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Dear Ted, I wholeheartedly agree with your statement that "...in other words, not only do we have to radically transform our notion of science, in order to get to inclusionality, we have to radically transform our understanding of ‘who we are’ (transform ourselves from ‘observers’ of the world out there to a-centric ‘experients’ of inner-outer inclusion in the world). these two needed transformations seem to be the same thing expressed in different ways (the nature of consciousness, the nature of our somatic dynamics; i.e. the nature of ‘mind’ and ‘matter’)." It is for this reason that I was drawn to existential phenomenology (as developed from Husserl's transcendental phenomenology by Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty), which situates knowledge as subordinate to the activity of being already thrown into the world. Hence, I am in favour of a more descriptive, less explanatory basis for natural science, that aims at a holistic effort to capture the essence of the phenomenal experience of being situated within the world. After ceasing physics, I was particularly drawn to Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of Nature, as transcendent otherness within which we are in intimate relation, and find myself to be in broad agreement with his criticisms of modern science as articulated in Phenomenology of Perception and his essays On Nature (posthumously published). It seems to me that natural histories and descriptive narratives, which remain conscious of the situated naturalist as the narrator, provide a much more careful, scientific basis for understanding ourselves in the natural world than the experimental sciences provide. However, we also need to be reflectively conscious of the extent that the way we relate and describe our situated being is dependent on inherited historically contingent categories and concepts, which obscure and conceal our situated being. Thus, Heidegger's approach and criticisms, as articulated in Being and Time, are important and insightful. However, we also need to place such phenomenologies under historical analysis in order to remain aware that our situatedness is itself embedded within its own historical development, understood and constructed in terms that we have inherited, modified in accordance with inherited rules of modification, and put to use, for the purpose of understanding our own situatedness. We are unable to actually achieve the 'clearing' that Heidegger proposed because, as speakers and writers, we remain trapped by the structures of language and categorisation of language-games, which we cannot transcend and reach that pure space 'beyond language', in order to capture the essence of being-there, without being silent or spouting gibbering nonsense. It is in this sense that Lao Tsu spoke when he said "He who knows does not speak. He who speaks does not know." This was not a statement of esoteric elitism or mysticism. It was a statement of the limitation of language when attempting to describe something perpetually in motion and change. One is forced to appeal to metaphors, which have no literal referent, or to deal with abstracts, which (while open to logical analysis) are unsatisfactory. It is for this reason that I tend to read phenomenology through the spectacles of my reading of Plato, Nietzsche, and a neo-Marxist analysis, also known as Critical Theory, inspired by Georg Lukacs, the New York-Frankfurt School (namely Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, Gadamer, and Habermas), with a personal preference for Lukacs' and Marcuse's work, read alongside the so-called poststructuralists, such as Foucault and Derrida. As a result, I tend to find myself adopting a socratic hermeutics, which situates our understanding of ourselves and our being-in-the-world in an ongoing, interpretive, historical project that is bound-together with social, practical, and political activity. I also find that there are many points of commonality between my perspective and what is known as the school of Critical Realism (as founded by Roy Bhaskar). However, I have many fundamental disagreements with both Marxism and Critical Realism, but I do not need to go into that here. So while I freely admit to finding many points of profound interest in Alan's (and your) ideas about inclusionality, as well as finding it is be a succinct way of articulating problems with science, I also have many criticisms of it too. However, this is not the forum for those criticisms. There is a great deal of positive value in inclusionality that both Alan (and yourself) can introduce to interested parties on this forum, without any need for me to adopt the role of devil's advocate or spoiler. My own view is that, putting aside my own quibbles and points of disagreement, I think that many people on this forum will find much of interest and use in 'inclusionality'. Hence, for the time being, I shall maintain a silence about inclusionality, except for affirming it as an interesting set of ideas, until there has, at least, been a discussion about what inclusionality means between Alan, yourself, and other interested parties. If the future shows that people are not interested in discussing inclusionality on this forum, then I will be more than happy to discuss it with you, Alan, or anyone else, off this list, in private emails or a different forum. So I, for one, welcome your contribution to this forum and invite other interested parties to take up a discussion about inclusionality and how it relates to Nick Maxwell's call for a revolution in academia. For my own part, my interests are in the technological ontology that underlies modern experimental science and, through its economic conditions (i.e. funding in exchange for providing machine prototypes to satisfy the commercial, military, and civic ambitions of a social elite), it is bound-together with the construction of a technological society, which promises to be an improvement upon our natural state of organic animality, by providing increased power, certainty, and freedom from our material limitations and the capriciousness of Nature. Such a project is premised upon a confrontation with Nature (an attempt to pacify existence and order the world into a paradise on Earth) and metaphysical presuppositions about rationality, causality, objectivity, and the human good life. Hence, it seems to me that Nick Maxwell's call for "wisdom" to be placed over "scientific knowledge" is both timely and ancient. It seems to me that a crucial part of the debate about wisdom and science involves a debate about the relationship between visions of the ideal society, technological innovation, and the nature of education. We need to question the rationality of technical rationality. This is essential because technical rationality dominates our sciences and politics, while the vision of the ideal society and human well-being that is presupposed in the trajectories of the development and implementation of technoscience are left implict and unquestioned. In my view, given the dominance of a class-based technocracy in modern society, Nick Mawell's call for a revolution in the way that academia is organised is no less than a call for an intellectual revolution in the way that our modern, technoscientific society is organised. It is a call for a critical evaluation of our societal aims and that is of the profoundest philosophical importance. best regards, Karl. --------------------------------- All new Yahoo! Mail "The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use." - PC Magazine