Here for interested readers is some Orwellian nonsense. The CIA did not
have enough money to properly make a map? Of course, we can scrutinize
the title of this piece and take the obverse which does make a little more
sense, "Without war, Mistakes Don't Happen." I think that is closer to the
truth, e.g. maybe if we had a disarmament process and destroyed nuclear
weapons
planning there wouldn't be anything for "Chinese spys" to steal.
May 12, 1999, The New York Times
In War, Mistakes Happen
By ROBERT M. GATES
One result of the tragically mistaken bombing of the Chinese Embassy in
Belgrade last week is the ritual search in Washington for human sacrifice,
someone to blame. Before the tumbrels roll, however, three things should be
taken into account.
First, within the Central Intelligence Agency and the
military there was a system failure as well as mistakes by individuals.
The source of all mapping information for United States military targeting
is the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, a joint military and civilian
intelligence organization. According to The New York Times, that agency was
apparently the
source of outdated maps. Then the C.I.A. analysts apparently misidentified
the target. And finally, military databases in the United States and NATO
used to check the accuracy of such information failed to catch the error.
The immediate causes of failure will be identified and
responsibility fixed, but Americans also should understand that outdated
maps and insufficient personnel are related to 12 years of budget cuts in
both the military and intelligence -- mapping is considered one of those
"lower priority" functions that often get the budget ax first. When
satellite imagery resources
are limited, use of precious orbit time for long-range database building --
like mapping --often comes last.
When the mapping agency and the C.I.A. find themselves short
of skilled map makers and analysts, and everyone is working prolonged hours
because we are at war, mistakes will happen.
We had a rash of intelligence errors at the end of the 1970's
and early 1980's after a budget drought lasting nearly a decade. The
C.I.A. today is just three-quarters the size it was when I retired as
director in 1993, and yet I believe the tasks assigned to the agency are
both more complex and more numerous than during the cold war.
There is a very real correlation between resources and
performance. Those in high dudgeon today over this most unfortunate
targeting mistake would do well to keep that in mind, even as the
authorities try to figure out precisely what went wrong.
Second, somehow some commentators seem shocked that mistakes
like the embassy bombing can happen. In truth, with the thousands of
munitions that have been used, it is extraordinary that so few have either
gone astray, malfunctioned or been mistargeted. Whenever one does, and
innocent bystanders are killed, it is tragic. But for all the obfuscation
in Washington, we are at war with Serbia. And it is inevitable that there
will be unintended and innocent victims.
Whether we should have begun this war at all must be debated
when the fighting is over, but while the fighting continues, citizens of
NATO countries -- and noncombatants in Serbia -- would do well to remember
that a war is on, and that there never has been one in which civilians did
not die accidentally. Therein is one of the tragedies of war and why it
should not
be undertaken lightly.
Third, China's outrage is justified and the United States has
issued an official apology. But I also believe the bombing of the embassy
has provided a pretext and opportunity for China tovent its broader outrage
at NATO's intervention to right wrongs in a sovereign country -- a
precedent that both Russia and China find most unsettling. I am certain
that the ChineseGovernment is puzzled and angry at the United States for a
number of reasons right now, and the bombing is a good chance to show it.
We ought to have learned from Soviet history that Communist leaders in
these huge empires -- Soviet and Chinese -- are isolated and paranoid and
often attribute motives and scheming to the United States that we might
find laughable.
One thing that doubtless mystifies leaders in both Beijing
and Moscow is why we are willing to risk our relationship with them over
Kosovo. As one sees the Administration alternately and unpredictably anger
and appease both countries, Americans too might welcome some indication of
a strategy or set of general principles for dealing with these two powers
so as to protect future stability in Asia and in Europe, even while we deal
with the multitude of real issues that are raised by their behavior -- and
ours.
The bombing of the Chinese Embassy seems to be a tragic yet
simple mistake. But it raises deeper questions about what has happened to
our military and intelligence establishment,about our expectations in
fighting an ugly war, and about American strategy. Some answers would be
nice.
Robert M. Gates, a career intelligence officer, served on the
National Security Council staff under four Presidents and was Director of
Central Intelligence under President George Bush.
Dr. Jonathan Michael Feldman
Centre for Innovation and Entrepreneurship
Linkoping University
Teknikringen 4
S-581 83 Linkoping, Sweden
PHONE: 46 13 28 5687
FAX: 46 13 122299
E-MAIL: [log in to unmask]
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