, restaurants, offices and other
deliberative settings."

The survey and interview-based study was conducted by Hoffman, Monica
Prasad, Ph.D., assistant professor of sociology at Northwestern
University; Northwestern graduate students Kieren Bezila and Kate
Kindleberger; Andrew Perrin, Ph.D., associate professor of sociology,
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; and UNC graduate students
Kim Manturuk, Andrew R. Payton and Ashleigh Smith Powers (now an
assistant professor of political science and psychology at Millsaps
College). 

The study addresses what it refers to as a "serious challenge to
democratic theory and practice that results when citizens with
incorrect information cannot form appropriate preferences or evaluate
the preferences of others." 

One of the most curious "false beliefs" of the 2004 presidential
election, they say, was a strong and resilient belief among many
Americans that Saddam Hussein was linked to the terrorist attacks of
Sept. 11, 2001.

Hoffman says that over the course of the 2004 presidential campaign,
several polls showed that majorities of respondents believed that
Saddam Hussein was either partly or largely responsible for the 9/11
attacks, a percentage that declined very slowly, dipping below 50
percent only in late 2003.

"This misperception that Hussein was responsible for the Twin Tower
terrorist attacks was very persistent, despite all the evidence
suggesting that no link existed," Hoffman says.

The study team employed a technique called "challenge interviews" on a
sample of voters who reported believing in a link between Saddam and
9/11. The researchers presented the available evidence of the link,
along with the evidence that there was no link, and then pushed
respondents to justify their opinion on the matter. For all but one
respondent, the overwhelming evidence that there was no link left no
impact on their arguments in support of the link.

One unexpected pattern that emerged from the different justifications
that subjects offered for continuing to believe in the validity of the
link was that it helped citizens make sense of the Bush
Administration's decision to go to war against Iraq.

"We refer to this as 'inferred justification,'" says Hoffman "because
for these voters, the sheer fact that we were engaged in war led to a
post-hoc search for a justification for that war.

"People were basically making up justifications for the fact that we
were at war," he says.

"One of the things that is really interesting about this, from both the
perspective of voting patterns but also for democratic theory more
generally, Hoffman says, "is that we did not find that people were
being duped by a campaign of innuendo so much as they were actively
constructing links and justifications that did not exist.

"They wanted to believe in the link," he says, "because it helped them
make sense of a current reality. So voters' ability to develop
elaborate rationalizations based on faulty information, whether we
think that is good or bad for democratic practice, does at least
demonstrate an impressive form of creativity."

The University at Buffalo is a premier research-intensive public
university, a flagship institution in the State University of New York
system and its largest and most comprehensive campus. UB's more than
28,000 students pursue their academic interests through more than 300
undergraduate, graduate and professional degree programs. Founded in
1846, the University at Buffalo is a member of the Association of
American Universities.


See this article online at: http://www.buffalo.edu/news/10364

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For more information please see the UB News Services
web site at http://www.buffalo.edu/news
******
[end of copied news release]
 
Peggy Noonan
www.pjnoonan.com
@pjnoonan
 
 
 
In a message dated 12/4/2009 11:05:33 A.M. Mountain Standard Time, [log in to unmask] writes:
I'm a freelance journalist, and I'm writing a piece examining pushbacks against evidence-based medicine (for instance, see the latest mammogram controversy in the U.S.) 

In particular, I'm exploring the role of belief in the uptake of EBM. In my reporting, I've found that new scientific evidence is often rejected when it contradicts strongly held (but erroneous) beliefs. It's not that people don't see the evidence, it's that they don't believe it (or they don't believe that it applies to them). 

I'm looking for research on the role of belief systems in the uptake of EBM. Has anyone studied ways to defeat scientifically wrong but strongly held beliefs via narrative? The idea being, that in some cases it's not the evidence itself that convinces, but instead, the story or narrative constructed from the evidence. How can new evidence be more effectively communicated when it contradicts established practice?

cheers,
Christie

Christie Aschwanden
Freelance writer






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