Gerard Toal Wrote:

Rambouillet was tough on the Serbs but considering the blatant violation of
the Holbrooke negotiated accord in 1998 and the Serbian state's record of
violating ceasefires and the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, this toughness was
justified.

Graham Gardner wrote about: "drowning in a sea of post-modern angst, and
who goes beyond relativism and rhetoric"

I have several questions about this:

	First, the NATO campaign has a real cost in innocent civilians. Can
the Pentagon/NATO really pass moral judgments on Serbia people (not
Milosevic) given the U.S. links to mass atrocities in Guatemala? The
distinction between Milosevic and the Serbian people is key, because some
believe that
NATO must risk innocent civilians in Serbia because the Serbians have war
guilt/responsibility.  By this logic, U.S. citizens have war
guilt/responsibility for the actions of the Pentagon/CIA, etc. in Central
America.

	Second, the Rambouillet accords were not conducted in good faith as
it  was not simply a matter of being "tough"  (see below).

	Third, the anti-war position is not about "moral equivalancy"
or "post modern angst."  In prior listings I have described any number of
operational things geographers could do to help prevent future
tragedies like the one in Yugoslavia.  For example, all interested parties
on this list could join forces in a sister city exchange to build up the
peace and democracy movements in Croatia, Yugoslavia, etc.   With the war
going on, it may seem a bit late to use such proactive strategies in this
instance. But, in Turkey and countless other countries, there is plenty of
opportunity for the proactive approach.  This approach will be needed after
the war. The underlying problem is that we need a foreign policy from below
and should not rely on NATO/the Pentagon to settle disputes for us. That is
why we had the United Nations. Do bombing advocates believe we should
"junk" the UN?
How do bombing advocates propose to solve the future moral  tragedies that
NATO will discover?  Stopping these future war maneuvers will also prove
insufficient, which is why it makes sense to focus on a foreign policy from
below.

	Fourth, anti-war critics argue that the military campaign
accelerated atrocities and helped destroy the democracy/anti-war movement
in Serbia, a main check on Milosevic.  Do bombing advocates suggest that
the U.S. war machine is the best guarantor of peace? Being dependent upon
the U.S. war machine to advance morality means, however.  It's an extremely
dangerous position to take because by assuming this position, a foreign
policy from below becomes irrelevant and so does any chance for
international solidarity. The case for
UN solutions, Russian involvement etc. in policing the area is that the
immediate conflict should not be exploited to aid the Pentagon's political
capital and ability to unilaterally intervene.  Thus, we have
solutions to stop Serbian aggression which do not simply depend on NATO.
The anti-bombing position need not mean that an international policing
force was not necessary. A policing solution was and is warranted. But,
watch how the bombing continues because NATO wants its forces heavily
involved in the policing.

	Finally, this military campaign adds to the legitimacy of NATO/the
Pentagon, which threaten furthers military campaigns. The "political
economy" argruments about intervention may be less relevant than the
argument that
the campaign is a byproduct of U.S. military managerialism. Here is Michael
T. Klare's assessment of the Clinton doctrine:

	President Clinton's decision to use military force against the
Serbs was not simply a calculated response to Slobodan  Milosevic's
intransigence. A careful reading of recent Administration statements and
Pentagon documents shows that the NATO bombing is part of a larger
strategic vision.

       That vision has three basic components. The first is an increasingly
pessimistic appraisal of the global security   environment....

       The second component is the assumption that as a global power with
far-flung economic interests, the United States has a vested interest in
maintaining international stability. Because no other power or group of
powers can guarantee this stability, the United States must be able to act
on its own or in conjunction with its most trusted allies (meaning NATO). ..

       The third component is a conviction that to achieve global
stability, the United States must maintain sufficient forces to conduct
simultaneous military operations in widely separated areas of the world
against multiple adversaries, and it must revise its existing security
alliances--most of which, like NATO, are defensive in nature--so that they
can better support US global expeditionary operations ("The Clinton
Doctrine," The Nation, April 19, 1999...full text
accessible through archive search @ http://www.TheNation.com).


CHOMSKY ON RAMBOUILLET

The "Diplomatic Scene," in brief, as of May 8
Michael Albert prepared from material made available by Noam Chomsky



       (I): The Rambouillet accords of March were presented to Milosovic as
a take-it-or-get bombed ultimatum. This was not a  legitimate exercise in
diplomacy, of course, at least for those few in the West who join the great
majority of people in the world in accepting that constraints on the use of
violence by the powerful are important. Still, it is part of the "diplomatic
scene," such as it is, and so we begin with Rambouillet.

              Rambouillet called for military occupation of Kosovo by NATO,
and effective military occupation of the rest of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (FYR), at NATO's will. The terms for the occupation are set out
in Appendix
B: Status of Multi-National Military Implementation Force. One crucial
paragraph reads:

NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels,
aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access
throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters.
This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac,maneuver,
billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support,
training, and operations.

The remainder of the Appendix spells out the demand that NATO forces and
whoever they employ can do as they wish throughout the territory of the
FYR, without any obligations or concern for the laws of the country or
jurisdiction of its authorities, though the latter are required to follow
any NATO orders "on a priority basis and with all appropriate means."

              The text has apparently not been published in mainstream U.S.
media. The wording apparently was´ designed to guarantee rejection. Would
any country even consider such terms, except in the form of unconditional
surrender?


       (II): The Serbian National Assembly responded to the US/NATO
ultimatum on March 23 (one day before the bombing). The  Assembly's
Resolution rejected the demand for military occupation, and called on the
Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe and the U.N. to facilitate a peaceful diplomatic
settlement. Specifically, "We also condemn a withdrawal of the OSCE Kosovo
Verification Mission. There is not a single reason for this but to put the
withdrawal into the  service of blackmails and threats to our country." The
withdrawal of the international OSCE observers had just been ordered
by the U.S., in preparation for the bombing after the (apparently intended)
FYR rejection of the Rambouillet ultimatum.

       The Assembly Resolution further calls for negotiations leading
"toward the reaching of a political agreement on a wide-ranging autonomy
for Kosovo and Metohija [the official name for the province], with the
securing of a full equality of all citizens and ethnic communities and with
respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of
Serbia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." Further:

              The Serbian Parliament does not accept presence of foreign
military troops in Kosovo and Metohia. The  Serbian Parliament is ready to
review the size and character of the international presence in Kosmet
[Kosovo/Metohija] for carrying out the reached accord, immediately upon
signing the political accord on the self-rule agreed and accepted by the
representatives of all national communities living in Kosovo and Metohia.

(http://www.lbbs.org/ZNETTOPnoanimation.html)
look under Kosovo etc.

_________________________________________________________________________

Dr. Jonathan Michael Feldman
Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Linkoping University
Teknikringen 4
S-581 83 Linkoping, Sweden
PHONE: 46 13 28 5687
FAX: 46 13 122299
E-MAIL: [log in to unmask]







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