sounds good to me except that it is philosophically inadequate and I
suggest also personally inadequate.
"PHILOSOPHICAL ADEQUACY" DEPENDS ON THE PHILOSOPHY YOU CHOOSE. I CHOOSE A CONSTRUCTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY. ACCORDINGLY, THE MOTIVES THAT I INVENT TO EXPLAIN OTHERS' BEHAVIORS, MAY NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH HOW THESE OTHERS MOTIVATE THEIRS TO THEMSELVES AND TO ME. THIS IS FUNDAMENTAL TO ME.
To give just the easy example as
proof - in the event of a person telling me a lie, there is an
imputation of intention, on my part, to the other person - if I do not
impute intention to the other person then I have no way of making a
claim or forming the view that I have been told a lie.
Same goes for
love and all the general qualities we like to consider we are able to
esteem, evaluate, impute to others. Can a person love me without
intending to love me?
And, can they be said, by me, to love me, without
my forming a view as to their intention? Can they hold a view, in
relation to a subject without having an intention?
Can they look at me without there being an intention? The extreme
version of this, which shows the flip from hard (always there) to soft
(may be there) is in the case of the very famous movie line "Are you
talking to me?"
So, Kalus, just what is your view of my intention in my intending this
email? Can there be an intention beyond my intention that is evident in
my construction? Which of course leads to the famous "INtentional
Fallacy" and New Criticism.
all the non-intentional best
keith (oi oi oi)
Klaus Krippendorff wrote:
> i prefer to consider "intention" as someone's sincere claim that s/he
> has it to do or say so-and-so. not much else is needed.
>
> i can know only my own intentions and would not want to impute
> intentions to other's behavior without being told that it is
> intentional indeed.
>
> klaus