Let me rob Peter to pay Paul a compliment about his and Peter's observations: I think they are building nicely and very informatively on each other. One has no evidence beyond one's own mind that a text exists b/c it exists first and ultimately in that mind. However, external evidence of the wording of an immaterial text comes to oneself and then to others when something derived from that mental text is actually inscribed. At that instant of inscription comes reading; the writer becomes a reader, and subsequent viewers of the inscription become readers. So to respond to Paul's suggestion that immaterial and material cannot be entirely separated, I am wondering if another way of putting it is that a "texual process" occurs at the moment of inscription when mental text becomes embodied as a physical text. This textual process is also a writer-reader process. (Which, as Peter observes, is a necessarily interpretive process.) I would also like to suggest (and I really mean "suggest" and not "suggest" as a euphuism for "argue") that the "revision text"--that is, the sum total of inscriptions and immaterial wordings that can be witnessed or deduced from an inscribed revision--gives us closer access to the textual process. This would be because in revision sites, we witness the kinds of vacillations and verbal oscillations that represent the attempt of an immaterial text to find its (for the moment) most satisfactory embodiment. So, if this makes sense, I would argue that a very concrete "history of reading" (to quote Peter) can be constructed not only in marginalia, diaries, reviews, etc., but also in "revision texts." Finally, if Book History is the study of the production and consumption of books as an index of the evolution of culture, then there is no more concrete evidence of production and consumption than at the revision text level. Hence the text for the study of book history is a text that follows revision and versions in books. yrs, John ___________ John Bryant, English Department, Hofstra University, Hempstead, NY 11549 >>> Peter Shillingsburg <[log in to unmask]> 03/26/07 1:36 PM >>> When Paul, currently sitting across the room from me, writes in response to Wim: "Going back to Wim's observation: it still leaves unanswered the nature of the relationship between the material and the conceptual dimensions of text and how (if at all) text may be said to exist 'independently'. I don't think it does." I think it may not just be perverse to say the opposite: The only way that text "exists" is separated from the material. It is saying two different things. What I mean, and I think this is operationally important, is that for text to get off the page and into our experience is must be interpreted--signs only signify by an interpretive act. So, the work, as experienced, is OFF the material page and it can do that only according to skills of the person reading it off. That is not really a contradiction of what Paul said. He is right. The only place a set of symbols can be kept for reuse is in a material form. Even Matt Kirschenbaum would agree to that, I dare say, given his emphasis on the materiality of electronic texts. But a text on the page is not a text in the mind or in a process of being experienced. The importance of that distinction weighs very much with me when I try to think of the history of reading. Is it the history of the reading experience that gets recorded in marginalia and book reviews and diary entries, or are we looking at something else and just calling it reading? -----Original Message----- From: The list of the European Society for Textual Scholarship and the Society for Textual Scholarship [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Paul Eggert Sent: 26 March 2007 18:16 To: [log in to unmask] Subject: Re: Texts as cultural objects Wim van Mierlo interestingly picks up for clarification the perhaps satisfying but nevertheless baffling idea of texts as cultural objects that Dan O'Donnell had originally put forward in this discussion and that John Bryant reminded us G. Thomas Tanselle had defined: > When it comes to using the words "text" and "object," I tend > to think in terms that Barbara's mentor Tom Tanselle offers: > that is, a text is words or wording, and hence essentially > conceptual; a book or document is an object on which a > version of the text is inscribed. Generally, speaking texts > are not objects; they are separate from the material > documents upon which they appear, or even the ink or medium > in which they are inscribed or printed. At least that is a > good place to start. Wim replied: > >1) Perhaps "texts" and "books" are indeed two separate things, as John >says, the one slightly more immaterial, the other material. Yet one >cannot have "text" without the physical object in/on which it is >inscribed. Where "text" would exist independently, it would have to be >in the "work" (using Tanselle's distinction between the two). So the idea of text as a cultural 'object' runs two dimensions of its existence together in an initially satisfying formulation that becomes, when looked at more carefully, an obfuscation. At least, as here, bibliographical thinking forces us to think harder about the conceptual basis of what we study than a book history that is not so assisted necessarily does. An all-encompassing, inclusive book history can be a conceptually lazy book history. Some book historians, for instance, seem unaware of the contribution that the theory associated with scholarly editing made in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, particularly in relation to the documentation of textual 'process' and the 'life' of works. This forgetting perhaps comes from the fact that work-based book history (as opposed to methodologies of the larger sweep) is not an especially popular approach, although I am attracted to it. Going back to Wim's observation: it still leaves unanswered the nature of the relationship between the material and the conceptual dimensions of text and how (if at all) text may be said to exist 'independently'. I don't think it does. John B's examples in his more recent mailing (excerpted below) show that it doesn't in the actual practice of inscription. We can (if we wish) only conspire to believe that it does. Paul Eggert >Let me respond to Wim's two, well-articulated, totally sensible, and >very useful points. > >1). I'm not sure how something is "slightly more immaterial." It seems >to me either it is or it isn't, and if it isn't immaterial then it is >something other than text; it is a witness, or a physical >representation, or an embodiment of text. Tanselle is good on these >matters of the tangible and intangible, or material and immaterial, in >discussing text, and Wim is right I think in suggesting that Tanselle >places text along with his notion of work, in the realm of the >conceptual, immaterial, intangible. One thought game on this is the >following: I am thinking right now a line of words: Mickey Mouse is >dead. I haven't written it: oops I just wrote it, but you know what I >mean. The wording is there in my mind; it exists in thought and as >thought. When I get around to inscribing that string of words, it might >actually come out differently: Mickey, he's dead. The former wording >banging around in my brain is immaterial and the text of what I hope to >inscribe; the latter is material and what I actually inscribed. Another >thought game is this. I have two material words to give you: text and >TEXT. These are the same word but presented differently, and with >different impact on the reader; they are coded differently. As >differently coded witnesses, they represent something a concept of Text, >call it. It's an immaterial wording that has some kind of real >existence in mind and concept that is different from those two printed >witnesses to the concept. -- Paul Eggert | Professor of English | Director, Australian Scholarly Editions Centre Projects | School of Humanities & Social Sciences | University of New South Wales at ADFA | Canberra ACT 2600 | AUSTRALIA | +61 (0)2 6268 8900 +61 (0)2 6268 8899 (fax) http://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/ASEC