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dear keith, let me intersperse my replies right into your arguments -- in caps ABOUT INTENTIONS, Dr Keith Russell wrote: >sounds good to me except that it is philosophically inadequate and I >suggest also personally inadequate. >"PHILOSOPHICAL ADEQUACY" DEPENDS ON THE PHILOSOPHY YOU CHOOSE. I CHOOSE A >CONSTRUCTIVIST EPISTEMOLOGY. ACCORDINGLY, THE MOTIVES THAT I INVENT TO >EXPLAIN OTHERS' BEHAVIORS, MAY NOT HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH HOW THESE >OTHERS MOTIVATE THEIRS TO THEMSELVES AND TO ME. THIS IS FUNDAMENTAL TO ME. >To give just the easy example as >proof - in the event of a person telling me a lie, there is an >imputation of intention, on my part, to the other person - if I do not >impute intention to the other person then I have no way of making a >claim or forming the view that I have been told a lie. TRUE, IT IS YOUR IMPUTATION OF (BAD) INTENTION THAT MAKES YOU PERCEIVE THE OTHER TO HAVE TOLD YOU A LIE. BUT WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO DO WITH THE OTHER? SUPPOSE S/HE TOLD THE TRUTH, SUPPOSE S/HE SPOKE ROUTINELY, WITHOUT THINKING? >Same goes for >love and all the general qualities we like to consider we are able to >esteem, evaluate, impute to others. Can a person love me without >intending to love me? I SUGGEST: IF A PERSON INTENDS TO LOVE YOU. S/HE DOESN'T LOVE YOU. LOVE DEFIES BEING EMBEDDED IN A RATIONAL (GOAL-ORIENTED PURPOSIVE) PARADIGM. >And, can they be said, by me, to love me, without >my forming a view as to their intention? Can they hold a view, in >relation to a subject without having an intention? ANYONE CAN FORM A VIEW OF ANYONE ELSE'S INTENTIONS, AND EVEN ACT ON THAT VIEW. MOST PROBLEMS OF AN INTERPERSONAL OR INTERNATIONAL NATURE ARISE FROM FALSELY IMPUTING INTENTIONS ON OTHERS' ACTION. THIS IS THE REASON WHY IT IS DESIRABLE TO INQUIRE FIRST WHAT THE OTHER'S INTENTIONS WERE. EVEN IN COURT, WHERE LYING IS COMMON, TO PROOVE SOMETHING TO BE A LIE REQUIRES SHOWING THAT THE SPEAKER INTENDS TO DECEIVE, I.E. S/HE KNOWS ONE THING AND SAYS SOMETHING ELSE IN ORDER TO BENEFIT FROM NOT REVEALING WHAT S/HE KNOWS. >Can they look at me without there being an intention? The extreme >version of this, which shows the flip from hard (always there) to soft >(may be there) is in the case of the very famous movie line "Are you >talking to me?" > >So, Kalus, just what is your view of my intention in my intending this >email? Can there be an intention beyond my intention that is evident in >my construction? Which of course leads to the famous "INtentional >Fallacy" and New Criticism. I SUGGEST THAT WE DON'T READ EACH OTHER'S MINDS. BRINGING IT BACK TO DESIGN, DESIGNERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO JUSTIFY EVERYTHING IN TERMS OF INTENTIONS. MUCH OF WHAT DESIGNERS DO MAY HAVE NO REASON WHATEVER, RESULTS FROM ROUTINES, INTUITIONS, OR MAY NOT EVEN BE NOTICED BY THEM. IN CASE OF THE LATTER, YOUR IMPOSITION OF INTENTS IS YOUR UNACKNOWLEDGED IMPOSITION. MUCH HARM IS DONE IN THE WORLD WHEN MOTIVES ARE IMPUTED OTHERS WITHOUT THEIR CONSENT. CONSPIRACY THEORIES ARE ONE EXAMPLE. >all the non-intentional best > >keith (oi oi oi) NEVERTHELESS, WHEN I SAY "MY BEST WISHES TO YOU," I MEAN IT (=INTEND IT) AND YOU SHOULD NOT DOUBT THAT. KLAUS >Klaus Krippendorff wrote: > > > i prefer to consider "intention" as someone's sincere claim that s/he > > has it to do or say so-and-so. not much else is needed. > > > > i can know only my own intentions and would not want to impute > > intentions to other's behavior without being told that it is > > intentional indeed. > > > > klaus klaus krippendorff gregory bateson professor for cybernetics, language, and culture the annenberg school for communication university of pennsylvania 3620 walnut street; philadelphia, pa 19104-6220 telephone: 215.898.7051 (office); 215.545.9356 (home) fax: 215.898.2024 (office); 215.545.9357 (home) e-mail: [log in to unmask] www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/krippendorff/index.html