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I agree with Johnson's post. First, Jim, I don't think the term 'research' is narrow, nor do I think that we don't look at the kind of topics you mention. I would rather have more information from you about your own work in the areas you are interested in than what seem to be contrary arguments that have the sole purpose of bashing those of us who are rather less pragmatic in orientation. I certainly do think that we tend to look rather less at disability than we do at impairment, as the various 'me too' posts illustrate, but I also think that impairment is 'too dark to debate' - for most disabled people, it's a topic we'd rather avoid - and so we're not very clear about how we do research on impairment or how to talk about it beyond personal stories. But perhaps, from a historical perspective, there's a reason for why it now comes up more and more. Very recently, Colin Barnes wrote: 'The original definition of impairment was limited to physical conditions, it was later expanded to include all impairments - sensory and intellectual. This was in recognition of the fact that all physical conditions have psychological implications and that all intellectual impairments have physiological consequences. Also, that these labels were imposed rather than chosen and that they were politically and socially divisive.' (1999: 578) Colin - and I can think of few people who are more interested in the kind of topics you list, Jim - in keeping the attention focused on impairment, is working on the premise that there IS an adequate model of impairment that is separate from the social model, which is concerned with disability. Since Jim and others want more disability-related topics, I'd like to ask the list to speculate on two things: What implications does Colin's suggestion have for the pre-eminently pragmatic social model? That is to say if the social model was founded on an assumption of *physical* impairment and impairment now *includes* sensory and intellectual impairment, how does the social relation with disability change, and do we therefore need a more inclusive understanding of disability? Does the conceptualisation of disability itself change? I ask this simply on the purely pragmatic level that surely if you extend the theoretical base of a model, or do research that suggest that you should, it must change the model. Equally, if you keep the model the same and apply it to the extended base what you end up with is either the suggestion that those impairments which are now included are included in a tokenistic way, or you assume a position where practice appears to be driven by theory. Personally, I still go by the phrase 'There's nothing so practical as a good theory.' and a good disability theory is inclusive, as Colin suggests. That means a social model that practices what it preaches. Best wishes Mairian Mairian Corker Senior Research Fellow in Deaf and Disability Studies Department of Education Studies University of Central Lancashire Preston PR1 2HE Address for correspondence: Deafsearch 111 Balfour Road Highbury London N5 2HE U.K. Minicom/TTY +44 [0]171 359 8085 Fax +44 [0]870 0553967 Typetalk (voice) +44 [0]800 515152 (and ask for minicom/TTY number) ********* "To understand what I am doing, you need a third eye" ********* %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%