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I think the only thing that i'd take issue with here is the assertion of artifacts having properties, but that depends on what one means by properties. For ANT, there aren't 'essential properties' there are just associations/relations amongst things, ideas, etc. I suppose one could form a type of ANT with an essentialist instead of a relational epistemology, but I think that might end up having different problems. I think that if one heads in the direction of essentialism then one does end up tied into constructions of agency and subjectivity that must be, or not be attributed in some way to artifacts. I think that if we stay toward the relationalist models, we avoid that and we can then assign agency as a relation if it is necessary after our analysis. I guess i just don't know about that word 'property' as it could mean many things, some of which won't fit very well with the principle of symmetry that requires equal treatment of objects/subjects/quasi- objects/quasi-subjects in the analytical field. If we have an essential property, such as agency, that is attributed to things only with other essential properties, reason, intention, and memory, then we can't treat things with that essential property similar things that do not. However, with the agnostic account of relations, we don't attribute such necessary relations, unless they are demonstrated in some way. That said... there is quite a lot to say about networks that has nothing to do do with actor-network theory or relational epistemologies and ontologies and there are models of networks that do take into account agency and essential properties, they just aren't actor-network theory as i understand it. On Apr 23, 2009, at 11:44 AM, Victor Margolin wrote: > Hello everyone: > I would like to add something to the network discussion. I find > actor network theory helpful in creating analyses of how complex > actions occur. I think the question is how much agency to attribute > to artifacts. They have properties that contribute to action > outcomes and in that sense can be included in systemic analyses of > such outcomes. But Klaus is right in distinguishing human agency > from artifact properties. The problem becomes more complex, however, > as devices and systems are invented to replace human agency as in an > ATM machine instead of a bank teller, on-line shopping instead of a > music store and on and on. I have previously made a distinction > between human-human exchanges and machine-human exchanges, arguing > that machines may substitute for humans but they are less flexible. > In this age of economy, many managerial types are hoping to replace > humans with expert systems that perform equivalent functions. I > believe that the difference between human and machine exchanges has > been undertheorized and ought to be considered more. In some ways, > we may be giving too much agency to machines, electronic programs, > and so forth. Whereas we might once have envisioned a mechanized > world in terms of physical robots (which we may still see some of), > the mechanized world now is filled with physically invisible systems > that play an ever greater role in human lives. I find this > disconcerting and would like to see design theorists think much more > about this from the social point of view. There are folks who have > begun to write about it a bit but not in any systematic theoretical > way that could lead to the level of debate that I believe is needed. > -- > Victor Margolin > Professor Emeritus of Design History > Department of Art History > University of Illinois at Chicago > 935 W. Harrison St. > Chicago, IL 60607-7039 > Tel. 1-312-583-0608 > Fax 1-312-413-2460 > website: www.uic.edu/~victor