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A cites: > He says that "belief in the causal nexus is superstition", which you > might take note of. He also criticises the "modern" tendency to treat > "the laws of nature" as inviolable explanations, as God and Fate were > treated by earlier peoples, and says "the wisdom of the ancients is > clearer, insofar as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while > the modern system tries to make it look as everything were explained." > I like the smell of this. I read the Tractatus long ago (someone bought me a copy for my birthday, for which I've never forgiven them) but neither know where it is right now (possibly pretending to be a tree falling in a forest, or a squiggle) nor, unlike our punctillious fellow-listee, took notes, and like much that I have read that is NOT poetry, I can't quite remember a lot of it, (what a primitive compelling argument for poetry the mnemnomic is, almost a defensible), other than an impression of voice talking on the sands, alone, as the rollers mounted, but the notion of causal nexus as 'superstition', isn't that beautiful, and liberating. But better still the thought of the ancient, acknowledged terminus, against the modern superiority that arrogates to itself explanation. There's a kind of voice, a dry, scouring tone, that I keep on meeting in the custodial accounts of our culture, works, wisdom, verse, that is so damned _knowing_ so secure in its sense of superiority. I recall reading a work by an Oxbridge philosophe who casually but smugly announced that 'by the end of the first decade of the next century it is quite probable we shall have arrived at an explanation for everything'. Now apart from the unlikelihood of this there was a certain point that His Smugness left begging: that We Might Not Like The Explanation. Nor be able to live by it. Which does matter. Just as poetry may not be able to live in walls of explanation, that assume a superiority to their subject. Which subject is living, and vulnerable as the next corner, and finds no solace at extinction round the bend, being inclined rather to, for another minute, still go on talking... david b ----- Original Message ----- From: <[log in to unmask]> To: <[log in to unmask]> Sent: Thursday, February 15, 2001 8:46 PM Subject: Re: statement > >The last sentence is particularly telling. Logic tells us how to say > >things. That in language, it goes without saying that we obey logical > >principles may make it difficult to see how dependent we are on logic. I do > >not say, "the leaves were in the tree" because it would be illogical. This > >is basic. But there are no language rules that tell me this. I know this > >because of logic. This is a necessity that language naturally accords to > >and therefore it works a ground for language and a limit to language. I > >can't see why this is difficult to appreciate? > > Wittgenstein's statement seems to be saying, rather, that logic is a very > partial quality of language and, perhaps, not even the most important; > and also very clearly that logic bears relationship to signs only, not to > reality. Certainly, logic is not the quality which matters most in > poetry, which is perhaps primarily _expressive_ language; or perhaps, > language expressing _itself_ (if one is Valery, or W being alogical). In > another place, W discusses tautology and contradiction, both staples of > poetry, for example, which he says do not make _sense_. > > I have some notes from Tractatus, but not the book. > > When Wittgenstein says: "The limits of my language are the limits of my > world", he immediately follows it with "We cannot think what we cannot > think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either... The philosophical > self is not the human being, not the human body, not the human soul, with > which psychology deals, but rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of > the world - not a part of it." > > Now, I am not entirely sure how W separates the "metaphysical subject" > from the human body and soul: how can there be such a thing? but it is > very clear that he is discussing the subject and subjectivity, especially > when he tells us that "so too at death the world does not alter but comes > to an end" (only for the subject, obviously); and the limits he is > approaching are those the French so love to call the Other. And also > when he suggests that solipsism is the truest way to apprehend reality. > He is talking about the borders of the _self_, as he construes them. > > The model of reality within language is for Wittgenstein a "proposition". > "Everyday language", he says, "disguises thought"; so that while > "propositions" might behave logically, language itself does not behave > logically. > > He says that "belief in the causal nexus is superstition", which you > might take note of. He also criticises the "modern" tendency to treat > "the laws of nature" as inviolable explanations, as God and Fate were > treated by earlier peoples, and says "the wisdom of the ancients is > clearer, insofar as they have a clear and acknowledged terminus, while > the modern system tries to make it look as everything were explained." > > This is an argument which is so at odds with what you're saying, I wonder > that you quote Wittgenstein to support you. > > > since my words are simply not > >getting through > > Your words are "not getting through" because they don't make "sense". So > it's very difficult to argue with them, and very easy to get irritated, > > Best > > Alison