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how interesting!!!

all five questions are questions that a scientist must ask who wants to
determine what something really IS (a scientist who then easily gets into
trouble with others see things differently, finding that what IS is quite
arbitrary)

what about asking the question what people actually do who say they do
science, or what do we want to call a particular practice?

once someone takes responsibility for what s/he says it IS, we can argue
whether the name is useful for our conversation to go where we want it to go.

klaus

At 08:59 AM 4/15/02 +0200, Ken Friedman wrote:
>Dear Colleagues,
>
>Jose Aravena's brief post raises five more issues for consideration.
>The nature of the questions he asks requires us to consider these
>issues:
>
>Problem 11: What is science?
>
>Problem 12: What is philosophy?
>
>Problem 13: Is design research beset by positivist fundamentalism?
>
>Problem 14: What is positivism, anyway?
>
>Problem 15: Why are definitions useful?
>
>As with Andrew King's post, I will not answer here.
>
>As with Andrew's post, I will point out two problems. These are, once
>again, linked to the problem of reading.
>
>The term "positivism" is used loosely in many fields. In design
>research, the term is used so loosely that it loses all meaning. It
>can mean anything from "empirical quantitative research methods as
>used in physics and chemistry" to "stuff that I don't like," "stuff
>that I don't agree with," or "stuff that I simply don't understand."
>
>Jose referred to Per Galle's excellent special issue of Design
>Studies as an example of positivism. Jose writes,
>
>"I think the Design Society (and PhD) is very envolved with
>positivist fundamentals. . . .  Just take a look on what is called
>design philosophy in the last number of Design Studies Journal and
>maybe you could agree with me."
>
>This is not so. Do not take my word for it, though. Read the issue
>for yourself to see whether the authors of the ten articles are
>positivist fundamentalists. To make it easy, you will find the
>abstracts to all articles in the issue in the next post.
>
>It seems to me that these articles represent a wide spectrum of
>views. Some of them are clearly empirical in leaning, but none seem
>positivist to me. Of course, my view on this is influenced by Bunge's
>(1999: 216) view that there are no positivists left in the community
>of serious philosophers - and only a few left in what he playfully
>refers to as the backward regions of natural and social science where
>unreflected data gathering is the main sport.
>
>Jose seems to believe that definitions have no value. I disagree. The
>fact that Jose mislabels as positivist the contents of the entire May
>issue of Design Studies suggests there is, indeed, value to
>definitions. I will attempt to demonstrate that this is so when I
>post my answer to problem 15: "Why are definitions useful?"
>
>Jose writes, "We need philosophers!"
>
>Philosophers are more than polemicists. Philosophy requires
>understanding what it is we are discussing. This is one reason that
>we require definitions, particularly if we are not making progress in
>design research, as Andrew and Jose assert.
>
>It also means relevant reading and close argument from the source
>material. One reason I like Norris's (1997) book on epistemological
>relativism is that he summarizes the major varieties of
>epistemological relativism so well that his book constitutes a good
>introduction to the different schools of thought against which he
>argues.
>
>To be honest, though, I am not entirely sure what Jose calls for. At
>the same time he argues AGAINST definitions, he says, "we need
>descriptions and words." At the same time he argues against theories,
>he says, "we need philosophers." One of the central activities of
>philosophy is theorizing, at least in the basic meaning of the word.
>
>Philosophy begins with relevant reading. Andrew noted that not all of
>us have access to everything we ought to read. True enough. That is
>precisely why I argue for careful citation of source material. That
>is why source arguments must be summarized in the citing document,
>rather than merely pointing to an external argument, as many tend to
>do. That is also why many of us have been concerned with the problem
>of scholarly communication and using he power of the Internet to make
>resources available in full text. As these threads go by, they add up
>to a systematic view of what it is to be engaged in the research
>enterprise. On more than one occasion, you will find that arguments
>posted in one thread have been substantively addressed under another
>rubric.
>
>Now Andrew also suggests that the "problem of reading" involves time
>and stamina. That is true. One need not do a comprehensive literature
>review every time one discusses an issue. One MUST read the relevant
>literature. If one has done enough relevant reading over the years,
>the cumulative knowledge also enables a certain level of engagement.
>
>The topics in this thread are rich enough and important enough that
>the reding we do will be rewarded. It DOES take time to address
>problems in the philsophy of design.
>
>Best regards,
>
>Ken Friedman
>
>
>
>
>
>References
>
>Bunge, Mario. 1999. The Dictionary of Philosophy. Amherst, New York:
>Prometheus Books.
>
>Norris, Christopher. 1997. Against Relativism. Philosophy of Science,
>Deconstruction, and Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.
>
>
>--
>
>Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
>Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
>Department of Leadership and Organization
>Norwegian School of Management
>
>Visiting Professor
>Advanced Research Institute
>School of Art and Design
>Staffordshire University

klaus krippendorff
professor of communication
gregory bateson term-professor for cybernetics, language, and culture
the annenberg school for communication
university of pennsylvania
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