 |
 |
Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University http://fbc.binghamton.edu/commentr.htm Comment No. 137, May 15, 2004 Immanuel Wallerstein "The U.S. and Europe, 1945 to Today" Since 1945, a primary objective of U.S. foreign policy has been to keep western Europe as a subordinated, highly integrated part of its geopolitical strategic resources. This was easy to achieve in the aftermath of the Second World War, when Europe was economically exhausted from the effects of the war, and when a majority of its populations, and even more of the political and economic elite, were fearful of Communist forces, both because of Soviet military power and because of the popular strength of western European Communist parties. The U.S. program took the form of Marshall Plan economic assistance for European recovery and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is within this context that the moves to create European institutions took place. At first, these efforts were limited to six countries - France, West Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries - and involved limited economic arrangements. There were also early efforts to create European military structures, which were not successful. The movement in this direction was strongly supported by European Christian-Democratic parties, but also by Social-Democratic parties. They were strongly opposed by the Communist parties in these countries, who saw these structures as part of the Cold War. From a U.S. point of view, European structures seemed desirable, both because they strengthened European economies (and therefore made them better customers for U.S. exports and investments), and because they seemed to be a way of allaying French fears about German military rearmament and integration into NATO. By the 1960's, two elements in the equation began to change from the U.S. point of view. First, Western Europe was becoming too strong. It was emerging as an economic peer of the U.S. and therefore as a potential serious competitor in the world-economy. Secondly, Charles de Gaulle came to power once again in France. And De Gaulle wanted to have European structures that would be politically autonomous, that is, not subordinate segments of U.S. geopolitical strategic resources. At this point, U.S. enthusiasm about European unity began to cool. But the U.S. found itself politically unable to state this openly. There were further shifts in the situation. The Communist parties of Western Europe grew weaker electorally. And their politics began to change in the direction of what was then called Eurocommunism. One of the consequences was a shift in the position of these parties about European structures, which they began cautiously to support, or at least tolerate. This was the period in which the U.S. was losing the war in Vietnam, which took a serious toll on the U.S. geopolitical position. The combination of this political-military setback, combined with the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as major economic competitors, meant the end of unquestioned U.S. hegemony in the world-system and the beginning of a slow decline. It required a major shift in U.S. foreign policy from the simple outright dominance of the earlier period. The shift started with Nixon - détente with the Soviet Union, and more importantly the trip to Beijing and the transformation of U.S.-China relations. Nixon initiated the policy of what I call soft multilateralism," a policy that would be pursued by every successive U.S. president from Nixon to Clinton, including Reagan and George H.W. Bush. In terms of Europe, the main consideration was how to slow down what seemed to be a growing trend towards European political autonomy. To do this, the U.S. offered Europe geopolitical "partnership" (that is, a degree of political consultation) on two fronts - the continuing Cold War with the Soviet Union, and the political-economic struggles of the North versus the South. This was supposed to be implemented by a multitude of institutions - among others, the Trilateral Commission, the meetings of the G-7, and the World Economic Forum at Davos. The program on the Cold War resulted in the Helsinki agreements. The North-South program resulted in the drive against nuclear proliferation, the Washington Consensus (in favor of neo-liberalism, against developmentalism), and the construction of the World Trade Organization. In the 1970s and 1980s, one could say that the adjusted U.S. foreign policy was partially successful. Although Europe's political autonomy increased - remember German's Ostpolitik and the gazoduc linking the Soviet Union and Western Europe - by and large Europe did not wander very far from the U.S. geopolitically. In particular, attempts to create a European army were effectively blocked by continuing opposition by the United States. In practice, although not in words, the U.S. had become hostile to European unity. U.S. policy seemed even more successful on the North-South front. Most Third World countries fell in line with the IMF's structural adjustment policies, and even the socialist countries of east-central Europe moved in this direction. Popular disillusion with the national liberation movements in power and with the Communist regimes in the socialist bloc muted any remaining militancy and created a sense of morose pessimism among the world left. And of course, the final "triumph" was the collapse of the U.S.S.R. But this "triumph" did not at all serve U.S. foreign policy interests, least of all in western Europe. For it removed the last major argument as to why western Europe should accept a subordination to U.S. geopolitical "leadership" around the world. Saddam Hussein seized the moment to pose an overt challenge to the U.S., something he would never have been able to do in the previous Cold War days. The Gulf War ended in a truce at the line of departure, which, as the decade went on, seemed less and less acceptable to the U.S. Clinton nonetheless pursued the Nixon policy of "soft multilateralism" in the Balkans, the Middle East, and East Asia, and the west Europeans still declined to break openly with the U.S. on any major issue. Meanwhile, to ensure that western Europe would stay in line, the U.S. pushed hard for the incorporation into European institutions (and NATO) of the now non-Communist east and central European states, feeling that these states would be eager to maintain and reinforce ties with theU.S. and would thus counterbalance the emerging autonomist sentiments in western Europe. Enter George W. Bush and the hawks. They viewed the Nixon-to-Clinton foreign policy as incredibly weak and a major contribution to the continuing decline of U.S. power in the world. They were particularly disdainful of any reliance on United Nations structures and especially anxious to contain Europe's aspirations to political autonomy. In their view, the way to do this was to assert U.S. power unilaterally, and militarily, in a blatantly forceful way. Their target of choice, well announced beforehand during the 1990s, was Iraq, for three reasons: The Gulf War had been "humiliating" for the U.S. in that Saddam Hussein survived; Iraq would be an excellent site for permanent U.S. bases in the Middle East; Iraq was an easy target, militarily, precisely because it did not have weapons of mass destruction. The theory of the hawks was that the conquest of Iraq would demonstrate the unbeatable military superiority of the United States, and would therefore have three effects: It would intimidate the western Europeans (and secondarily the East Asians) and end all aspirations for political autonomy. It would intimidate all aspiring nuclear powers and induce them to abandon any pretensions to obtaining such weapons. It would intimidate all Middle Eastern states, and induce them to end all aspirations for self-assertion geopolitically as well as get them to accept a settlement of the Israel/Palestine issue on terms acceptable to Israel and the United States. This policy has been a complete fiasco. The seemingly easy target of Iraq has turned out not to be such an easy target. At the moment, the U.S. occupation is facing resistance and an ever-growing uprising which will minimally end with an Iraqi government not at all to the taste of the U.S. and maximally with a total withdrawal of U.S. forces, as happened in Vietnam. The attempt to split Europe into two camps - the so-called "old Europe" and "new Europe" - had momentary success. But with the Spanish elections, the tide has turned entirely, and Europe is on the verge of establishing its geopolitical autonomy for the first time since 1945. Nuclear proliferation has not been slowed down. If anything, it has been speeded up. And Middle Eastern states are pulling away from, not edging towards, the United States (with the exception of Libya, a policy that may not last). And Israel/Palestine is in total deadlock, which will persist until it explodes in a way that cannot be contained. The macho unilateralism of the hawks has failed, and support for such a policy within the United States has declined considerably, even among Republican conservatives. However, what is the alternative? What the Republican moderates, and even more the centrist Democrats, led by John F. Kerry, offer in its place is a return to the "soft multilateralism" of the Nixon-to-Clinton years. Can this work now? It is very doubtful. It is almost certain that, in the next decade, the siren of nuclear armament will attract a dozen states at least, and that we shall be going from eight to twenty-five nuclear powers in the next quarter century. This provides a real constraint on U.S. military power. There seems no likelihood that Middle Eastern realities will move in any direction the U.S. will like. This is particularly true of Israel/Palestine. What of Europe? Europe is the big question mark of world geopolitics at the moment. Even the most "Atlanticist" of Europeans has become wary of the U.S. government, and even of a "multilateralist" U.S. But Europe still shares one interest with the United States - the North- South struggle. The adoption of a serious European constitution is still in doubt, especially since a single negative vote on a referendum in any one country can undo any agreement. And in particular, the European left is not yet cured of its post-1945 doubts about European unity, and is therefore not yet ready to throw itself wholeheartedly into European construction. This is particularly true in the Nordic countries and in France, but there are some similar reserves almost everywhere. A strong autonomous Europe is a first, and essential, building block of a multipolar world. An autonomous Europe that would be willing to work towards a fundamental restructuring of the world-economy in directions that would actually start to overcome the continuing North- South polarization would constitute an even greater change on the world scene. Both are eminently possible. Neither is at all certain. Immanuel Wallerstein [Copyright by Immanuel Wallerstein. All rights reserved. Permission is granted to download, forward electronically or e-mail to others and to post this text on non-commercial community Internet sites, provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To translate this text, publish it in printed and/or other forms, including commercial Internet sites and excerpts, contact the author at [log in to unmask]; fax: 1-607-777-4315. These commentaries, published twice monthly, are intended to be reflections on the contemporary world scene, as seen from the perspective not of the immediate headlines but of the long term.]