Preface: Thanks to Ken for clarifying the role and nature of the phd-design list---very useful---and to Dick for also confirming that this thread is in the right place. Warning: Sorry, this too is a bit long. About 170 lines. Dear Terry, Thank you for your thoughtful and thought provoking reply. To continue with just two things, you say that "... My take on this is to regard designing as the core activity of addressing non-routine situations." I like this. I think it fits with the concise characterisation of designing I use to tell people (in as few words as possible) what I'm interested in. It goes like this: We design things when there is a need or a desire for some part or aspect of our world to be different, and we cannot immediately specify how it should or could be changed. Which I could shorten to: We design things when there is a need or a desire for some part or aspect of our world to be different in a non-routine situation. Further on, you say: "... The difference between our perspectives is between 'knowledge as object' and 'knowledge as an a human activity/state'. Your model utilises 'knowledge as a capacity or potential for rational action' (an object). My approach takes knowledge as a dynamically evolving activity existing in a uniquely individualised biological process that includes reflexively related cognitive and feeling sub-processes." Actually, I don't think that there is this difference between us, though I agree that it can, and perhaps does, look like there is. I am quite sure that for Newell and Simon, knowledge at the Knowledge Level is to be thought of and treated as an objective concept: knowledge is something agents have but which can properly be treated as having an independent and externalised existence. This is also the predominant view in AI and Knowledge Engineering, and to a lesser extent in some quarters of Knowledge Management: people or agents are necessary as the carriers of knowledge, but their knowldge can be treated separately from them. Thus knowledge, for these people is (was, in the case of Newell) like the concept of energy. You cannot have any energy, in any of its forms, chemical, electrical, heat, or mechanical energy, etc. without some physical source, but we can and do theorise about energy, without having to include any theory of the physical processes that can provide a source of energy. However---and I realise that this is a bold thing to say---I think it is a category mistake to understand knowledge in this way, even knowledge conceived of as a capacity or potential for rational action, as we have it from Newell and Simon. I hope Klaus won't mind me borrowing his phrase "any understanding is always someone's understanding" (Krippendorff, 1997) to say that any knowing is always the knowing of someone, or of some particular agent or agency. Furthermore, any talk of that knowing must come from the agent that is the knower: it must be subjective talk. It cannot come from some other agent. That would be an agent talking of the knowledge it has of the knowing of another agent, or second-order first-person talk of some first-order first-person knowing, to use Sid Newton's terms. In other words, any knowing must be in the 'head/body' of an agent, and any knowing inside the 'head/body' of one agent is not directly accessible to any other agent. One agent can come to know of the knowing of another agent through observation and/or communication, but this is a different knowing; a second-order knowing, again to borrow form Klaus. So, to summaries, the concept of knowledge we have is a proper abstract notion, but the knowing it refers to is always a subjective matter. How, and to finally get to the cause of the category mistake, we often form representations or models of knowledge. Indeed we must do so in order to communicate it or about it. Modeling knowledge is central to modern Knowledge Engineering methods, and building computable representations is what knowledge-based systems technology is all about. Building a model or representation of some knowing involves, on the part of the agent doing the modeling, reflection and externalisation. Notice that an agent can only reflect upon and externalise its own knowing. An agent cannot reflect upon or externalise the knowing of some other agent. Most often of course, we are interested in modeling or externalising the knowledge of some other agent or agency, but doing this necessarily requires obtaining a knowledge of the knowing of the other agent first. It is this second-order knowledge of the knowing of the other agent that is then modelled. The knowing of the other agent is not modelled or represented directly. Externalised models and representations of knowledge are of course objects, things that any and all other agents can access, at least in principle. The category mistake is to think that because models and representations of knowledge are objects and objective, then the knowing that they are models or representations of is an too. The process of obtaining knowledge of the knowing of another agent, is what is called knowledge acquisition, and we often see this described and talked about as some kind of transfer process, of the knowing of the expert to the knowledge engineer who does the modeling. This is knowing as an object talk and an example of the category mistake in action. It is quite easy to see that the reality is not like this because any knowledge modeling always changes the knowing of the agent whose knowledge is (supposedly) being modelled. In other words, if agent X obtains, by communication with agent Y, say, knowledge of some knowing of agent Y, and agent X then forms a model of its (second-order) knowledge of what agent Y knows, which agent X then presents to agent Y, to see if agent Y approves of it as a model of its knowing, agent Y ends up knowing something else, which, in turn means that what agent Y now knows is not quite captured in the model. This process is not one that typically converges, so going round the loop several times does not necessarily result in a situation in which agent Y gains no new knowledge as a result of being presented with the new model. So, again, to summamrise, models and representations of knowledge are objective constructions, but the knowing they model or represent is not. The knowing is and remains a subjective aspect of the agents that do the knowing. This is, as I am sure you fully appreciate, quite different from the situation we, as scientists or technically educated people, are used to, where our objective models and representations are of objective things in the world. I should stop here to see what you, and others, make of this. I would simply add, however that this critique and the idea that knowing is and can only be a subjective aspect of agents is being swept away by the rush to establish the knowledge economy, to manage knowledge as an asset, to engineer knowledge systems, etc. Agur, Tim CEIT, Donostia / San Sebastián Reference Klaus Kkrippendorff, 1997. Human-Centeredness: A paradigm shift invoked by the emerging cyberspaces, Annenberg School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania. [http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/krippendorff/CENTEREDNESS.html] %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%