Dear Victor and Colleagues,
If I may add a few comments to Martin's recent message, I would point out that there is another maritime "boundary" in the eastern Mediterranean, that between Israel and the PLA. Perhaps its status is provisional--I leave the characterization to our learned legal specialists. However, it would appear to have some international status. I also have some additional, if dated information on negotiations and possible complications.
Israel-PLA
The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which was signed in Washington, D.C. on 28 September 1995, gave the Palestinian Council territorial jurisdiction over land, subsoil, and territorial waters [Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, art. XVII, para. 2a, and art. XXXI, para. 13]. The Interim Agreement incorporated maps from an earlier Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area that depicted the maritime area and specified coordinates (Map 3). The map is found on the Israel Foreign Ministry website (www.israel-mfa.gov.il/mfa/). The coordinates of the turning points are given in a table on the map, but the image is poor and the numbers difficult to read. The area extends 20 nautical miles from the shore. It is labeled a fishing zone.
During 2000, British Gas approached the Palestinian Authority (PA) for permission to prospect for gas off the coast of Gaza. In June, the PA Minister of Planning and International Cooperation stated that "Under the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the Israelis acknowledged our right to 20 miles (32 km) into the sea as an economic sovereignty area, including its potential resources, such as oil and gas." Israel approved the license to drill a well on 6 July. However, in September 2000 the PA accused Israel of preventing a second well, because it falsely claimed that the deposit was a joint gas field. [Al-Ayyam (Ramallah), 5 June 2000, pp. 1, 17 (translated in FBIS-NES-2000-0605); Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), 7 July 2000, p. 4 (trans. FBIS-NES-2000-0707); and Al-Hayah al-Jadidah (Ramallah), 28 September 2000, pp. 1, 15 (trans. FBIS-NES-2000-0928)]
Cyprus-Egypt and Cyprus-Lebanon
During the announcement of the Cypriot-Syrian negotiations (below) there was mention that "Cyprus is also expected to enter into dialogue on possible joint oil and gas projects with Egypt, Lebanon and Israel" [Cyprus Mail (Nicosia), 7 August 2001, pp. 1, 3 (transcribed in FBIS-WEU-2001-0807)]. What was meant by joint projects was not made clear. In mid-February 2003, the Cypriot Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism, Nicos Rolandis, met with Israeli and Syrian diplomats to discuss EEZ and continental shelf boundaries. He characterized the talks as preliminary, but said that negotiations with "Egypt had progressed to the stage where an agreement would be signed soon" [M2 Presswire via Comtrex, 13 and 15 Feb 2003]. A technical issue in any negotiations between Cyprus and Lebanon may be what, if any, effect to give the UK sovereign bases in Cyprus on the course of the boundary, as Martin mentions. Lebanon would benefit if the bases were discounted, because Akrotiri occupies a salient point that would deflect a median line toward Lebanon.
Cyprus-Syria
During the visit of Dr. Mohamad Maher Jamal, the Syrian Minister of Petroleum and Mineral Resources, to Nicosia in August 2001, the countries agreed to delimit their continental shelves and EEZs. Cypriot Minister, Nicos Rolandis, said, "although Syria had not signed the international Law of the Sea Convention of 1982, it was willing to use the Convention's basic provisions to conclude a bilateral agreement with Nicosia" [Cyprus Mail (Nicosia), 7 August 2001]. The countries will try and conclude a deal by the end of the year.
Neither Cyprus nor Syria has claimed an EEZ. Customary international law automatically accords continental shelf rights to coastal countries, but the 1982 UN Convention would appear to require that an explicit claim must be made to obtain EEZ rights. Aside from this legal nicety, a thornier problem for this boundary is the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which controls the northern third of the island of Cyprus. The TRNC includes the Karpas Peninsula that juts out toward Syria-the coastline that would be used to calculate any likely boundary. Presumably, the TRNC would view any maritime boundary with Syria as its domain. The TRNC has apprehended and, on occasion, attacked Syrian fishing boats for violating its "territorial waters" [Anatolia (Ankara), 11 September 1998 and 23 February 1999 (transcribed in FBIS-WEU-98-254 and FBIS-EEU-1999-0224, respectively)]. Depending how much backing Turkey wants to give its client state, the TRNC could become an obstacle to a Republic of Cyprus-Syria accord.
Syria-Turkey
A potential boundary between Syria and Turkey is probably inhibited by their dispute over Hatay, in addition to other bilateral issues. The dispute over the province of Hatay, which includes the city of Iskenderun and the seacoast where the Syria-Turkey land boundary terminates, dates to 1938. In that year France, the colonial power then in Syria under a League of Nations' mandate, transferred the area to Turkey. Syria does not recognize the transfer. Although the territorial dispute is relatively quiescent, it is occasionally raised. In 1998, an Ankara newspaper reported that the Turkish National Security Council was considering military, political, diplomatic, and economic measures to press Syria to stop aiding the outlawed Workers Party of Kurdistan and desist in claiming the Turkish province of Hatay [Associated Press (Ankara), 6 October 1998; Reuters (Ankara), 2 October 1998; Anatolia (Ankara), 5 October 1998 (translated in FBIS-WEU-98-279)]. Because any territorial sea boundary would begin at the boundary of Hatay province, the act of negotiating the boundary may enflame the old territorial dispute.
Regards,
Dan
Daniel J. Dzurek
International Boundary Consultants
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