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Dear Keith, When communicating with you, I recollected an anecdote about Roger Barker, the founder of Ecological Psychology (1968 book). The anecdote may not be funny by itself, but it is interesting in the context of the recent discussions about ways of thinking. The anecdote was told by Robert Bechtel, prominent environmental psychologist and editor of Environment & Behavior, at a session on Roger Barker (if memory serves) at the annual conference of Environmental Design Research Association (EDRA). A group of psychologists surrounded Roger Barker at a conference and told him: "Roger, you think just like a sociologist!" Which, in psychological parlance, meant: Roger, you are son of a bitch! This illustrates the difference in their ways of thinking and the paradigmatic divide among disciplines, even when they are very close social disciplines. So, we should not be astonished that we talk different "languages" on this list. Considering that several hundred fields are represented, with their diversity of paradigms and schools of thought, it seems to me that we are communicating pretty well together. Best wishes, Lubomir At 10:06 PM 1/27/2008, Keith Russell wrote: >Dear Lubomir > >Yep - I agree with what you say - but the issue for me can quickly be >found in the definition of "affordance" that says "Affordance is a >quality or a perceived quality of an object." The thought experiments >that Gibson undertakes in his work all involve "perceiving" qualities >rather than in listing "perceived" qualities. The listing is a >subsequent activity based on acceptance of the directness of perceiving >being granted the material status of a direct perception. > >While Gibson goes a long way towards a phenomenology, he gets distracted >by the simplicity of a non-poetic account of directness. Gibson is happy >with love. > >Nope, I'm not coming from Norman's cultures of perception. > >cheers > >keith russell >OZ newcastle > > >>> "Lubomir S. Popov" <[log in to unmask]> 01/28/08 1:51 PM >>> > > >Dear Keith, > >Affordance is a quality or a perceived quality of an object. Theory >of affordance is conceived in an ecological framework. Every time you >hear ecology, suspect Positivism and Materialism. There is a >difference between conceptualizing experience like a result of >human-environment interaction and the study of experience as a way to >understand the world. These are two different conceptualizations, >imply different methodologies, and epistemologies. I don't see much >of a phenomenology (in the Husserlian sense) in Ecological >Psychology. Ecological Psychology is soaked with Positivism and >systems thinking. Actually, maybe a benign version of a more >enlightened Positivism. For me, it is too much on the Positivist >side. I admire Bronfenbrenner, and actually use a lot of his staff. >Long ago he was one of my deities, together with Roger Barker >(environmental psychology, behavior setting). I still believe I can >make something out of the behavior setting concept in my theoretical >pursuits. I often refer to these scholars, Barker in particular. >However, I am aware of the shortcomings of the paradigm and wish I >can go further away from it. I would rather work with Goffman and >Burke when researching environment and behavior interactions. > >It is quite possible that you conceptualise affordance in a slifghtly >different way, in particular if your background is in HCI. In that >field, Norman introduces slightly different tilt and more emphasis on >the perceived properties, but still stays in the framework of eco and >systems thinking. > >Sorry, I am going for the night. It is getting late here. > >Have a great evening at the other end of the world, > >Lubomir > >At 09:00 PM 1/27/2008, Keith Russell wrote: > >Dear Lubomir > > > >You point out that the concept of affordance is related to materialist > >thinking - but only if one wishes it so. Gibson allows a directness in > >the experience of things that is a directness of experience, not a > >directness of things. Giving oneself over to/finding oneself > >expereincing directly, does not make the thing any more real than a > >phenomenological apprehension. Indeed, they might usefully be treated >as > >the same. > > > >My left field email (earlier) was a pediction we would end up here. > > > >cheers > > > >keith russell > >OZ Australia > > > > > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > >Lubomir wrote, in part: > > > >Let me mention that the concept of affordance is at disciplinary > >level (including multi- or inter- in this reading). In this regard, > >the concept of affordance can not serve for resolving the fundamental > >question of philosophy. By the way, the concept of affordance is > >related to materialist thinking. The very idea that the material > >world affords implies that there is a material world that affords the > >realm of ideas. Extreme idealism claims that the idea has controls > >matter. > > >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> > > > >