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=20
=20
The following  is extracted from Derek Hook's paper in the latest J of=20
Critical Psychology,  Couns and Psychotherapy. I thought it might pep up the=
 debate.=20
Craig=20
Critiques  internal to the discipline.=20
The earliest criticisms of  power within psychotherapy tended to arise withi=
n=20
the discipline itself. The  basis of such critiques was the in-fighting=20
between the major therapeutic  'schools' each trying to assert themselves as=
 the=20
predominant mode of treatment.  It is interesting to reflect back on certain=
 of=20
these debates, which, assuredly,  have lost none of their trenchancy.=20
Importantly, these critiques were not  fundamentally of psychotherapy as a w=
hole, and=20
as such one might contend that,  the redressing of power here occurs somewha=
t=20
superficially and in the interests  of a developing humanism (as is=20
exemplified by Redlich (1986)). Indeed many  phenomenological and existentia=
l avenues=20
towards psychotherapy took this  'humanising route' in their attempt to bypa=
ss=20
the ostensibly mechanistic,  theory-heavy and client-disempowering tendencie=
s=20
of psychodynamic therapies  (Sartre, 1988; Van Kaam, 1966), and as a way of=20
avoiding=E2=80=94and  denigrating=E2=80=94behaviourist models of therapy. =20
Both the psychodynamic and  behaviourist approaches to clinical treatment=20
were seen as dehumanising (or  deindividualizing) because they put something=
, be=20
it encompassing meta-theory or  a mechanistic treatment schedule, as a=20
priority of clinical efficacy above  and beyond accommodating the patient on=
 their=20
own terms (Sartre, 1988; Van  Kaam, 1966). The unique nature and individuali=
ty=20
of each patient=E2=80=94so the charge  goes=E2=80=94was denied through a cli=
nical model that=20
focused simply on behaviour  change. Here the eradication of troublesome=20
deviances is thought to be the  ultimate end, whether it occurs through the=20
application of principles of  learning (in behaviour therapies), or through=20=
the use of=20
deterministic theory  that many feel cannot but reduce the features of the=20
patient's life to the  various explanatory variables of the psychodynamic=20
meta-narrative (Spinelli,  1994).=20
Behaviourist therapies have  been seen as simplistic and superficial because=
=20
their exclusive focus on  behaviour has sidelined the development of=20
sufficient self-understanding within  patients (Bootzin and Acocella, 1988).=
 More=20
pressingly, it has been argued that  such approaches deny the individual fre=
edom of=20
the patient and that behaviour  therapists move in and take control of=20
patient's behaviour, manipulating it  according to their own values (Bootzin=
 and=20
Acocella, 1988). On the  other hand, psychodynamic models have frequently be=
en=20
lampooned for not being  able to see more obvious explanations for, or=20
determinants of, maladaptive  behaviour than elaborate Oedipal scenarios (Ma=
sson, 1989;=20
Spinelli,  1994).=20
Both behavioural and  psychodynamic therapies have, in other words, been=20
criticised as reductionist.  Whether this reduction lies in attempting to co=
llapse=20
the complexity and  diversity of human experience into stimulus-response=20
understandings and  interventions (in behaviour therapies) (Bootzin and Acoc=
ella,=20
1988) or in  attempting to equate it to sexual drives, instincts and=20
unconscious motives of  the patient (in psychodynamic therapies) (Krauss, in=
 Szasz=20
(1977)), the  individuality of the patient, so the argument goes, is lost. T=
hese=20
treatment  models operate more to reproduce themselves and their understandi=
ngs=E2=80=94
that is,  their basic logic of human psychology=E2=80=94than to properly fac=
ilitate=20
hearing what  the patient is actually saying with any phenomenological or=20
contextual depth  (Sartre, 1988). =20

Central to  the ongoing critiques of the psychodynamic model is the=20
contention that it is  scientifically unverifiable. Perhaps the strongest pr=
oponent of=20
such attacks has  been Karl Popper who, in terms mentioned at the outset of=20
the paper observed  that psychodynamic conceptualizations of the human being=
 are=20
simply not  testable, irrefutable. =E2=80=98There [is] no conceivable human=20=
behaviour=20
which could  contradict them. This does not mean that Freud...[was] not=20
seeing things  correctly...But it does mean that those =E2=80=9Cclinical obs=
ervations=E2=80=9D=20
which analysts  naively believe confirm their theory cannot do this any more=
 than=20
the daily  confirmations which astrologers find in their practice (Popper,=20
cited in Szasz,  1977, p.73).=20


Although it is not of  fundamental import to this paper whether psychodynami=
c=20
thought and practice is  'unfalsifiable', it is of great importance that as=20=
a=20
social  science which relies both implicitly and explicitly upon the status=20
of  science to justify its interventions and procedures, much psychodynamic=20=
=20
psychotherapy makes claims which are unfalsifiable. Popper (1960) asserts th=
at =20
unfalsifiable and hence unscientific theories, when used in human affairs, a=
re=20
 merely the pseudoscientific justifications for oppression. Following this=20
line  of critique, it is impossible to convict the psychodynamic therapist o=
f a=20
false  diagnosis, to falsify and hence properly refute their pronouncements=20
(Szasz,  1977). =20
The psychodynamic therapist  then is in possession of powers of intervention=
=20
and interpretation that although  reliant on a 'scientific' legitimation are=
=20
in fact unscientific. Such  powers then may seem to be somewhat unwarranted,=
=20
and, given the importance of  the interpretative functions of the clinician,=
=20
deeply problematic. They grant a  great =E2=80=98interpretative latitude=E2=
=80=99 to the=20
clinician, which=E2=80=94bearing in mind the  complicated and indirect relat=
ionship between=20
mental processes and behaviour in  psychodynamic thought=E2=80=94frequently=20=
means that=20
presenting features of the patient's  narrative and behaviour may be taken t=
o=20
mean what the therapist wants them to  mean. =20
The power that this  scientific 'legitimation' grants the therapist over the=
=20
patient is as such  illegitimate, unethical, and potentially damaging (Masso=
n,=20
1989; Szasz, 1977).  This is a form of power, moreover, in which ultimately=20
it is the therapist's  own biases and values that come to exert influence in=
=20
the therapeutic arena.  As Szasz (1973) states, with a typical flair for=20
polemic, =E2=80=98Can anyone really  believe that a psychotherapist's ideas=20=
on religion,=20
politics and related issues  play no role in his [sic] practical work?=E2=
=80=99 (p.16).=20
That the therapist may make  use of their professional power (intentionally=20=
or=20
unintentionally) to assert  certain moral, normative, social or even persona=
l=20
values is of course the danger  here. This is one of Masson=E2=80=99s (1994)=
=20
predominant concerns: no form of  psychotherapy, he claims, is value-free. F=
urthermore,=20
no therapist can avoid,  however discretely, instilling values of this sort=20
within their patients. The  potential for damage, abuse and coercion in this=
=20
regard is quite obvious; it is  also one of the most common concerns of the=20
critical literature, which will  further be developed in a later section of=20=
the =20
paper.=20
A related concern here, and  it is an attack frequently put to psychodynamic=
=20
approaches, is that of an  over-riding theoretical bias that leads therapist=
s=20
to impose a particular  viewpoint on patients. Speaking of psychodynamic=20
practice, Spinelli (1994) warns  that therapists often impose their own valu=
es and=20
beliefs on patient's stories,  emphasizing and directing them to those=20
elements in their accounts which best  fit the therapist's theories. Spinell=
i (1994)=20
claims that a great deal of  contemporary therapeutic practice, regardless o=
f=20
the theory espoused, remains  theory-led, and as such can be seen as opening=
=20
therapists up to accusations of  misuse, however seemingly inadvertent, of=20
therapeutic power. The obvious example  here would be the automatic discount=
ing of=20
patient explanations that are not  commensurate with the therapist's general=
=20
theory of human functioning. This is  exactly the claim Masson (1984) makes=20
against Freud's abandonment of the  seduction theory=E2=80=94that his allegi=
ance to a=20
developing theory of unconscious  fantasy led to the fact that he systematic=
ally=20
ignored his patients=E2=80=99 real  conditions of incest and familial abuse.=
=20
Echoing these concerns of  the imposition of the therapist's own value,=20
Parker, Georgaca, Harper,  McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith (1995), point out th=
at=20
psychodynamic therapies  often preclude the possibility of meaning being=20
cooperatively reached in therapy  because of the therapist's theory-empowere=
d position.=20
The realm of influence in  such approaches may be seen as more encompassing=20
than this. Parker et al. (1995)  view psychodynamic practices as binding=20
patients into relationships of  subordination. It is not good enough simply=20=
to say=20
what the therapist wants to  hear, they claim, one must believe it (1995).=20
Brown makes the same point  (1973b) when he claims that =E2=80=98...therapy=20=
demands the=20
filial subordination of the  patient, as well as an acceptance of the=20
therapist's values, which are usually  similar to accepted societal values=
=E2=80=99 (p.482).=20
Humanist, person-centred and  existential-phenomenological therapies aimed i=
n=20
many ways to eradicate certain  of these above problems. The objective here=20
was often to eschew more directive  (or directing) explanatory accounts lock=
ed=20
into strict theory-based procedures,  facilitating instead a more=20
non-directive approach that limited didactic forms  of therapist=20
intervention/interpretation, preferring instead to facilitate the  autonomou=
s and unique person of the=20
'client' by approaching them on their own  terms (see Rogers, 1951; 1961).=20
Such treatment modalities typically place great  emphasis on the intimacy of=
 the=20
patient-therapist relationship. Efficacy in  treatment was now reliant less=20=
on=20
therapeutic process and more on the emotional  climate of the therapy, with=20=
a=20
key objective being that of the therapist trying  to enter the client's=20
phenomenological world. Masson (1994) has been critical of  these recommenda=
tions,=20
taking to task particularly Carl Rogers=E2=80=99 famous three  personal cond=
itions of=20
therapeutic efficacy: genuineness, unconditional positive  regard and empath=
y.=20
These are qualities that for Masson (1994) cannot simply be  manufactured in=
=20
a clinical setting, and are better obtained from  extra-therapeutic=20
relationships (like friendships) where they are not  cultivated=E2=80=94or a=
t worst contrived=E2=80=94
by/in a therapist.  =20
Masson=E2=80=99s point is that these  therapeutic qualities are designed and=
=20
implemented to bring about change, to  provide a form of cure, so, although=20=
the=20
qualities of humanistic therapy may not  appear to be openly coercive, their=
 role is=20
fundamentally the same as the more  obviously power-stricken qualities of th=
e=20
behaviourist and psychodynamic  schools. As Richer (1992) has cautioned, tha=
t=20
therapeutic procedures are not  explicitly directed by the therapist does no=
t=20
mean that s/he does not retain  powerful levels of control and influence. Th=
e=20
therapist=E2=80=99s values are still  thought to play a fundamentally import=
ant part=20
in determining the therapy=E2=80=94in  humanistic-existential therapies thes=
e values=20
are simply implicit as opposed to  more overtly evident (Richer, 1992). Rath=
er=20
more polemically Richer (1992)  comments that: =E2=80=98We imagine that by a=
voiding=20
objectification and medicalization,  the hermeneutic...and humanistic trends=
 in=20
psychology somehow transcend the job  of social control more explicit in oth=
er=20
forms of psychology. Nothing could be  further from the truth. In the end,=20
the... humanistic...approaches are more  efficient at normalizing than=E2=
=80=A6the=20
shaping techniques of behaviourism=E2=80=99  (p.118)=20
As  is apparent from these comments, there are those critics who believe tha=
t=20
the  humanistic-existential therapies involve the use of a more profound and=
 =20
sophisticated power than the psychodynamic and behaviourist procedures. From=
 =20
this perspective, humanistic-existential therapies are seen as  reinforcing=20
the concept of individuals as isolated from their culture and  history. By=20
supporting what Kvale (1992) calls =E2=80=98the cult of the individual  subj=
ect and its=20
self-actualization=E2=80=99 (p.43), the humanistic-existential therapies  ar=
e seen as=20
expanding the reach of therapeutic power by internalizing its  operation wit=
hin=20
the therapeutic subject who increasingly causes it to play  upon themselves.=
=20
In a humanistic ethics, virtue became a responsibility towards  one's own=20
existence, and vice, irresponsibility towards oneself; the  self-actualizing=
 person=20
had to be self-contained and true to themselves (Kvale,  1992). The claim=20
here is basically that therapies of this nature attempt in some  way to=20
internalize, within their subjects, the effects of a controlling power,  whi=
ch although=20
individualistic in nature, would never be substantially divorced  from=20
dominant social values and morals.

___________________________________

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-------------------------------1091360851
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<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML xmlns:o =3D "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office"><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; charset=3DUTF-8">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1106" name=3DGENERATOR></HEAD>
<BODY id=3Drole_body style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 10pt; COLOR: #000000; FONT-FAMILY:=20=
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<DIV>
<DIV class=3DSection1>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><FONT size=3D3><SPAN lang=
=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-size: 15.0=
pt">The following=20
is extracted from Derek Hook's paper in the latest J of Critical Psychology,=
=20
Couns and Psychotherapy. I thought it might pep up the debate.</SPAN></FONT>=
</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><FONT size=3D3><SPAN lang=
=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-size: 15.0=
pt">Craig</SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><FONT size=3D3><SPAN lang=
=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-size: 15.0=
pt"></SPAN></FONT>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><FONT size=3D3><B><SPAN l=
ang=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-size: 1=
5.0pt"></SPAN></B></FONT>&nbsp;</P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><FONT size=3D3><B><SPAN l=
ang=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'; mso-bidi-font-size: 1=
5.0pt">Critiques=20
internal to the discipline.</SPAN></B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-FAM=
ILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p></o:p></SPAN></FONT></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>The earliest criticisms=20=
of=20
power within psychotherapy tended to arise within the discipline itself. The=
=20
basis of such critiques was the in-fighting between the major therapeutic=20
'schools' each trying to assert themselves as the predominant mode of treatm=
ent.=20
It is interesting to reflect back on certain of these debates, which, assure=
dly,=20
have lost none of their trenchancy. Importantly, these critiques were not=20
fundamentally of psychotherapy as a whole, and as such one might contend tha=
t,=20
the redressing of power here occurs somewhat superficially and in the intere=
sts=20
of a developing humanism (as is exemplified by Redlich (1986)). Indeed many=20
phenomenological and existential avenues towards psychotherapy took this=20
'humanising route' in their attempt to bypass the ostensibly mechanistic,=20
theory-heavy and client-disempowering tendencies of psychodynamic therapies=20
(Sartre, 1988; Van Kaam, 1966), and as a way of avoiding=E2=80=94and=20
denigrating=E2=80=94behaviourist models of therapy. <o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN=
></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Both the psychodynamic a=
nd=20
behaviourist approaches to clinical treatment were seen as dehumanising (or=20
deindividualizing) because they put something, be it encompassing meta-theor=
y or=20
a mechanistic treatment schedule, as a priority of clinical efficacy <I>abov=
e=20
and beyond accommodating the patient on their own terms</I> (Sartre, 1988; V=
an=20
Kaam, 1966). The unique nature and individuality of each patient=E2=80=94so=20=
the charge=20
goes=E2=80=94was denied through a clinical model that focused simply on beha=
viour=20
change. Here the eradication of troublesome deviances is thought to be the=20
ultimate end, whether it occurs through the application of principles of=20
learning (in behaviour therapies), or through the use of deterministic theor=
y=20
that many feel cannot but reduce the features of the patient's life to the=20
various explanatory variables of the psychodynamic meta-narrative (Spinelli,=
=20
1994).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Behaviourist therapies h=
ave=20
been seen as simplistic and superficial because their exclusive focus on=20
behaviour has sidelined the development of sufficient self-understanding wit=
hin=20
patients (Bootzin and Acocella, 1988). More pressingly, it has been argued t=
hat=20
such approaches deny the individual freedom of the patient and that behaviou=
r=20
therapists move in and take control of patient's behaviour, manipulating it=20
according to <I>their</I> <I>own</I> values (Bootzin and Acocella, 1988). On=
 the=20
other hand, psychodynamic models have frequently been lampooned for not bein=
g=20
able to see more obvious explanations for, or determinants of, maladaptive=20
behaviour than elaborate Oedipal scenarios (Masson, 1989; Spinelli,=20
1994).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Both behavioural and=20
psychodynamic therapies have, in other words, been criticised as reductionis=
t.=20
Whether this reduction lies in attempting to collapse the complexity and=20
diversity of human experience into stimulus-response understandings and=20
interventions (in behaviour therapies) (Bootzin and Acocella, 1988) or in=20
attempting to equate it to sexual drives, instincts and unconscious motives=20=
of=20
the patient (in psychodynamic therapies) (Krauss, in Szasz (1977)), the=20
individuality of the patient, so the argument goes, is lost. These treatment=
=20
models operate more to reproduce themselves and their understandings=E2=80=
=94that is,=20
their basic logic of human psychology=E2=80=94than to properly facilitate he=
aring what=20
the patient is actually saying with any phenomenological or contextual depth=
=20
(Sartre, 1988). <o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><B><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   s=
tyle=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT><=
/o:p></SPAN></B></P>
<P class=3DMsoBodyText style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt; TEXT-ALIGN: left"   ali=
gn=3Dleft><SPAN style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Cent=
ral to=20
the ongoing critiques of the psychodynamic model is the contention that it i=
s=20
scientifically unverifiable. Perhaps the strongest proponent of such attacks=
 has=20
been Karl Popper who, in terms mentioned at the outset of the paper observed=
=20
that psychodynamic conceptualizations of the human being are simply not=20
testable, irrefutable. =E2=80=98There [is] no conceivable human behaviour wh=
ich could=20
contradict them. This does not mean that Freud...[was] not seeing things=20
correctly...But it does mean that those =E2=80=9Cclinical observations=E2=
=80=9D which analysts=20
naively believe confirm their theory cannot do this any more than the daily=20
confirmations which astrologers find in their practice (Popper, cited in Sza=
sz,=20
1977, p.73).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P></DIV><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMIL=
Y: 'Times New Roman'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-l=
anguage: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA"><BR =20=
 style=3D"PAGE-BREAK-BEFORE: always; mso-break-type: section-break"   clear=
=3Dall></SPAN>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Although it is not of=20
fundamental import to this paper whether psychodynamic thought and practice=20=
is=20
'unfalsifiable', it <I>is</I> of great importance that as a <I>social=20
science</I> which relies both implicitly and explicitly upon the status of=20
science to justify its interventions and procedures, much psychodynamic=20
psychotherapy makes claims which are unfalsifiable. Popper (1960) asserts th=
at=20
unfalsifiable and hence unscientific theories, when used in human affairs, a=
re=20
merely the pseudoscientific justifications for oppression. Following this li=
ne=20
of critique, it is impossible to convict the psychodynamic therapist of a fa=
lse=20
diagnosis, to falsify and hence properly refute their pronouncements (Szasz,=
=20
1977). <o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>The psychodynamic therap=
ist=20
then is in possession of powers of intervention and interpretation that alth=
ough=20
reliant on a 'scientific' legitimation are in fact <I>unscientific</I>. Such=
=20
powers then may seem to be somewhat unwarranted, and, given the importance o=
f=20
the interpretative functions of the clinician, deeply problematic. They gran=
t a=20
great =E2=80=98interpretative latitude=E2=80=99 to the clinician, which=E2=
=80=94bearing in mind the=20
complicated and indirect relationship between mental processes and behaviour=
 in=20
psychodynamic thought=E2=80=94frequently means that presenting features of t=
he patient's=20
narrative and behaviour may be taken to mean what the therapist wants them t=
o=20
mean. <o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>The power that this=20
scientific 'legitimation' grants the therapist over the patient is as such=20
illegitimate, unethical, and potentially damaging (Masson, 1989; Szasz, 1977=
).=20
This is a form of power, moreover, in which ultimately it is <I>the therapis=
t's=20
own biases and values</I> that come to exert influence in the therapeutic ar=
ena.=20
As Szasz (1973) states, with a typical flair for polemic, =E2=80=98Can anyon=
e really=20
believe that a psychotherapist's ideas on religion, politics and related iss=
ues=20
play no role in his [sic] practical work?=E2=80=99 (p.16). That the therapis=
t may make=20
use of their professional power (intentionally or unintentionally) to assert=
=20
certain moral, normative, social or even personal values is of course the da=
nger=20
here. This is one of Masson=E2=80=99s (1994) predominant concerns: no form o=
f=20
psychotherapy, he claims, is value-free. Furthermore, no therapist can avoid=
,=20
however discretely, instilling values of this sort within their patients. Th=
e=20
potential for damage, abuse and coercion in this regard is quite obvious; it=
 is=20
also one of the most common concerns of the critical literature, which will=20
further be developed in a later section of the=20
paper.<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3></FONT></o:p></SP=
AN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>A related concern here,=20=
and=20
it is an attack frequently put to psychodynamic approaches, is that of an=20
over-riding theoretical bias that leads therapists to impose a particular=20
viewpoint on patients. Speaking of psychodynamic practice, Spinelli (1994) w=
arns=20
that therapists often impose their own values and beliefs on patient's stori=
es,=20
emphasizing and directing them to those elements in their accounts which bes=
t=20
fit <I>the therapist's</I> theories. Spinelli (1994) claims that a great dea=
l of=20
contemporary therapeutic practice, regardless of the theory espoused, remain=
s=20
theory-led, and as such can be seen as opening therapists up to accusations=20=
of=20
misuse, however seemingly inadvertent, of therapeutic power. The obvious exa=
mple=20
here would be the automatic discounting of patient explanations that are not=
=20
commensurate with the therapist's general theory of human functioning. This=20=
is=20
exactly the claim Masson (1984) makes against Freud's abandonment of the=20
seduction theory=E2=80=94that his allegiance to a developing theory of uncon=
scious=20
fantasy led to the fact that he systematically ignored his patients=E2=80=
=99 real=20
conditions of incest and familial abuse.<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Echoing these concerns o=
f=20
the imposition of the therapist's own value, Parker, Georgaca, Harper,=20
McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith (1995), point out that psychodynamic therapies=20
often preclude the possibility of meaning being cooperatively reached in the=
rapy=20
because of the therapist's theory-empowered position. The realm of influence=
 in=20
such approaches may be seen as more encompassing than this. Parker et al. (1=
995)=20
view psychodynamic practices as binding patients into relationships of=20
subordination. It is not good enough simply to say what the therapist wants=20=
to=20
hear, they claim, one must <I>believe</I> it (1995). Brown makes the same po=
int=20
(1973b) when he claims that =E2=80=98...therapy demands the filial subordina=
tion of the=20
patient, as well as an acceptance of the therapist's values, which are usual=
ly=20
similar to accepted societal values=E2=80=99 (p.482).<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPA=
N></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Humanist, person-centred=
 and=20
existential-phenomenological therapies aimed in many ways to eradicate certa=
in=20
of these above problems. The objective here was often to eschew more directi=
ve=20
(or directing) explanatory accounts locked into strict theory-based procedur=
es,=20
facilitating instead a more non-directive approach that limited didactic for=
ms=20
of therapist intervention/interpretation, preferring instead to facilitate t=
he=20
autonomous and unique person of the 'client' by approaching them on their ow=
n=20
terms (see Rogers, 1951; 1961). Such treatment modalities typically place gr=
eat=20
emphasis on the intimacy of the patient-therapist relationship. Efficacy in=20
treatment was now reliant less on therapeutic process and more on the emotio=
nal=20
climate of the therapy, with a key objective being that of the therapist try=
ing=20
to enter the client's phenomenological world. Masson (1994) has been critica=
l of=20
these recommendations, taking to task particularly Carl Rogers=E2=80=99 famo=
us three=20
personal conditions of therapeutic efficacy: genuineness, unconditional posi=
tive=20
regard and empathy. These are qualities that for Masson (1994) cannot simply=
 be=20
manufactured in a clinical setting, and are better obtained from=20
extra-therapeutic relationships (like friendships) where they are not=20
cultivated=E2=80=94or at worst <I>contrived</I>=E2=80=94by/in a therapist.=20
<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT></o:=
p></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 0cm 0pt"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   styl=
e=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><FONT size=3D3>Masson=E2=80=99s point i=
s that these=20
therapeutic qualities are designed and implemented to bring about change, to=
=20
provide a form of cure, so, although the qualities of humanistic therapy may=
 not=20
appear to be openly coercive, their role is fundamentally the same as the mo=
re=20
obviously power-stricken qualities of the behaviourist and psychodynamic=20
schools. As Richer (1992) has cautioned, that therapeutic procedures are not=
=20
explicitly directed by the therapist does not mean that s/he does not retain=
=20
powerful levels of control and influence. The therapist=E2=80=99s values are=
 still=20
thought to play a fundamentally important part in determining the therapy=
=E2=80=94in=20
humanistic-existential therapies these values are simply implicit as opposed=
 to=20
more overtly evident (Richer, 1992). Rather more polemically Richer (1992)=20
comments that: =E2=80=98We imagine that by avoiding objectification and medi=
calization,=20
the hermeneutic...and humanistic trends in psychology somehow transcend the=20=
job=20
of social control more explicit in other forms of psychology. Nothing could=20=
be=20
further from the truth. In the end, the... humanistic...approaches are more=20
efficient at normalizing than=E2=80=A6the shaping techniques of behaviourism=
=E2=80=99=20
(p.118)<o:p></o:p></FONT></SPAN></P>
<P class=3DMsoNormal style=3D"MARGIN: 0cm 1cm 0pt 0cm"><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB  =20=
style=3D"FONT-FAMILY: 'Times New Roman'"><o:p><FONT   size=3D3>&nbsp;</FONT>=
</o:p></SPAN></P><SPAN lang=3DEN-GB   style=3D"FONT-SIZE: 12pt; FONT-FAMILY:=
 'Times New Roman'; mso-fareast-font-family: 'Times New Roman'; mso-ansi-lan=
guage: EN-GB; mso-fareast-language: EN-US; mso-bidi-language: AR-SA">As=20
is apparent from these comments, there are those critics who believe that th=
e=20
humanistic-existential therapies involve the use of a <I>more profound and=20
sophisticated power </I>than the psychodynamic and behaviourist procedures.=20=
From=20
this perspective, humanistic-existential therapies are seen as=20
<I>reinforcing</I> the concept of individuals as isolated from their culture=
 and=20
history. By supporting what Kvale (1992) calls =E2=80=98the cult of the indi=
vidual=20
subject and its self-actualization=E2=80=99 (p.43), the humanistic-existenti=
al therapies=20
are seen as expanding the reach of therapeutic power by <I>internalizing its=
=20
operation within the therapeutic subject</I> who increasingly causes it to p=
lay=20
upon themselves. In a humanistic ethics, virtue became a responsibility towa=
rds=20
one's own existence, and vice, irresponsibility towards oneself; the=20
self-actualizing person had to be self-contained and true to themselves (Kva=
le,=20
1992). The claim here is basically that therapies of this nature attempt in=20=
some=20
way to internalize, within their subjects, the effects of a controlling powe=
r,=20
which although individualistic in nature, would never be substantially divor=
ced=20
from dominant social values and morals.</SPAN></DIV></FONT></BODY></HTML>
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