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On Sat, 26 Apr 2003 18:58:24 -0400, richard <[log in to unmask]> wrote: > >James' provocative submissions deserve evaluation. I disagree along with >Nietzsche that Eastern thought has a "more sophisticated and coherent >tradition" and that the problem of being addressed by "endless convoluted >speculation" is somehow circumvented by simply and magically determining >that 'something either is or isn't". OK that was slightly more rhetorical, than accurate. My point is/remains, however, that there is a fundamental distinction between mentation/language and what 'is', and Western philosophical methods often seem to forget this. Elegant constructions of thought are given some kind of truth value, missing the more fundamental point. And then what happens (in academia mostly) is those patterns of speculative thought become the accepted and normative form of intellectual discourse. Indian and Chinese philosophy usually avoids this because it is phenomenologicaly based - ultimately, from meditation. The difference is like riding a stationary exercise bike and actually getting on the road and going somewhere. <<We do not begin and end with ourselves >because >even if there were a self, it would be an interpretation. >> 'Consciousness' is perhaps a better way of describing this. There's no reason to assert that this is all a question of interpretation only. All that does is subsribe to the view that Intellect is the ultimate and only means of perception or reality, equivalent to 'consciousness'. Which it isn't. There are different kinds of consciousness and - the critical point - different kinds of philosophical outlook apply according to what kind of consciousness you begin with. Most Western phil. is fiercely 'intellectual' ie attempting to cram everything into rational explication. Which is impossible. There are a few exceptions - Bergson distinguished between intellect and intuition, using the latter term to describe a more non- habitual awareness which is not the norm, but a kind of breaking away from automatism. >The notion of the equivalence of "logical construction" and the K'n >thing-in-itself sounds like a misreading and makes no sense. How does one >tie these two concepts together in any consistent acceptable way. And no one >has submitted the impossible notion that language "is the thing itself" >. Hmm. Maybe Heidegger never said this, which may be your reservation here. But my point is, however much you wrestle with H, Sartre, Bergson or anyone else, it is ultimately a mind game ie mentation, which is not, in my opinion, the necessary or appropriate way to investigate 'being'. When H died, I doubt very much if all his years of study made the slightest difference to that basic phenemological fact. I would have liked to have said to him "Now then H, what was all that about being and nothingness? All those books are't really making any difference, are they?" - Why would I say this? Because it proves the point that 'being and nothingness' are not amenable to intellectual perception.