Theories of design
(Long post)
The debate on theories of design has, indeed, become lively. I'd like to
reply to issues in the notes of Bruce Moon, Michael Mullins, and Wolfgang
Jonas.
Before answering the specific question that Bruce Moon posed in his
response to me, I want to clarify three issues. This post will therefore
consist of four parts,
(1) A note on Herbert Simon.
(2) Definitions of theory.
(3) What Thomas Kuhn really said.
(4) Answer to Bruce Moon's questions.
(5) Conclusion
(1) A note on Herbert Simon.
Is Herbert Simon a "positivist"? The concept of positivism can be used in
two ways. In one sense, positive science distinguishes science that
describes what is from science that descries what should be. Positive
science posits and describes. Normative science sets norms and prescribes.
In this sense, everyone whose work describes phenomena accurately is
therefore in some sense a positivist.
The other sense of the word positivism involves the use of reductionism and
quantitative methods.
As a computer scientist and a pioneer in artificial intelligence, Simon has
been involved in both kinds of positivism. But attached to the second
meaning of the term positivism, is the notion of positivism as a faith,
characterized by inappropriate devotion to reductionism and quantitative
methods as the only approach to scientific understanding. Simon has never
been a positivist in this sense.
Relatively few scholars in design or design studies have read Simon deeply.
Those who have done so are aware of Simon's rich humanistic background and
wide-ranging interests.
In describing his own interests, Simon has written that he is "more
interested in questions than in their answers." He goes on to note that "I
am a social scientists before I am an economist, and a scientist before a
social scientist - and, I hope, a human being before either of the others.
Disciplines, like nations, are a necessary evil that enable human beings of
bounded rationality to simplify the structure of their goals, and reduce
their choices to calculable limits. But parochialism is everywhere, and the
world sorely needs interdisciplinary travelers who will carry new knowledge
from one enclave to another."
Simon came from the University of Chicago, and his experiences there shaped
his views in great part. Chicago was the home of George Herbert Meade, for
example, and the Chicago school of sociology was well known for Herbert
Blumer's symbolic interactionist perspective. The methodological approach
to the description of human action they used was phenomenological,
heterodox, and qualitative. Blumer, for example, argued strongly against
attempting to understand the phenomenal world of human beings by reducing
human action to charts and numbers. Reductivist models permitted easy
solutions to extremely limited questions. My own background includes
doctoral work in symbolic interactionist methods, and I am well aware of
the dangers of reductionist thinking and quantitative positivism. I do,
however, understand the value of theory, on which more follows. It is a
mistake to label any attempt to unsdertand and describe human action as
positivistic.
As an economist, it is obvious that much of Simon's work involves
mathematical description, and the necessarily reductionist examination of
limited questions. This is not the whole of Simon or his work.
To reject Simon's ideas out of hand seems to me a form of prejudice. I'd
like to know what is positivistic in the narrow, reductionist meaning of
the term about Simon's proposal for a design science. If the idea is
structuralist, so much the better. Social science and natural science alike
require structure for the organization of ideas, issues, and analysis. That
doesn't mean that structure is eternal, nor does it mean that one sees
structure in any given case as more than a form of heuristic.
Some of Simon's concepts can fruitfully be applied to design. It is not
necessary to agree with or to use all of his concepts to benefit from using
some of them. Most of us make some use of Pythagoras every day without
subscribing to the Pythagorean religion. To use the Pythagorean Theorem
does not oblige us to avoid eating beans simply because Pythagoras linked
the two concepts. Even if Simon were not as broad a thinker as he is, we
could draw on his project for design science without becoming involved in
economics, game theory or artificial intelligence.
(2) Definitions of theory.
My description of theory is one of several plausible descriptions. It is
not based on what Bruce Moon labels assumptions. The word theory has been
used in the English language for four centuries. My note hews closely to
the meanings that the word theory has had since it entered the English
language in 1597 via Latin from the original Greek.
Merriam-Webster defines theory as: "1 : the analysis of a set of facts in
their relation to one another 2 : abstract thought : speculation 3 : the
general or abstract principles of a body of fact, a science or an art
<music ~> 4 a : a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the
basis of action <her method is based on the ~ that all children want to
learn> b : an ideal or hypothetical set of facts, principles or
circumstances - often used in the phrase in theory <in ~, we have always
advocated freedom for all> 5 : a plausible or scientifically accepted
general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena <wave
~ of light> 6 a : a hypothesis assumed for the sake of argument or
investigation b : an unproved assumption : conjecture c : a body of
theorems presenting a concise systematic view of a subject <~ of
equations>."
The word theory has clear meanings. They involve modeling, structuration,
and analysis. Not all theory involves science or even quantitative data.
Nearly all theory involves propositions that model, structure, and analyze
phenomena in some way.
The pre-Socratic Greek philosophers were the first theorists. They
developed a vocabulary of theoretical distinctions in their effort to
explain the world around them. To the Greeks, theoria, meditation,
speculation, contemplation, involved seeking to know the highest and
eternal principles. Aristotle believed this to be life's highest function.
In Plato's Phaedo, Socrates says that it is, "the superlative thing to know
the explanation of everything, why it comes to be, why it perishes, why it
is." Explanation makes empirical demands. At the same time, empiri must be
structured in some way if we are to understand what we are observing.
Science involves three conceptual approaches - observation,
experimentation, and theory. Plato's science stood on one leg, Aristotle's
on two. It was not until the great age of physics that Galileo, Newton and
Bacon developed the concept of robust experiment that made scientific
progress possible by stabilizing scientific method with its third leg. The
distinction between a science and a craft is systematic thought organized
in theory. Craft involves doing, perhaps even experiment, but it is the
frame of theory that allows us to organize observations. Theory permits us
to question what we seen and do, and it helps us to develop generalizable
answers that can be put to use by other human beings in other times and
places.
Not everyone defines theory as Bruce Moon does, and not all theory
describes actions in the physical world. A theory is a structured set of
propositions which provides principles of analysis or explanation of a
subject matter. A theory is a model. It is an illustration describing how
something works by showing its elements in their dynamic relationship to
one another. Not all models reflect physical or material subjects. One can
model processes, thoughts, and intellectual artifacts, mathematical objects
. in fact, one can model any subject, object or process complex enough to
be represented as a structure comprised of elements operating in dynamic
relationship.
McNeil's proposes eleven characteristics of any general theory. 1) A theory
has a constitutive core of concepts mutually interrelated with one another.
2) A theory has a mutually productive, generative connection between
central concepts and the peripheral concepts where theory verges onto
practice. 3) The core concepts of a theory are stated in algorithmic
compression, parsimonious statements from which the phenomena in the theory
can be reproduced. 4) A theory has an irreducible core of concepts, a set
of concepts in which no central concept can be removed without altering the
scope and productivity of the theory or perhaps destroying it entirely. 5)
Two or more of the core concepts in a theory must be complementary to each
other. 6) The central concepts of a theory must be well defined and must
harmonize as much as possible with similar concepts of enlightened
discourse. 7) The central concepts of a theory must be expressed at a
uniform level of discourse. Different levels of discourse must be
distinguished and used consistently. 8) More general theories (higher-level
theories) must relate to less general theories (lower-level theories) and
to special cases through a principle of correspondence. This principle
confirms and guarantees the consistency of the more particular theories and
their applications. 9) Explicitly or implicitly, a theory describes dynamic
flows with contours that trace relatively closed loops as well as
relatively open links. 10) A theory states invariant entities in its
assumptions or formulas that provide standards for measurement. 11)
Theories describe phenomena in the context of a conceptual space. This
implicitly establishes a relationship between the observer and the
phenomena observed.
These can apply to many kinds of theory, and to many kinds of
conceptualization.
(3) What Thomas Kuhn really said.
Bruce Moon misreads Kuhn where he writes, "In Kuhn's argument for
theoretical revolution, theories take on a different perception. Rather
than contested theory being representative of inadequate knowledge, each
represents the ideological preferences of the theoriser/s. Thus, is theory
a true portrayal of the physical world, or the extension of some (abstract)
belief system?" This last sentence was not written by Kuhn. It is Moon's
view of Kuhn. Kuhn himself has a very different view, as will be shown
below in his own words.
Kuhn did not argue for "theoretical revolution." Kuhn described the process
in which paradigm shifts led to what he termed scientific revolutions. A
paradigm is not identical with a theory. Kuhn uses the term "in two
different senses. On the one hand," he writes, "it stands for the entire
constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the
members of a given community. On the other, I denotes one sort of element
in that constellation, the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as
models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution
of the remaining puzzles of normal science." It is easy to see how the
second sense of the word can be confused with theory, but a close reading
of Kuhn's book shows that he hardly writes about theory at all. He is,
rather, describing sociology of science.
Kuhn's has sometimes been described as the most cited and least read author
of our time. To read Kuhn is to enter a difficult world of subtle and
challenging issues. It's easy to forget that Kuhn was first a physicist,
and only moved into the sociology and history of science after he completed
his Ph.D. in physics. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was the fruit
of two decades work teaching, doing research and thinking on the subjects
he examined.
Kuhn explicitly argues against the notion that: "the proponents of
incommensurable theories cannot communicate with each other at all; as a
result, in a debate over theory-choice there can be no recourse to good
reasons; instead theory must be chosen for reasons that are ultimately
personal and subjective; some sort of mystical apperception is responsible
for the decision actually reached."
Kuhn plainly states that this is a misconstruction of his view. Kuhn's does
not see theory in Moon's terms, "the ideological preferences of the
theorizer." For Kuhn, the working physicist, theory was far more than the
"extension of some abstract belief system."
To the contrary, Kuhn explicitly argued for the valid use of theory. In
describing the marks of theoretical development, he notes "accuracy of
prediction; the balance between esoteric and everyday subject matter, and
the number of different problems solved also important determinants of
scientific life, would be such value a simplicity, scope and compatibility
with other specialties." He goes on to state that, "scientific development
is, like biological, a unidirectional and irreversible process. Later
scientific theories are better than earlier ones for solving puzzles in the
often quite different environments to which they are applied. That is not a
relativist's position, and it displays the sense in which I am a convinced
believer in scientific progress."
Confusion may arise in understanding Kuhn's interpretation of theory as a
representation of nature. On this issue, Kuhn argues for theory as an
instrument for discovery and problem solving. This is a delicate argument.
Kuhn believes in the uses of theory and the validity of specific theories
in the cases for which they are constructed. He grants theory
epistemological status without granting theory an ontological status. that
is, he questions the idea of theory as the accurate representation of
nature in a metaphysical sense.
This involves a subtle series of qualifications, not unlike the debates
surrounding the Copenhagen Interpretation of atomic theory. There was wide
agreement on many principles of atomic theory, its validity, and uses, but
there were philosophical arguments on what atomic theory meant at a deep,
philosophical level. A similar argument is the debate on whether or not
numbers are real, and -- if they are real -- the debate on the way in which
numbers are real and the ways in which they represent reality.
Moon seems to take the position that all theories merely reflect personal
views. He seems to suggest that any theory is merely an artifact of opinion
and social agreement. This is not Kuhn's view at all.
Kuhn's work was a careful, historically bounded analysis of the ways in
which opinion and social agreement affect how theories are developed,
understood, contested and accepted or rejected. The relation of paradigm to
theory construction and theory reception is an issue in the sociology of
science, not an issue of how, or why theory and theorizing may be valid.
(4)
Finally, Bruce Moon asks a question. I will attempt to answer it. He asks,
"While mental reflection is a set of actions, how can one theorize about
good mental reflection?"
Mental reflection is a set of actions in some sense. To explore the issue,
I will jettison the term good. Good is a normative term. Mental reflection
describes an activity, so I'll simply describe how one can theorize about
mental reflection.
Some forms of mental reflection are physical and material. Some involve
aspects of thought. Human beings have theorized the immaterial and
non-physical process of mental reflection since the days of the
pre-Socratic philosophers in ancient Greece. This is an aspect of
philosophical inquiry going back more than 2,500 years.
An enormous amount of theorizing has gone on about mental reflection in the
form of structured sets of propositions which provides principles of
analysis or explanation of a subject matter. The last two or three hundred
years have been especially rich in this, including the field of
phenomenology which in great part focuses on the act of mental reflection.
Starting in the late 1700s, a new form of theorizing on mental reflection
began with the earliest development of psychology. This blossomed into a
major field of inquiry. Much of Kierkegaard's work involves the analysis of
mental reflection. James, Freud, Maslow, or Perls, and thousands more since
have theorized on mental reflection, and its relations to the world.
In the last century, scientists began to investigate the physical act of
mental reflection. This involves the working of the physical brain and its
relationship to immaterial mind. With the new imaging technologies now
available to us, we can see the brain at work without surgery, and we can
now observe the relationship between mental reflection and different states
of mind, emotion, and physiology.
In recent years, cognitive science, learning theory, and several rich
fields of action research all theorize mental reflection. It is, indeed,
possible to be able to theorize about mental reflection.
However, Bruce goes further. When he asks, "can something that cannot be
empirically analyzed be the subject of theory?" the question itself is
wrong in two ways.
First, mental reflection can be empirically analyzed. Many thinkers,
philosophers, scientists and scholars - past and present - have undertaken
empirical analysis of mental reflection.
Second, a theory need not focus on empirical data. There are subjects of
inquiry -- philosophy, contemplation, mathematics, literature, and dozens
of other areas -- that benefit from structured sets of propositions which
provide principles of analysis or explanation of their subject matter. In
theorizing these fields, we also learn and grow.
(5) Conclusion
While Bruce Moon raises some thoughtful challenges, it seems to me that
Wolfgang Jonas is correct in seeing a fair amount of aggression. Since I
don't see myself as a positivist, it's hard for me to understand what the
fuss is about.
Throughout the note, the word "good" appears, always in quotation marks to
demonstrate a rich, skeptical distance. Except in the modest motto, "there
is nothing as practical as a good theory," I didn't use the word. With one
exception in Satoshi Kose's note, neither does anyone else.
Bruce seems quite worried about using the term "good," and defining that
which is "good." I'm not sure how this arose on a debate over the issue of
theory in design, but since I didn't use the term, it isn't my concern.
It's clear that theory embraces descriptions of actions undertaken in the
social world and individual actions. Not all actions are worth theorizing.
It is, indeed, possible to make a theory about a trip to the snowfields,
but I don't know why anyone would want to.
Ken Friedman, Ph.D.
Associate Professor of Leadership and Strategic Design
Department of Knowledge Management
Norwegian School of Management
Box 4676 Sofienberg, N-0506 Oslo
Norway
+47 22.98.51.07 Direct line
+47 22.98.51.11 Telefax
email: [log in to unmask]
Home and home office:
Ken Friedman
Byvagen 13
S-24012 Torna Hallestad
Sweden
+46 (46) 53.245 Telephone
+46 (46) 53.345 Telefax
email: [log in to unmask]
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