From: Progressive Response [mailto:[log in to unmask]] Sent: Friday, June 09, 2000 9:46 PM To: ProgResp List Subject: Korea; Privatized Military Training; Social Development ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response 09 June 2000 Vol. 4, No. 24 Editor: Tom Barry ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response (PR) is a weekly service of Foreign Policy in Focus (FPIF), a joint project of the Interhemispheric Resource Center and the Institute for Policy Studies. We encourage responses to the opinions expressed in PR and may print them in the "Letters and Comments" section. ------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Updates and Out-takes *** NORTH KOREA REACHES OUT *** By John Feffer *** PRIVATIZING MILITARY TRAINING: SOME PROMISE, SOME RISK *** By Deborah D. Avant II. Outside U.S. *** IS GENUINE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POSSIBLE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? *** By International South Group Network ------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Updates and Out-takes *** NORTH KOREA REACHES OUT *** By John Feffer (Editors Note: On the eve of this historic summit, the Clinton administration has promised to lift sanctions immediately after the summit's conclusion. This action is to be applauded, but given the history of broken promises, observers should be wary until the administration's commitments are actually translated into action. Furthermore, as FPIF analyst John Feffer notes, the lifting of sanctions is but a first step in altering U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula.) In many respects, the Clinton administration has broken with cold war traditions in its policy toward North Korea. The decision to create the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) to help rebuild the energy capacity of a declared adversary--through the Agreed Framework--was an extraordinary act of trust building. In addition, the administration has been generous with its foreign aid. In 1999, for instance, the U.S. provided 53% of the $380 million in international aid for North Korea. Despite these generous gestures, Clinton administration policy has been flawed and contradictory. It has employed economic carrots and military sticks in an attempt to coax and threaten North Korea into being cooperative. This asymmetric approach has alleviated short-term suffering in North Korea, but it has also contributed to escalating military tensions in the region. Even the economic carrots have not been without blemishes. For instance, as Clinton administration insiders admit, the decision to create KEDO was based on an expectation that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear plants come on line. And indeed, due to a mixture of internal politics and a failure of strong leadership, construction of the plants has been delayed by several years. Such delays have not inspired North Korean confidence in the U.S. ability to abide by agreements. The more critical failure has occurred around economic sanctions. After the successful September 1999 meetings, the Clinton administration formulated new regulations that would permit most bilateral trade. As part of the package, Washington agreed to remove North Korea from the so-called terrorism list, otherwise known as the Export Control Act. Such a move is overdue. According to the U.S. government itself, North Korea has not initiated terrorist activities since 1987, the year before the Export Control Act was adopted. However, the administration has neither implemented the 1999 regulations nor removed North Korea from the terrorism list. This is a breach of promise and a disturbing indication that Washington responds more to North Koreas aggressive acts than to its peaceful overtures. Although these failures to follow through on economic promises are disappointing, the continued use of military sticks may prove in the long run to be the more damaging aspect of U.S. policy. For Clintons entire tenure, the U.S. has refused to consider altering its military posture in the Asia-Pacific region. The U.S. military continues to hold costly joint exercises with its allies in the region, has concluded a new basing arrangement with the Philippines, and has developed a new military plan that endorses a preemptive strike against North Korea. The administration is forging ahead on Theater Missile Defense (TMD), the regional Star Wars, which enrages not only North Korea, but China and Russia as well. From Pyongyangs point of view, Washington is raising the military stakes in the region, so that even the relatively benign tripartite coordination of policy with Japan and South Korea resembles encirclement, not consensus building. To justify its military presence in the region, the U.S. government cites the threat of North Koreas weapons program, specifically its ability or desire to build an intercontinental missile. But according to arms control experts, this threat is exaggerated--by both North Korea and the United States. In reality, North Koreas missile program is technologically suspect and more useful as a bargaining chip than for military purposes. Contrary to some congressional assertions, North Korean missiles cannot reach the United States and cannot carry nuclear payloads. North Koreas longest range missile, the Taepodong 2, has never been tested. Critics of North Korea remain skeptical of Pyongyangs current diplomatic overtures. North Korea is viewed as simply buying time, rather than truly engaging with the outside world. As The Economist has editorialized, It is certainly too early to detect any strategic shift in North Korea's thinking about the outside world, nor is there any real sign that the poverty-stricken country is preparing to adopt real reforms at home. Yet, North Korea opted for a strategic shift in outlook over a decade ago, when it established joint venture laws and a free trade zone. Domestically, a range of real reforms have already taken place, resulting in the decentralization of authority, greater scope for private economic activity, and a wider range of contacts with South Korea and other countries. Although this is not a Chinese rush to the market, the changes all point to greater engagement with the outside world. Instead of encouraging these changes through the lifting of sanctions and the lessening of military tensions, U.S. conservatives continue to expect North Korea to collapse prior to absorption by the south. South Korea, chastened by the costs of such a German scenario, is pursuing a different strategy, a slow motion unification that proceeds patiently and incrementally. If the June summit proves successful, South Korea will provide major investments in northern plants and infrastructure, helping to allay North Korean concerns of German-style ingestion. According to some reports, the North Korean economy is already showing signs of recovery. In 1999, state revenues improved by 3%, reversing a decade-long decline. Peaceful unification is advanced by an economically viable North Korea. The Clinton administration has expressed concerns that South Korean President Kim Dae Jung is proceeding unilaterally, offering economic incentives without securing agreements on North Korean missile production or sales. Instead of chastising its ally, Washington should consider developing its own innovative approaches to strengthen prospects for unification. Both sides talk of keeping their powder dry. It is the responsibility of the stronger party to make the first move. Washingtons offensive posture--bases, military presence in South Korea, TMD, joint maneuvers--does nothing to allay Pyongyangs fears of invasion. The U.S. must consider the following steps: ** Cancel joint exercises with South Korea, and put the issue of U.S. troop withdrawal on the negotiating table. The North Korean military threat has been inflated, and the South Korean military can already counter any North Korean threat without U.S. troop support. North Koreas entire government budget of $9.4 billion is smaller than South Koreas military budget of $13 billion. ** Cancel TMD. This system is wildly expensive ($60 billion over the next fifteen years), technically flawed, and disruptive to U.S. relations with numerous countries. An East Asian space race is already pushing countries to develop satellites. Rather than encouraging this race, the U.S. must lead the way in restraining the militarization of space. ** Encourage regional security dialogue. U.S. military withdrawal from the region should avoid creating a vacuum in its wake that might encourage major arms programs in South Korea or a remilitarized Japan. Only an effective multilateral security framework that oversees confidence building measures and regional force reductions can ensure a nonhegemonic peace in the region. As part of this approach, the U.S. must reduce arms sales to the region and abandon the costly Pentagon doctrine of maintaining the capacity to fight two wars simultaneously. Sources for More Information Organizations American Friends Service Committee, Asia Desk 1501 Cherry St. Philadelphia, PA 19102 Voice: (215) 241-7149 Fax: (215) 241-7026 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.afsc.org/ Contact: Alice Andrews Asia Pacific Center for Peace and Justice 110 Maryland Avenue NE, Ste. 504 (Box 70) Washington, DC 20002 Voice: (202) 543-1094 Fax: (202) 546-5103 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.apcjp.org/ Korean American Peace Institute 60 Cedar St. Ridgefield Park, NJ 07660 Voice: (201) 440-6975 Fax: (201) 229-0072 Email: [log in to unmask] National Council of Churches of Christ (USA) Office of East Asia & Pacific 475 Riverside Drive, 6th Floor New York, NY 10115-0050 Voice: (212) 870-2371 Fax: (212) 870-2064 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.ncccusa.org/ Nautilus Institute 1831 Second St. Berkeley, CA 94710 Voice: (510) 204-9296 Fax: (510) 204-9298 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/ Contact: Timothy Savage U.S. Department of State The Office of Korean Affairs 2201 C Street NW Washington, DC 20520-6310 Voice: (202) 647-7717 Fax: (202) 647-7388 Websites Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/dprk/ Institute of North Korean Affairs http://www.koreascope.org/ Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization http://www.kedo.org/ Korea Web Weekly http://www.kimsoft.com/korea.htm Stratfor.com Global Intelligence Update http://www.stratfor.com/asia/countries/northkorea/ United Nations http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf (John Feffer <[log in to unmask]> works for the American Friends Service Committee in the East Asia Quaker International Affairs Program based in Tokyo. He travels regularly to North and South Korea and China to encourage dialogue on peace and justice issues.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- *** PRIVATIZING MILITARY TRAINING: SOME PROMISE, SOME RISK *** By Deborah D. Avant During the post-cold war era, there has been a proliferation of private companies providing a wide array of security services ranging from military advice and training to operational support to security protection, logistics support, policing, drug interdiction, intelligence, and more. Western governments, developing countries, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private companies who operate in the worlds hot spots have each purchased these services. Military advice and training has been one of the most significant areas of growth, particularly in the United States. It also comes closest to the core mission of the military. In the post-cold war period, however, the number of firms offering military services has grown, the scale of their operations has expanded, and their role has become more public and regarded as being more legitimate. Revenues from the global international security market are expected to rise from $55.6 billion in 1990 to $202 billion in 2010, according to private industry projections. The Pittsburgh Post Gazette (February 2000) reported that private security companies with publicly traded stocks grew at twice the rate of the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the 1990s. Private firms trained militaries in more than 42 countries during the 1990s. Although the older companies such as Vinnell, Booz-Allen, and Cubic are still active, many of the highest profile firms (including MPRI, which boasts that its 1997 volume of business exceeded $48 million), postdate the cold war. As the industry has grown, private military companies (PMCs) have sought to polish their images. They establish websites, grant interviews, and appear at conferences. Sandlines website offers everything from British government documents regarding Sandlines activities to opinion papers on how the private security industry might best be regulated. Foreign military training programs have expanded in the post-cold war period, offering greater opportunities for private military companies. Training foreign armies is a prime component of current U.S. engagement strategy, according to the Office of the Presidents 1999 document A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Military training is said to further U.S. contact with other countries, to aid in the spread of democracy and good civil-military relations, and to enhance specific U.S. strategic concerns regarding such issues as counternarcotics and counterterrorism. To achieve these objectives, U.S. Special Forces train with over 100 countries annually. While major threats have diminished in the post-cold war period and U.S. forces have been downsized, ethnic conflict, humanitarian emergencies, and the desire to prevent further problems with the U.S. engagement strategy have boosted the number of operations involving the U.S. military. In scrambling to meet more requirements with fewer personnel and a more competitive labor market, policymakers have turned to private contractors to conduct some of their foreign military training programs. The current generalized push toward the privatization and outsourcing of government functions only abets this trend. Privatizing military training has long-term political and foreign policy implications. Employing private companies may increase the flexibility and expand the capacity of the U.S. military. Such flexibility may help impose stability in troubled regions in the short run and may avoid lengthy political debates over the proper number of U.S. troops required to support the engagement policy outlined in A National Security Strategy for a New Century. The downside of this approach, however, could be a public increasingly disengaged from global problems; a military ever more focused on high-tech combat operations rather than military training, assistance, and other engagement activities; and significant reliance on private firms for a central part of U.S. military assistance and overseas operations. The U.S. government and private military companies need to work toward an international regulatory structure that will increase transparency and accountability and will encourage military training that promotes stability, the rule of law, and respect for human rights. The British company Sandline has already voiced its support for international regulation. An international office, perhaps at the UN (replacing the UNs special rapporteur on mercenaries), would be one mechanism through which the international community could bolster the industrys fledgling efforts at self-regulation. Such a structure could also open the way for a dialogue regarding how and whether private military firms should be employed by NGOs--or even the UN--to carry out certain tasks, such as providing security or training for UN forces in complex emergencies. Policymakers need to evaluate the economic and political implications of privatizing military training before the U.S. proceeds further down this path. If they decide that private firms are to play a role in training security forces, Congress and the administration should work at both the international and domestic level to ensure that PMC practices are regulated to comply with international law and human rights norms. (Deborah Avant <[log in to unmask]> is an associate professor of political science and international affairs at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.) Sources for More Information: Organizations Amnesty International, USA 322 8th Avenue New York, NY 10001 Voice: (212) 633-4200 Fax: (212) 627-1451 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.amnesty-usa.org/ International Alert 1 Glyn Street London, UK Voice: (0207) 793-8383 Fax: (0207) 793-7975 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.international-alert.org/ Overseas Development Council 1875 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 1012 Washington, DC 20009 Voice: (202) 234-8701 Fax: (202) 745-0067 Email: [log in to unmask] Website: http://www.odc.org/ Websites Doug Brooks listserv http://www.egroups.com/group/AMPMlist/ MPRI http://www.mpri.com/ Sandline http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html ------------------------------------------------------------------------- II. Outside U.S. (Editor's Note: This section of the Progressive Response includes non-U.S. perspectives on the impact and directions of U.S. foreign policy. They do not necessarily reflect the viewpoint of the editor or Foreign Policy In Focus. Article submissions of 1,000 words should be sent to: <[log in to unmask]>) *** IS GENUINE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT POSSIBLE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? *** By International South Group Network >From June 26-30, 2000 world leaders will gather in Geneva to assess the progress made on the implementation of commitments made in the 1995 United Nations World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen. Among the key issues to be addressed in the Geneva Summit are poverty eradication and improvement of living conditions, employment, social integration, access to basic social services, empowerment, etc. This early, the inability of many governments to realize even the narrow targets of the Copenhagen Declaration and Program of Action can be gleaned from official documents of the Geneva Summit. There is an open admittance that people living in poverty has increased since 1995, that there is an increase in causal and informal employment, and that many countries still fall short of the targets established--particularly for the provision of basic social services. Likewise, the worsening terms of international trade are recognized as contributing to the factors that have undermined poverty eradication measures. These are to be expected in an institution that sticks to the narrow confines of the current world order, where a few rich and powerful nations dictate the terms of socioeconomic and political relations at the expense of people--particularly those in developing countries. It can never address the fundamental problems that have kept nations and peoples impoverished and powerless. In fact the Social Summit pursues the same neo-liberal policies of liberalization, deregulation, and privatization that have deprived many of the even the barest needs for survival. It will be utilized by global powers in its agenda toward further liberalizing world trade and investments. We are aware that globalization is the biggest stumbling block for the attainment of genuine social development. It drives poor countries further into underdevelopment, and their people to more miserable situations. It denies the people their means of livelihood--i.e. peasants of their land, and workers of decent employment. The acute mal-development of the majority of the world's population cannot be cured by simply instituting appropriate reforms--as the Social Summit prescribes-- to strengthen current national and international arrangements. In the same light, structural adjustment programs cannot be expected to effect social development, especially eradication of poverty. But the Social Summit in Geneva provides another avenue for social movements from different parts of the globe to muster strength and relentlessly pursue the struggle against globalization. Build on the significant gains of the anti-globalization struggles in Seattle and in Bangkok, and continue the fight in Geneva. As the question of poverty and social development takes center stage at the Social Summit in Geneva, there should be more than enough space to espouse the bases of our resistance against, and alternatives to globalization. For more information on ISGN plans for the Social Summit: Resource Center for People's Development (RCPD) Email: [log in to unmask] and [log in to unmask] (use both) International South Group Network: Website: http://www.isgnweb.org/ ------------------------------------------------------------------------- The Progressive Response aims to provide timely analysis and opinion about U.S. foreign policy issues. The content does not necessarily reflect the institutional positions of either the Interhemispheric Resource Center or the Institute for Policy Studies. We're working to make the Progressive Response informative and useful, so let us know how we're doing, via email to [log in to unmask] Please put "Progressive Response" in the subject line. Please feel free to cross-post the Progressive Response elsewhere. 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