on 23 mar 1999 Joerg Strueberg [[log in to unmask]] wrote
> Having read Glaser's "Emergence vs. Forcing" book as well as all the other
> grounded theory stuff, I must say that I am by far not as impressed by his
> arguments as you seem to be.
> Besides the fact that the style in which he wrote especially his
> introduction is all but academia's pride,
Hi Joerg.....yes, it is a bit strong isn't it!
> there seem to be a number of
> serious misunderstandings in his arguments:
>
> First of all, Glaser takes GT for a methodology in the sense that it would
> show a 'forcing' and complete way to make theory out of nothing but
> empirical data.
I think he 'fudges' the issue, and implicit in his work is the
need to go 'beyond the data' and interpret what is going on,
e.g. p55 of 'theoretical coding'
'substantive codes conceptualise the empirical substance of the area
of research.'
fine, but already the researcher is interpreting, this doesn't just
come from the data alone. as for theoretical coding...
'Theoretical codes conceptualise how the substantive
codes may relate to each other as hypotheses to be integrated into
the theory'
How else can this be done, other than by interpretation?
>He explicitly (and angrily) neglects Strauss' notion of the
> value of previous knowledge (including theory) for analyzing empirical
> data.
I can see why, as this might cause a researcher to miss something in
the data, or try to force it to fit in with existing knowledge, but I
can also see the value of relating the completed theory to previous
knowledge.
> Strauss, on the contrary would argues that (in my words) GT, instead
> of being a theory, is a set of heuristics meant to allow for building
> theories that are profoundly grounded in empirical data.
I perceived a similar theme in glaser's work
> Between these two different notions that seem to be so closely together,
> lies a whole continent of difference in meaning and - consequently - practice.
maybe they were always at cross-purposes, but only realised in later
years? this would explain what I perceive to be a certain lack of
clarity in their collaborative works.
> Now, as to Barny Glaser:
>
> The problem is that there is no such thing as pure
> inductivism. You want a prove? Glaser himself is the best prove: How does
> he 'really' come to his family concept if not out of previous knowledge
> (including theory)? There is a profound theory bias behind his statement
> that a ready made set of families is _the_ useful tool in order to make
> sense out of data. Thereby, he himself admits that explaining phenomena out
> of empirical data _alone_ does not work. That way, you would not achieve
> more that a nice description of your phenomena.
I see your point, this seems to be another reason to be careful of
the idea that grounded theorising is purely inductive, as well as
those I outlined earlier.
> The crucial point for GT in Strauss' version is that it is concerned with
> reasonable and feasible ways of producing theory
I see what you mean, strauss is not claiming that his approach will
produce an inductive theory, it is just a way to produce theory?
Actually, I think that my research approach has a lot to do with my
bias for glaser. I am not taking a symbolic interactionist
approach, but am attempting to 'do' existential phenomenology. The
significance of this is that I find it easier to adapt glaser's work
to my needs, precisely because implicit in his approach is the need
to do non-inductive interpretation of the relationships between
'substantive codes'. Thus substative coding can be re- conceptualised
as the vehicle for the descriptive aspect of existential
phenomenology, and 'theoretical codes' as the vehicle for the
transcendental aspects. well, if you can't experiment during a Ph.d.,
what can you do eh?
regards, adrian.
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Adrian Bromage
Westhill College
Weoley Park Road
Selly Oak
Birmingham UK
B29 6LL
Tel 0121 472 7245
Fax 0121 415 5399
E-Mail [log in to unmask]
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