Responding to Neil Smith's message, I would like to point out that although
Milosevic is definitely not the victim in the Balkan crisis, Serbia and Serb
people are undoubtedly amogst the victims. In particular, I disagree with
Neil's view that the Serbs or Serbia were the common denominator in the
Yugoslav crisis. The Serbs were the largest nation in Yugoslavia and
happened to have the strongest army (Yugoslavia's federal army), but the
Croats and Bosnian-Croats and Bosnian-Muslims were equally brutal and
criminal when they had the chance (for example, the ethnic cleansing of
200,000 Serbs from Crajna in Croatia, carried out by Croatian nationalist
forces, about which most of the media in the West were silent). Also, I
believe that it is very simplistic to argue that a Greater Serbia is/was the
greater goal. The region's history is much more complicated and that has to
be taken into account.
As Peter Gowan points out in a recent article, ( 'The NATO powers and the
Balkan Tragedy', New Left Review, vol. 234, March/April 1999, pp. 83-105)
Yugoslavia before the war had constitutional arrangements, furnishing rights
to the country's republican territories and its nations and people, which
were premised upon Yugoslavia remaining an integrated state. As Gowan puts
it, Yugoslavia after the second World War was "divided into republics in
such a way that the non-Serb nations would not fear that Yugoslavia would
become a Serb-dominated state. To achieve this, as Branka Magas('The
Destruction of Yugoslavia, Verso, London, 1993) explains, required 'winning
Serbian acceptance of the new constitutional order which was to divide -
more in form than in fact - the Serbian nation inside post-revolutionary
Yugoslavia'. Thus, large parts of the Serb population were placed within
other republican territories or within autonomous provinces which enjoyed
greater autonomy than say the Basque country in today's Spain. The Serbs
were thus split up between Serbia proper, Croatia, Bosnia, Vojodina and
Kosovo. This was, indeed, a question 'more in form than in fact' within an
integrated Yugoslavia, but it became, of course, a division more of fact
than of form in the context of Yugoslavia's break-up. But Yugoslavia's
constitutional prinicples did provide a key to its resolution, for the
constitution gave rights to nations of equal force to the rights of
republics. Thus, under these criteria, the Serb nationals in , say Croatia
were the subjects of national rights which could not be overridden by the
will of the Croatian republic. But how was this issue to be dealt with in a
context where the Yugoslav constitution was collapsing? " (Gowan, 1999:
p.90)
The answer to the above question was given by the Western powers in 1991
when they declared Croatia's independence on the grounds of self
determination within the boundaries of republican Croatia which were
established within post-second World War Yugoslavia (Ibid.). Again, as Gowan
explains:
"Self determination was established by the fact that a referendum of the
Croatian nation had voted for independence. This was the formula for war
between the Croatian nationalist government and Croatia's Serb population
because it violated the principles for handling the national question
established in the post-war Yugoslav constitution: it denied the Serbs in
Croatia their sovereign national rights" (Gowan, 1999: p.91)
In addition, another interesting point made by Gowan is that the majority of
EU states adopted the approach that Croatia should be independent state and
that the Serb population of Croatia should accept their status as a national
minority within an independent Croatia, provided that the latter would
guarantee the CSCE principles for protecting minority rights. However,
Croatia was recognised as an independent state in 1991, despite the fact
that it rejected the guarantee of these principles and standards.
It can be argued that the common denominator in the Yugoslav tragedy (from
1991 to the Kosovo) crisis was NATO and the 'Western powers'. These powers
supported and stimulated the nationalist/fascist trends and the violent
split up of Yugoslavia, instead of encouraging democratic procedures, which
could have led to a peaceful decision on whether to split-up the country or
not and (if the democratic decision was to split up the country) would
guarantee the respect of the rights of minorities in the new formed
republics (as it has happened in Czechoslovakia).
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
Dimitris Ballas
School of Geography
University of Leeds
Leeds LS2 9JT
UK
tel: (+44) (113) 233-3328
fax: (+44) (113) 233-3308
e-mail: [log in to unmask]
<><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><><>
----- Original Message -----
From: Neil Smith <[log in to unmask]>
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Cc: <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 1999 5:22 PM
Subject: Re: Serbian fascism
> There have been a number of responses to my initial e-mail arguing for
> bilateral defeat of NATO and Milosevic. I agree with alll of those who
> argue that NATO and the US represent by far the largest and most dangerous
> threat in the long term. That's why I want NATO defeated.
> But the responses that have simply reiterated "Stop the
> Bombing", while not all supporting Milosevic, have chosen to see Milosevic
> as a victim. Seiko Kitajima argues that the Serb onslaught in Kosovo is
> purely reactuive and defensive. This is simply unsustainable. In Croatia
> and Slovenia in 1991, in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1994-1995, and in Kosovo in
> 1999 there was one common denominator. It was not NATO or even the US;
> not Croatia nor Bosnia. The common denominator is Serbia and Serbian
> nationalism now fascism since 1991 has been utterly offensive not
> defensive. A Greater Serbia is the clear goal. To focus on the very real
> and vicious assaults by Croats in 1991 and Kosovans (KLA) more recently
> while excusing Milosevic as "reactive" is perverse.
> Even the most committed "Stop the Bombing" folks admit that the
> Serb military had massacred a minimum of 2,000 in Kosovo before the NATO
> attacks. If there was any convincing argument that a halt to the bombing
> would lead to a halt to the ethnic cleansing I would immediately sign up
> for the most strategically simplistic version of "Stop the Bombing."
> Instead it seems to me obvious that Montenegro, the last remaining state
> of old Yugoslavia is already in Milosevic's sights. That's why a fascist
> like Milosevic has to be stopped.
> Linda Peake's post, including Cynthia Cockburn's report from the
> London march and e-mails from sisters in Kosovo and Belgrade, captured the
> difficulty of the "Stop the bombing" argument, for me. There's also an
> article by Slavoj Zizek in this week's "The Nation" entitled "Against the
> Double Blackmail" which makes the same point. He makes the obvious but
> crucial point that the main isssue is how to build transnational movements
> of the sort that can challenge both local manifestations of the New World
> Order (Milosevic) and its more global face (NATO). personally, 've always
> believed in Lenin's "revolutionary defeatism": fight tpo defeat your own
> ruling class first. In this situation, however, although of course the US
> reasons for intervention were political economic and cycnical, a
> one-sided defeat of NATO in the short term would cost a lot of Kosovar and
> probably Montenagran lives.
>
> Neil Smith
> Department of Geography
> and Center for the Critical Analysis of Contemporary Culture
> Rutgers University
> Piscataway NJ 08854
>
> phone: 732 445 4103 (Geography)
> 732 932 8679/8426 (CCACC)
>
> fax: 732 445 0006 (Geography)
> 732 932 8683 (CCACC)
>
>
>
>
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