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From: Vladimir / S�nia Micheletti <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Value demonstrated in geometrical order / Heisenberg / Marx / Freeman
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Dear friends

Alan Freeman has asked me to subscribe him to the Brazilian Society of Political Economy�s List of Discussion. I thank Alan Freeman for moving the discussion forward. I have argued that his critic writings (Marx and Non-equilibrium Economics, for example; and many others �critics�) never reached the level of critic set by Keynes.

The following is a copy of the message just mailed to the Brazilian list.

Thanks for your attention.

Vladimir D. Micheletti

Departamento de Economia

Universidade Federal de Alagoas

Northeast of Brazil

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This equation, exchange-value=use-value [bisector line], or limit of the inverse proportional function, ev=f(1/uv), is extremely important, even though we can dispense it in proceeding the analysis on value theory.

Why is it [vt=vu] so important, at the same time, nonessential?

1) First, you Alan Freeman � like Marx and all the physicians based on relativistic quantum mechanics � may consider it nonessential because �it has no special quantitative relationship with labour-value�.

Despite the Heisenberg uncertainty principle {Dx Dy > h/m), this uncertainty occupies only the mind of the physicians not attained to the relativistic quantum mechanics. Heinsenberg said that this uncertainty principle should not preclude the physics� proceedings because it was knowledge�s problem. So, Dx Dy = h/m prevailed and the relativistic scientists proceeds their works.

            Wouldn�t this knowledge�s problem be analogous to the Spinoza�s hour that never passes? I mean, Spinoza brought an example based on the duration of an hour that never reaches the full hour: to get the full hour the indicator must pass the first half, than the half of the rest, than the half of the next rest, and so on that it continues passing / separating / dividing and never reaches the full hour. Spinoza explained this never happening hour by the entity of REASON [x2; the duration minded] that differs from the real entity [x; the time presented by the clock].[1] (Is it a knowledge or mathematical�s problem? � we�ll see this later).

We all know that you (Alan Freeman), Marx, Einstein, Bohr, Malaguti, Paulo de Tarso, Menezes, Frederic Lee, Alfredo Saad-Filho, M�sz�ros[2], etc. find this �difference�, between the hour presented by the clock and the hour reasoned by our minds, meaningless. Who cares about this meaningless difference? It is just a fraction (0,000000000123), the �remaining thing�, the �residue�, the �Statistical error�, that doesn�t make any difference.

Spinoza, Comte, Marx (from the Mathematical Manuscripts, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, and Ethnological Notebooks) don�t think this �residue� is meaningless.

Why did Marx think of this �residue� as meaningless, at the same time, as important? (�the real and therefore the simplest relation of the new with the old is discovered as soon as the new gains its final form, and one may say the differential calculus gained this relation through the theorems of Taylor MacLaurin. Therefore the thought first occurred to Lagrange to return the differential calculus to the firm algebraic foundation (auf strict algebraische Basis). Perhaps his forerunner in this was John Landen, an English mathematician from the middle of the 18th century, in his Residual Analysis. Indeed, I must look for this book in the [British] Museum before I can make a judgment on it� (p. 113, Mathematical manuscripts, New Park Publications, 1983).

First, Marx considers it meaningless because it did not obstruct the construction of his economic theory (Marxist Economic Theory � MET), and the Conventional Economic Theory was just being born at that time (Engels, at the preface of tome III � �in reality, however, this theory is merely a paraphrase of the Marxist�). Second, this �residue� is a mathematical problem, and even being a mathematical problem, Marx tried to solve it as the latter quotation shows.

Let us come to our discussion. You said: �therefore for me, it [use-value = exchange-value; bisector line] has no special quantitative relationship with labour-value�. You are right. The relativistic physicians don�t care neither about the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, but they operate their categories in the micro-world.

What about you?

Do you believe that �the alternative is that education be directed towards a non-instrumental aims, or at list, that there is a better balance between the two [MET and CET]. Clearly, heterodox ideas [Marx, Keynes, and someone else] have a major role to play in a non-instrumental economics education. However, there is also a role for the orthodox [neoclassical or CET]. As it can be used to achieve specific intrinsic aims. The question then becomes one of balance [equilibrium? Bisector line?],�� (�why Marxist economics should be taught but probably won�t be!�, Clarke and Mearman, Capital & Class, n� 79, spring 2003)?

Do you really think Marx�s theory does not carry an instrumental aim? That we cannot operate it?

Do you really believe that Marxist Economic Theory should be taught as part of a �parallel perspective� approach as Clarke and Mearman said? Is that for the students to reveal their preferences?

Aren�t you all observing that MET actually is the �residue� or the �remaining thing� that doesn�t make any difference?

I think we should, I mean, we must revert this situation.

How can we revert it?

Let us return to your question. The question you and Carchedi have posed at the Foreword of your own book: �a further question is however posed by this conclusion. How, for nearly the whole of this century, could Marx have been systematically misrepresented even by those with every reason not to?�.

But now I include you, Malaguti, Paulo de Tarso Soares, Reinaldo Carcanholo, Claus Germer, Jason, Frederic Lee, Menezes, Idaleto, Fred Lee, Alfredo Saad-Filho, etc. among �those� you and Carchedi have thought of, because you all have not reached the level of critic posed by Keynes.

2) Dare I say this value demonstrated in geometrical order is the only and scientific way to make MET robuster (from the �residual� condition to �main� paradigm), but we must reach some agreements before the presentation of why, how, and when the equation � excgange-value=use-value, as a result or limit of the proportionally inverse function, ev=f(1/uv), and also the �salto vital� (Lenin / Engels) and �powered residue� (Spinoza / Comte / Durkheim) � makes the difference, I mean, is extremely important.

First, we all should agree with: �the Twentieth century has been nothing if not innovative. Its technological miracles would have astonished the Victorians. Cosmology has reshaped space and time; physics has abandoned determinacy and biology defies the laws of evolution. There are, however, two exceptions to this pageant of revolutions: religion and economics. Adam Smith has been re-instated as prophet of the market, Ricardo as the oracle of trade, and economic gospel reduced to the following: the market satisfies all and wastes nothing; no-one could be better off without it, and no-one goes without work who takes the going wage. The foundation of this cathechism is a dogma: that supply equates itself to demand. Its formal basis, despite the beatification of the classicals, was laid in the 1870s and bears the name of General Competitive Equilibrium. Since then Arrow, Debreu, Hahn and others have added some rigor, time preferences have been tacked on, and the elastic distinction between short and long run has tied down some loose ends. But the basic instruments are as Walras, Jevons and Menger bequeathed them. Keynes�s brief excursus has been assimilated into what Arestis (1992) calls the �Grand Neoclassical Synthesis� and today�s economics is a theory of supply curves, demand curves and simultaneous, instantaneous market clearing� (Freeman and Carchedi, 1996, p. vii). But this �Grand Neoclassical Synthesis� is false because it just misrepresented the real keynes� synthesis. Actually the �Neoclassical Synthesis� is the General Equilibrium that you and Carchedi rejected � �the first line of investigation, as the title implies, is thus a thoroughgoing rejection of equilibrium� (p. x). That means, we shall not reject the general equilibrium because this equilibrium may be the utmost objective of MET.

Second, Keynes almost reached the dialectical way of thinking (bidimensional) � �the composition of this book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, and so must the reading of it be for most readers if the author�s assault upon them is to be successful � a struggle of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression�When I began to write my Treatise on Money I was still moving along the traditional lines of regarding the influence of money as something so to speak separate from the general theory of supply and demand� and is in this way linked up with our fundamental theory of value. We thus led to a more general theory, which includes the [neo]classical theory with which we are familiar, as a special case� (Keynes, 1964, preface).

I said Keynes almost reached the level of critic posed by Marx / Engels (and he left you all behind) because Keynes, at least, noted the �residue�. Keynes appropriated the terms �speculation� and �enterprise�, and said: �even apart from the instability due to speculation, there is the instability due to the characteristic of human nature that a large proportion of our positive activities depend on spontaneous optimism rather than on a mathematical expectation, whether moral or hedonistic or economic. Most, probably, of our decisions to do something positive, the full consequences of which will be drawn out over many days to come, can only be taken as a result of animal spirit [potential spinozistic?Comtean � Anomia�?] � of a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction,� We should not conclude from this that everything depends on waves of irrational psychology� (Keynes, ch.12).

Keynes did not know the origin of this �irrational psychology� and how it could become a �constituent power�. That is why he said: �for my own part I am now somewhat skeptical of the success of a merely monetary policy directed towards influencing the rate of interest. I expect to see the State, which is in a position to calculate the marginal efficiency of capital-goods� calculated on the principles I have described above� [constant marginal utility/efficiency - bissetriz]� (ch.12).

You, Alan Freeman, in despite of NOT noting the �residue� (this irrational aspect left besides even by the mathematicians, therefore, these gentlemen accepted it as number four or six centuries later) have also found that �mathematics does not help him [or neoclassical] in this respect; the problem is not its use but its abuse, which this chapter seeks to end� (Freeman, p. 227). But the problem is also mathematical. Mathematics, as you said � �suffers the same limitation as formal logic, which has to separate things conceptually that are not isolated actually� (p. 226) � so all we have to do is to attack this formalism (this one-sided way to think of; mathematicians think the form, they don�t think about the content) and NOT �to develop a complete alternative way of going about things so as to break [separate] the stranglehold of equilibrium thinking [the first and actually �neoclassical Synthesis�, the �combination�]� (Freeman, p. 226). [Griffon mine].

What about this contradiction? Why do you attack the real synthesis, to separate the combination?

Aren�t you being capitulated before this �critic� to the false �neoclassical synthesis� and the unilateral mathematics?

When I say that you and many of ours colleagues have not reached the level of critic posed by Keynes, I mean that you have not noted the �residue� and its meaning. Therefore, others supposedly �Marxists� even make fun of the Marxist categories (I have read so many texts that the object is: �the abstract labor is opposed to concrete labor�; �no, the concrete labor is opposed to abstract labor�).

3) You said that: �geometry. I have problems with |Vladimir�s use of this word. I need that he should explain more clearly what he means by a geometric demonstration� exactly what his system of value really is�� (Message, May 12, SEP).

First, I have no system of value, I just brought up the Marxists categories using some equations and a graphic, and considering that Marx used the dialectical triade, which Hegel had obtained from the Holy Trinity (Father, thesis; Son, antithesis; and Holy Spirit, synthesis). These equations and graphic have provided us the understanding / observation of many others categories like Spinozian, Comte (it seems to me that Comte were the first to use the category � �uneven and combined development�), Pareto�s optimum, and the real �neoclassical synthesis�.

About the geometrical demonstration of value, I think this Spinoza�s example is sufficient: �Let there be three numbers given through which it is required to discover a forth which shall be to the third as the second is to the first. A merchant does not hesitate to multiply the second and the third together and divide the product by the first, either because he has not yet forgotten the things which he heard without any demonstration from his schoolmaster, or because he has seen the truth of the rule with the more simples numbers, or because from the 19th prop. In the 7th  book of Euclid he understands the common property of all proportional. But with the simplest numbers there is no need of all this. If the numbers 1, 2, 3, for instance, be given, every one can see the fourth proportional is 6 much more clearly than by any demonstration� (Spinoza, Ethic, propXL). The solution is: thesis or induction - (1+2+3=6); antithesis or deduction � (6=3+2+1), therefore, the fourth proportional is 6, the bisector line or limit of the function commented before.

About the �salto vital�: �Engels plainly employs the salto vitale method in philosophy, that is to say, he makes a leap from theory [antithesis] to practice [thesis]. Not a single one of the learned (and stupid) professors of philosophy, in whose footsteps our Machians follow, would permit himself to make such a leap, for this would be a disgraceful thing for a devotee of �pure science� to do. For them the theory of knowledge, which demands the cunning concoction of �definitions,� is one thing, while practice is another. For Engels all living human practice permeates the theory of knowledge itself and provides an objective criterion of truth. For until we know a law of nature, it, existing and acting independently and outside our mind, makes us slaves of �blind necessity.� But once we come to know this law, which acts (as Marx pointed out a thousand times) independently of our will and our mind, we become the masters of nature. The mastery of nature manifested in human practice is a result of an objectively correct reflection within the human head of the phenomena and processes of nature, and is proof of the fact that this reflection (within the limits of what is revealed by practice) is objective, absolute, and eternal truth�. (Lenin, 1982, p.144) [Griffon is ours]

About the �residue�, I think the work of Marjorie L. DeVault � Feeding the family: the social organization of caring as gendered work � is extremely important because it shows the �theory of caring�, it presents the newest kind of work � the �gendered work� � originated from the families (the �residual� families) that have become the �constituent power�. This �new kind of work� is opposed to the labour that measures prices / value, that is, it is intrinsically gendered and cannot be priced.

This way we pose the limit to function commented before.

Mathematicians have no other alternative if not accepting this limit (the limit to formal logic, but the combination with the dialectical logic).

I hope you all will not wait to long to accept this value demonstrated in geometrical order. I mean, the mathematicians took 4 or 6 centuries to accept the irrational into the set of numbers, and we all know how important these irrational numbers are.

Well, I better go now.

Thanks for the attention.

Abra�os.

Vladimir D. Micheletti

Departamento de Economia

Universidade Federal de Alagoas

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[1] I am supposing you have read about the �function of knowledge�  presented by Pierre Fougeyrollas: Suponhamos que esta fonte seja a realidade atual (soruce of the text = reality). Voc�, eu and a religious wo/man are observing this same reality (x). N�s trazemos para dentro de nossa mente a representa�-o desta realidade, we cannot bring the objective reality into our mind, so we �subjective� the reality (characteristic of or belonging to reality as perceived or known as opposed to reality as it is in itself or independent of mind), isto �, n�s re-presentamos (repetimos a presenta�-o na mente), ent-o, em nossa mente temos a relidade2, mesmo porque realidade = x and we represent it into our mind: x.x = x2 . A representa�-o mental do homem / mulher religioso pode at� ser x5, xn, porque as rela��es que o religioso faz com os fatos (sociais) na mente podem ser extremamente complexas. Keynes, por exemplo, disse: �we have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degree� (ch.12, Long-term expectation).

O que � este �terceiro grau� que Keynes comenta? What third degree is this? Is it Spinozian third kind of knowledge? � o terceiro grau de conhecimento de Spinoza? Is it Comte�s third state? � o terceiro estado de Auguste Comte? (teol�gico [tese]; metaf�sico [ant�tese]; positivo [s�ntese]). Com certeza, o �third degree� de Keynes pode ser ambos os princ�pios de Spinoza e de Comte, pois todos dois apresentam seus princ�pios com base tr�ade dial�tica (tese, ant�tese e s�ntese), ainda que n-o se referindo diretamente a esta tr�ade. Al�m do mais, ambos apresentam a �pot�ncia� (ou �anomalia selvagem� de Spinoza) e a �anomia� (Comte; que Durkheim, mais tarde apresentar� como �res�duo�).

[2] The first phrase of his book � Beyond Capital: towards a theory of transition � M�sz�ros wrote: �The �little corner of the world� of which Marx spoke in 1985 is no longer a little corner��. At chapter 1, he returns to it and say: �given the obvious global of the historical transformation experienced since Marx�s day, no one could confine any longer the prospects of fundamental social upheavals to a �little corner of the world�� (p. 36).

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