Dear Larry,
Yes, I believe what I wrote. Fire
suppression does not offer complete protection and no one would guarantee
it as foolproof unless they were a fool. We can look at the twin
towers and ask why fire suppression system did not work in that case. The
fire suppression system were not designed for thousands of gallons of aviation
fuel. Systems can be designed for any number of eventualities, but
fire, especially fire, behaves in ways that make a mockery of human design.
Yes, systems are designed and can be in place to deal with fires. However,
airplanes, nuclear reactors, nuclear submarines, race cars and buildings
succumb to fires even though they have fire suppression systems designed
and tested for just that eventuality.
The problem, in this case, might not
even be a design flaw. If humans are involved, there is no such thing as
a 100% secure system. Computer systems can be designed as secure but all
it takes is one user to leave a "door" open for convenience and
the system is breached. Human nature is the hardest thing to design a system
to counter. Moreover, one can have a situation where the room is designed
with fire doors and the ceiling bursts open because of the heat or a door
does not close because of an explosion.
More to the point regarding fire suppression,
once the fire suppression system has expended its agent, (water, gas, or
foam or whatever), it is then the fire's turn. Fire suppression allows
you to evacuate, if you are lucky, and for the fire brigade to show up.
However, if the fire is of an intensity that the fire suppression does
not suppress and the fire brigade cannot handle it, then you have to let
it burn. It is as simple as that.
Hope this helps.
Lawrence W. Serewicz
Scrutiny Manager
Management Support Unit
Wear Valley District Council
01388-761-985
> Fire suppression only suppresses a fire. Thus,
a large and sustained
> fire, especially in a dry paper environment, will quickly overwhelm
a
> suppression system. Thus, a suppression system will be able
to
> contain a small fire, but something that spreads rapidly and has lots
> of fuel (air and material) will soon get out of control because it
can
> reignite. The goal of a fire suppression system is to extinguish
> small fires, contain large fires, and allow you to evacuate your
> people.
I'm hoping you don't actually believe what you've said here.
If you're familiar with the design specifications of NFPA 13 for
Sprinkler Systems, they are designed not only to allow the occupants to
safely exit the facility and to suppress small fires, but to disallow a
fire from getting completely out of control in an industrial or
commercial facility. They are supposed to be designed based on the
contents of the storage facility, based on the combustible nature of
the contents and the projected volume.
Additionally, if you're familiar with NFPA232 the "Standard for the
Protection of Records", you'd know that facilities aren't supposed
to
have more than 250,000CF of records in any one compartment, and that
compartments are supposed to be separated by 4-hour firewalls and
designed in a manner that they are defensible in the event of a fire.
SOMETHING was not designed properly here, and while there may not be a
requirement to comply with, or design to, NFPA Standards in the UK...
there should be some guidance beside the ICBO Codes and Standards
there, and I'm sure the guidance that exists also speaks to the
requirement to build fire suppression systems adequate for the contents
of the facility they are intended to protect.
> I worked in a library in California, which was a hybrid of a modern
> earthquake resilient wing and a 30 year old brick and mortar wing.
> The fire brigade explained that we would have about 30 seconds
to
> evacuate the old wing because it was built like a giant kiln. The
> paper was so dry within the building that the fire suppression system
> would only give us that amount of time. The halon system would
help
> suppress the fire but that and the lack of oxygen from the fire meant
> that you would die of asphyxiation. Either way your goose was
cooked.
>
> More to the point, a halon system only works if the room or structure
> remains sealed and no more oxygen comes into to feed the fire. An
open
> door or a broken window means the gas will escape and the fire can
> reignite.
Irrespective of the age or construction materials used to build the
facility, it can be retrofitted to be adequately protected, it won't
necessarily be cheap, and it may result in less space for patrons, but
it can be protected. Most libraries are designed in accordance with
NFPA909, and use NFPA13 guidance for sprinkler design. And because
these are public access facilities (unlike a commercial storage
facility) there are other requirements for life-safety that must be
taken that surpass fire protection of contents.
Halon (which is seldom used, except ion industrial complexes that have
been grandfathered in to allow it's continued use) or other gaseous
agents are used only in closed environments, not in open spaces. In
a
library setting, about the only place you'd use a gaseous suppression
agent would be in a vault-type room, or an actual vault, which is a six
sided enclosure and the volume of gas used would be that which was
required to flood the occupancy.
> In sum, a fire suppression works best in a controlled environment.
A
> large complex means that there are more rooms and access points.
> Design for access is also a design for fire.
What you've said is true about a GASEOUS FIRE SUPPRESSION system...
what they're talking about here is a water based, sprinkler and
standpipe supported system, typically roof/ceiling mounted, and
additionally supported by in-rack sprinklers for holdings exceeding 12
feet in height. The intent of the sprinkler system design is to
adequately protect the assets and facility until fire crews can gain
access and attempt to manually mitigate the effects of the fire... word
is they were on-site pretty quickly and ultimately, there were 100 of
them, but unfortunately, they were unable to stop the facility form
burning to a total loss.
And more importantly, the service provider was unable to provide
protection to their clients information assets that were entrusted to
them on a contractual basis.