not too fresh but sharp & still true i think the following analysis is gratefully & noncommercially lifted from http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_s_Islamic_Courts_Fracture_in_Middle_Shabelle.shtml with apologies for the clinging advert
Last Updated: Nov 3, 2008 - 11:09:50 PM
Somalia
Somalia's Islamic Courts Fracture in Middle Shabelle 9 Oct 9, 2008 - 6:26:07 AM
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
A closed
source on the ground in Somalia,who is conversant with the country's
political dynamics, reports a marked shift in its power configuration,
as sub-clan loyalties increasingly supplant broader alliances and
coalitions in the face of an expected and imminent withdrawal of
Ethiopian occupation forces.
The source says that despite the apparent gains by the Islamic Courts
movement, to the point at which it nominally controls several of
Somalia's regions and is making headway in all of them in its
"re-liberation" struggle against the occupation and the country's
notional Transitional Federal Government (T.F.G.), the movement has
entered a process of splintering into clan-based militias that are
often at odds with one another. The source describes the developing
situation as a "free-for-all" that is replicated outside the movement
with the proliferation of free-lance criminal gangs, rearming by
business interests and a general retreat to sub-clan self-protection.
According the source, devolution to the sub-clan level is complicated
by cross-cutting allegiances to different tendencies in the Courts
movement, creating rapidly shifting coalitions and
radical uncertainty among all of the players:"There is huge
apprehension as to how coalitions will form and sustain themselves, as
traditional clan structures are now divided across ideological and
profit lines."A separate source in the United Arab Emirates confirms
the preceding description, reporting that Somali businessmen in the
Gulf states have redirected their financial support away from umbrella
organizations to their specific sub-clans.
The dynamic of accelerated devolution that is noted by both sources has
been precipitated by the broad consensus among Somali political actors
that Ethiopia has reached the end of its tether in Somalia and will
remove its forces from the country whether or not they are replaced by
an unlikely United Nations stabilization mission and despite Western
pressure to remain in the absence of such a mission.An Ethiopian
pull-out would leave the powerless T.F.G. incapable of sustaining
itself, setting the stage for a scramble for power among the fragmented
factions, forcing each of them into a posture of pro-active
self-defense. Should such a situation transpire, the greatest
likelihood for Somalia would be a period of civil warfare preceding the
emergence of a more stable configuration of power, the design of which
is at present unpredictable.
Signs of an Ethiopian withdrawal have already been reported in Somali
media during late September and early October.On September 27,
Ethiopian forces withdrew from their major base in the Hiraan region on
the outskirts of its capital Beledweyne, leaving the region under the
control of the Courts movement, which announced plans to form an
administration based on Shari'a law. Hiraan, which borders Ethiopia's
restive Somali Regional State (Ogaden region) and is the gateway to
central Somalia, held the third largest number of occupation troops in
the country after the official capital Mogadishu and the transitional
capital Baidoa. Local media also reported that Ethiopian forces were
heading for the border in the southwestern Gedo region, where the
Courts movement already holds the capital Bardhere,but faces opposition
from local clans. Other reports indicate that Ethiopian forces are
concentrating in the Bay region, where Baidoa is located, to make a
last-ditch effort to dislodge Courts militias, led by the
internationalist-jihadist al-Shabaab group, from the control of towns
surrounding the provisional capital.
With various factions of the Courts movement dominant in every region of Somalia
south of the autonomous sub-state of Puntland, Ethiopia is playing an
increasingly diminished role in the country's power configuration,
regardless of whether or not it intends to withdraw. All the actors are
aware of the looming power vacuum, which is why they are in the process
of continually positioning and repositioning themselves.
Further
indications of weakness in Addis Ababa came at the end of Sept when
Ethiopia's prime minister, Meles Zenawi, met with United States
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and told her that his forces could
not remain in Somalia for an "indefinite period of time." Sensing
Zenawi's failing resolve, the fractious and divided parties forming
Ethiopia's political opposition found common ground in agitating for a
pull-out when the Ethiopian Democratic Party, which had backed the
occupation, called for a timetable for withdrawal, joining the United
Ethiopian Democratic Forces and the Unity for Democracy and Justice,
both of which have demanded an immediate end to the occupation.
The Case of Middle Shabelle
The closed source in Somalia indicated the shape of things to come in a detailed description
of the situation in the Middle Shabelle region, which has been
administered by the Courts movement for several months. Beginning with
the observation that "what we see on the ground is the perpetual
fracturing of the Islamic groups," the source reports that after the
Courts movement took control of the region, there were four factions
present: a group linked to al-Shabaab, two clan-linked groups operating
under the umbrella of the Islamic Courts Union (I.C.U.) and an I.C.U.
group affiliated with the diplomatic wing of the Alliance for the
Re-Liberation of Somalia (A.R.S.), to which administrative control had
been provisionally "ceded." Currently, says the source, there are at
least four new factions, three of which are clan-based and nominally
affiliated with the I.C.U., and one or more of which have splintered
from the A.R.S. along clan lines.
The source adds that the agreement allowing the A.R.S. faction
administrative control expires in a month with little prospect for its
renewal.
The
source reports that not only has the Courts movement splintered in
Middle Shabelle, but that its factions are engaging in predatory acts,
such as looting food shipments and firing on aid recipients, and using
access to humanitarianaid as a political weapon. Violent clashes
resulting in deaths occurred when I.C.U. forces guarding food shipments
attempted to loot them - in one case, local residents mobilized against
the I.C.U. "guards," killing one of them and driving the rest of them
off. The source likens the Courts factions in Middle Shabelle to
warlord and "rogue-businessman" groups that are "driven by the profit
and control motive."
Although
the source's account of events in Middle Shabelle has not been directly
confirmed in open sources, local media reported on October 3 that there
had been a spike in robberies in the region's capital Jowhar by
"unidentified militia groups" stealing cell phones, and that I.C.U.
officials were meeting to "decide how to resolve the situation." On
October 6, a United Nations delegation from Nairobi met with I.C.U.
officials in Jowhar to discuss the delivery of humanitarian aid; taken
at face value, this would appear to be a sign of stability in the
region and of growing legitimacy of the Courts movement. In light of
the source's report, the meaning of the visit is less clear.
Conclusion
If
the sources in Somalia and the U.A.E. are correct - and they have
proven to be reliable in the past - southern and central Somalia is
poised to descend into a period of strife with power draining to the
sub-clan level of society and attended by the complications of
cross-cutting ideological and business interests. Garowe Online
reported on October 6 that the chair of the Hawiye clan's Tradition and
Unity Council, Mohamed Hassan Haad, had recently returned from a trip
through Somalia's central regions, which are dominated by the Hawiye
clan family, with the aim of testing a proposal for a Hawiye regional
government, which would open up a process of clan-based cantonization.
Garowe Online's source, a former Puntland official, said that the trip
had met with "mixed results," but that it indicated "a process of
Hawiyism."
With
the Somalia source reporting that Washington is in a state of
"paralysis" on Somalia and with Ethiopia's power vector weakening, it
appears that Somalia will be abandoned to its own devices once again,
as it had been before the Courts movement mounted its aborted
revolution in 2006. As the Courts movement gained ground through 2008,
it appeared possible that it might maintain sufficient unity of purpose
to provide a political formula for Somalia. The source's report on
Middle Shabelle was intended to correct that misconception.
At present, there is no protagonist in Somalia, only a multitude of defensive antagonists.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University [log in to unmask]
& still clearer & more helpful tho a few days older yet from http://www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Analysis.shtml
Analysis: Ideological Diversity in Somalia's Islamic Courts Movement 25 Sep 25, 2008 - 8:35:30 AM
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
After Somalia's war
of liberation against the increasingly brutal dictatorship of Siad
Barre eighteen years ago, the fractured country's politics was marked
by an absence of ideological differences until the emergence of the
Islamic Courts movement in 2006. During its revolutionary phase in that
year, the Courts were guided by the vision of transforming Somalia into
a state based on the practice of Shari'a law. Ethiopia's invasion of
Somalia, supported by the United States, in December 2006 knocked the
Courts back, but did not destroy the movement, which regrouped and
through 2008 has once again become the dominant political force in the
country. As it mounted its resistance against the Ethiopian occupation,
the movement was initially united by the simple aim of removing
Ethiopian forces from Somalia, but as it has gained success on the
ground, it has begun to look forward to a possible victory and its
components have begun to articulate their contrasting visions of
political Islam, propelling the movement into an ideological phase
centered on a debate over the form of a future state.
All
genuine revolutionary movements include diverse perspectives gathered
under a general political formula that is specific enough to provide
focus, but that leaves ample room for differing interpretations of how
that formula should be applied in practice. Those relatively latent
interpretations become manifest and crystallize into ideologies under
the pressure of events, as factions in the movement reach the point at
which they are compelled to show their programmatic hands.At that
juncture, the ideological dimension becomes a relatively independent
factor in determining the course of the movement, providing
orientations towards the future that mobilize adherents and appeal to
sympathizers and potential supporters.When the ideological phase kicks
in, the
movement will either gain enhanced vitality through efforts to mediate
differences while preserving distinctions, or it will begin to collapse
through internecine conflict.
The Courts movement entered an ideological phase in September 2008,
following the capture of the strategic southern port city of Kismayo by
one of its components, al-Shabaab, and that group's subsequent decision
to attempt to block aircraft from using the international airport in
Somalia's official capital Mogadishu. Al-Shabaab's initiatives
triggered a response from the militant wing of the Islamic Courts Union
(I.C.U.), which has gained control of several regions of Somalia and is
affiliated with the faction of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of
Somalia based in Asmara, Eritrea (A.R.S.-A), which opposes the
country's Ethiopian backed and internationally recognized Transitional
Federal Government. Meanwhile, the conciliatory faction of the Alliance
that is based in Djibouti (A.R.S.-D) refused to sign a cease-fire
agreement with the T.F.G. due to differences over a timetable for
Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia. Taken together, those developments
precipitated overt ideological positioning among the groups.
Forms of Political Islam in Somalia
Contemporary political Islam, wherever it appears is defined
ideologically by its challenge to the modern secular nation state and
its aspiration to modify or supplant that form by introducing Islamic
law and practices into the juridical and/or political orders. Through
its development over eighty years, political Islam has crystallized
into three major ideological tendencies: Islamic transnationalism,
Islamic nationalism and Islamic pluralism, each of which is reflected
in a component of the Courts movement.
The sharpest challenge to the modern secular nation state is presented
by Islamic transnationalism, which proposes to supplant the nation
state with regional caliphates, modelled on pre-modern Muslim empires
and composed of local emirates that are governed by clerics according
to Shari'a law. Islamic transnationalism is represented in Somalia by
al-Shabab, which announced in mid-September the formation of the
"Islamic Emirate of Somalia" and claimed that the resistance fighters
(mujahideen) in Somalia were "close to uniting" and "will all come
under the Emirate's authority." A self defined "Salafist-jihadist"
organization, al-Shabab welcomes foreign fighters to join its struggle
and has expressed affinity with al-Qaeda after the U.S. placed it on
its list of "terrorist" groups.
Similar to Islamic transnationalism, Islamic nationalism, which is
represented in Somalia by the I.C.U. and A.R.S.-A, embraces a political
order founded on Shari'a law, but breaks with the former by affirming
the nation state and, as a consequence, adds particular perceived
national interests to its political formula. Unlike Islamic
transnationalism, which remains purely aspirational, there are extant
examples of Islamic nationalism, most notably a Sunni version in Saudi
Arabia and a Shi'a variant that developed in Iran after its early
post-revolutionary internationalism was thwarted.
Islamic pluralism, which is found throughout the Muslim world and is
represented in Somalia by A.R.S.-D, is nationalist, but does not insist
-at least provisionally - on a Shari'a state and is willing to coexist
with non-Islamic political tendencies in a state that is influenced to
a greater or lesser degree by Islamic law and practices. Prominent
examples of Islamic pluralism are Turkey, in which an Islamic party
governs uneasily in an officially secular state, and Pakistan, in which
secular parties are dominant in an officially Islamic state. A.R.S.-D,
which carried non-Islamic tendencies in the original
A.R.S with it when that organization ruptured, embodies Islamic pluralism within itself as well as toward external actors.
The major tendencies in contemporary political Islam are particularly
clear-cut in Somalia, because none of them has achieved unrivalled
dominance in the broader Courts movement and all of them are active
players in the country's manifold conflicts. All of the tendencies were
present during the Courts movement's revolutionary phase and its phase
of regrouping; only now in the movement's "re-liberation" push have
they become sharply configured.
Kismayo, Adan Adde and Djibouti
The most serious and revealing ideological difference that appeared in
September was between the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A and al-Shabaab, when the
latter led a force that captured Kismayo and then set up an
administration of its own choosing headed by a mayor from Somaliland
who was not a member of any of the clans that had supported al-Shabaab
in its action. On September 9, the I.C.U.'s secretary of social and
political affairs, Sheikh Ibrahim Shukri, declared that the new Kismayo
administration was "illegitimate" and had been created "behind closed
doors" without consultation with al-Shabaab's I.C.U. and local allies.
Shukri demanded that the administration be reformed to include local
clerics, intellectuals and other "important social components."
Shukri's demand was met by the new administration's communications
secretary, Sheikh Hassan Yakoub Ali, with the blunt statement: "There
is no point of others sharing the decision making with the combatants
who chased the clan militias out of the district." Al-Shabaab's
self-proclaimed "elder," Sheikh Hassan al-Turki, added that the
appointment of a mayor from Somaliland showed that the new
administration was
founded on Islam rather than clan representation, commenting that
deference to clan would have caused local clans "to fight among each
other."
Apart from considerations of power, the I.C.U.'s criticism of
al-Shabaab's move showed a difference between the former's conception
that wider interests be included in an Islamic political formula and
the latter's insistence on purism. Further evidence of al-Shabaab's
authoritarian tendencies was revealed when their administration called
journalists to a meeting and laid down press rules requiring that no
reports be disseminated of which the administration was unaware, that
only "factual" news be presented, that nothing detrimental to the
practice of Shari'a be reported, and that no music be played on the
radio that encouraged "sin." The reporters, in turn, appealed to the
administration to take action against the frequent telephone threats
they were receiving.
The ideological split between al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A
widened when, on September 13, the former announced that it would shell
Mogadishu's Adan Adde airport if it was not shut down, citing the uses
of the airport as a conduit for Israeli and U.S. intelligence
operatives,a supply line for the African Union's small peacekeeping
mission (AMISOM) in Mogadishu and for Ethiopian occupying forces, a
source of funds for the Ethiopians, and a transit point for
"extraordinary renditions" of suspected "terrorists" by the U.S. and
the Ugandan component of AMISOM.
On September 15, the I.C.U.'s spokesman, Sheikh Abdirahin Isse Addow, announced
that his group opposed the closure of Adan Adde, offering a
counter-list of concerns, including the use of the airport to bring in
medical supplies, ferry the sick and wounded for treatment outside
Mogadishu, allow members of the diaspora to conduct business and visit
friends and relatives, and permit residents of Mogadishu to conduct
their affairs outside the city and participate in the Hajj. Addow
concluded that the I.C.U. knows that the airport is "dominated by our
enemies," but is also aware that it "serves the interests of
everybody." The I.C.U., he said, would "give priority to the will of
the Somali people."
The contrast between the ideological purism and armed jihadism of
al-Shabab's program and the nationalist accomodationism of the
I.C.U./A.R.S.-A could not be presented more starkly than in the debate
over the airport closure. Leaving aside any judgment of the moral,
strategic and tactical merits of each side's case, it is clear that
al-Shabaab is focussed solely on defeating the enemy and that the
I.C.U./A.R.S.-A emphasizes its perception of broader national
interests, despite its own commitment to jihad and the establishment of
a Shari'a state. This clash of perspectives reveals a fault line in the
armed opposition that runs much deeper than divergence in tactics and
is only imperfectly designated by abstract terms such as "extremism"
and "moderation."
In order to understand the differences among the components of the
Courts movement and the course that it will take, it is necessary to
factor in ideology.
As al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A sparred over representation in Kismayo and
the attempted closure of Adan Adde, A.R.S.-D encountered the limits of
its pluralist program at a fresh round of negotiations with the T.F.G.
in Djibouti aimed by its United Nations brokers and Western and
regional backers at the signing of a cease-fire agreement.
Facing denunciation from al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A that it had
capitulated to Ethiopia and the U.S., A.R.S.-D remained committed to
its publicly stated belief that an Ethiopian withdrawal from Somalia
would satisfy the goals of the resistance and that power-sharing with
the T.F.G. would give the Courts movement an essential role in the
country's political future.
On arriving at the talks in mid-September, A.R.S.-D soon learned that
the cards had been stacked against it. Rather than facing a balanced
negotiating environment, A.R.S.-D found itself confronted by a TFG.
supported by the revived Washington-inspired International Contact
Group (I.C.G.), which had expanded from its original base of Western
powers to include the African Union, Arab League, Organization of the
Islamic Conference and a smattering of Arab and African states,
including Ethiopia. When A.R.S.-D became aware of the Ethiopian
presence, it walked out of the talks; local media reported that the
T.F.G. had prepared to meet A.R.S.-D "flanked" by observers from the
I.C.G.
It stretches the political imagination to reason out why the
ICG.adopted an intimidation strategy against A.R.S.-D, which was fast
losing its credibility and needed to be seen to be taken seriously;
perhaps Washington believed that having made concessions in the past,
A.R.S.-D would stand for anything. Nonetheless, despite its resistance,
the Italian ambassador to Djibouti succeeded in bringing A.R.S.-D back
into the talks, but, as it turned out, to no avail.
When it became clear that the T.F.G. had not brought a timetable for
Ethiopian withdrawal to the talks, as A.R.S.-D had expected it would,
but instead floated a proposal to defer the timetable and offer an
Ethiopian pull back from densely populated civilian areas, A.R.S.-D for
the first time put its back up and refused to sign a cease-fire that
al-Shabaab and the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would not have honored in any case,
and would have left A.R.S.-D void of credibility and a captive of
foreign powers. A.R.S.-D's security committee chair and
secretary-general, Umar Hashi Adan, explained that a solution to
Somalia's conflicts "can easily be found if Ethiopia withdraws, and
that there could be no cease-fire without a timetable.
By finally resisting external pressure, A.R.S.-D has pumped a little
life into its pluralist program and has a chance, albeit slim, to
become a subordinate player in the Courts movement, rather than the
isolated outlier that it had become. Had A.R.S.-D signed on to even a
meaningless and merely symbolic cease-fire, Islamic pluralism would
have become a dead issue in Somalia.
Ideological Diversity and the Courts Movement's Future
As the current protagonist in Somalia's political conflicts - a status
that is only due to the gains on the ground of al-Shabaab and the
I.C.U. - the Courts movement is faced with containing the outbreak of
overt ideological diversity within it. On an ideological plane, the
movement has the advantage of confronting an adversary in the T.F.G.
that has no ideology at all - no vision - but only the prospect of
continued clan-based politics and attendant corrupt warlordism. Despite
that advantage, however, there is a higher likelihood of a breakdown
into discord than of healthy competitive collaboration, given
Somalia's and the movement's recent past.
Were the Courts movement to infuse itself with political vitality, its
three ideological tendencies would cultivate mutual forbearance while
retaining their relative independence, which could be achieved without
their subsumption into a common organization. In such a process,
A.R.S.-D would mediate the movement to external actors, the
I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would mediate A.R.S.-D to al-Shabaab, and al-Shabaab
would defer its maximal revolutionary aims. This scenario would require
A.R.S.-D to continue to stiffen its bargaining position, drawing it
closer to the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A; and al-Shabaab to moderate its purism,
again drawing it closer to the I.C.U./A.R.S.-A. In turn, the
I.C.U./A.R.S.-A would seize its mediating role and act accordingly.
Of the ideological components of the Courts movement, the
I.C.U./A.R.S.-A holds the vital center. All of the ideological
tendencies in the movement would have to acknowledge and accept that if
the Courts movement is to remain intact.
Report Drafted By: Dr. Michael A. Weinstein, Professor of Political Science, Purdue University [log in to unmask]
besides the above 2 pieces weinstein who has been rather low key since the unexplained suspension last year of his power & interest news report http://www.pinr.com/ has more recently offered only this slight but telling update so far as i know within a broader analysis at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28158455/
"The Somali diaspora all around the world now
have taken to this business enterprise," said Michael Weinstein, a
Somalia expert at Purdue University in Indiana. He likened the racket
to "syndicates where you buy shares, so to speak, and you get a cut of
the ransom."
Weinstein said
his interviews with ransom negotiators and Somalis indicate the piracy
phenomenon has reached Canada, which is home to 200,000 Somalis.
but back to todays news
ethiopia reportedly agrees to delay withdrawal 5 days
http://en.afrik.com/news12500.html
as nigeria comes to the rescue
& to the reinforcement of the otherwise deserted & marooned uganda & burundi garrisons
NAIROBI, Dec 23 (Reuters) - Somalia's government and the
international community must deal with Islamists to avoid a security
crisis when Ethiopian troops withdraw later this month, a think-tank
said on Tuesday.
Ethiopia has provided military support for Somalia's weak,
Western-backed transitional government since December 2006 but has been
the target of near daily attacks by an Islamist insurgency that
controls most of the country's south.
More then 10,000 civilians have been killed during the two-year
insurgency, a million people uprooted and a third of the population
need emergency aid in a humanitarian crisis that has been described as
one of the worst in the world.
In its report, "Somalia: To Move Beyond the Failed State", the
International Crisis Group (ICG) argues that Ethiopia's withdrawal may
offer a chance for a credible political process.
"Despite the reluctance of the international community to engage
with the Islamist opposition, there is no other practical course than
to reach out to its leaders in an effort to stabilise the security
situation with a ceasefire and then move on with a process that
addresses the root causes," ICG said.
Ethiopia invaded its neighbour to prevent the Islamists from
gaining strength. Now frustrated by the lack of political progress in
Somalia and the international community's failure to send more
peackeepers, Ethiopia insists it will now withdraw.
There is little chance enough peacekeepers will arrive in Somalia
to prevent a power vacuum, leaving the capital Mogadishu at the mercy
of an Islamist insurgency that is not taking part in a now-floundering
U.N.-hosted peace process.
NEW PRESIDENT?
ICG said opposition to the Ethiopian occupation has been the single
issue on which many elements of the fractious Islamist insurgency could
agree, boosting its nationalist appeal as the interim government has
fast been losing support.
"When that glue is removed it is likely that infighting will
increase making it difficult for the insurgency to obtain military
victory or at least sustain it, creating opportunities for political
progress," the report said.
The decision to pull out comes at a time the Transitional Federal
Government (TFG) is on the verge of collapse, due to a deep rift
between President Abdullahi Yusuf and the man he sacked as prime
minister, Nur Hassan Hussein.
Washington and the European Union have sided with Hussein and
countries in the region have called for immediate sanctions to be
imposed on Yusuf for hindering the peace process.
"Yusuf hampers any progress on peace, has become a liability and should be encouraged to resign," the ICG said.
There is growing speculation in Somalia that Yusuf may take that
step very soon -- and plunge the anarchic Horn of Africa nation into a
new chapter of chaos.
(Editing by David Clarke and Michael Roddy)
with extreme thanx & best wishes to all encouragers interlocutors aiders abettors & allowers or i couldnt keep it up while it is my honor just to be with you all even if there were no greater interest for us to serve
