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CRIT-GEOG-FORUM  April 1999

CRIT-GEOG-FORUM April 1999

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Subject:

Rambouillet: a declaration of war

From:

James Blaut <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

James Blaut <[log in to unmask]>

Date:

Wed, 28 Apr 1999 15:12:31 -0400

Content-Type:

text/plain

Parts/Attachments:

Parts/Attachments

text/plain (180 lines)

------- Forwarded Message -------- 

>From: "iacenter" <[log in to unmask]>
>Reply-To: "[log in to unmask]" <[log in to unmask]>
>To: "[log in to unmask]" <[log in to unmask]>
>Subject: Rambouillet: a declaration of war
>Date: Tue, 27 Apr 1999 17:53:34 -0500

International Action Center
39 West 14th St., #206
New York, NY  10011
(212) 633-6646   fax:  (212) 633-2889
http://www.iacenter.org   email: [log in to unmask]

THE RAMBOUILLET ACCORD: 
A DECLARATION OF WAR DISGUISED AS A PEACE AGREEMENT

By Richard Becker, 
Western Regional Co-Director of the International Action Center
		
The official line in the big business media is that the Pentagon had
no choice but to rain bombs and missiles down on Yugoslavia because
the Milosevic government refused to negotiate over the issue of
Kosovo, a region of that country where ethnic Albanians make up the
majority.

The reality was very different: The Rambouillet accord, the U.S./NATO
"peace plan" for Kosovo was presented to Yugoslavia as an ultimatum.
It was a "take it or leave it" proposition, as Albright often
emphasized back in February. There were, in fact, no negotiations at
all, and no sovereign, independent state could have signed the
Rambouillet agreement.

Appendix B of the accord would have opened the door for the 
occupation of all of Yugoslavia.
>
>The accord provided for a very broad form of autonomy for Kosovo. A
>province of Serbia, one of two republics (along with Montenegro) 
which make up present-day Yugoslavia, Kosovo would have its own 
parliament, president, prime minister, supreme court and security 
forces under Rambouillet. The new Kosovo government would be able to 
negate laws of the federal republic's legislature (unlike U.S. 
states) and conduct its own foreign policy.

All Yugoslav federal army and police forces would have to be
withdrawn, except for a 3-mile wide stretch along the borders of the
province. A new Kosovar police force would be trained to take over
internal security responsibilities. Members of the U.S.-backed KLA
(Kosovo Liberation Army) which is supposed to disarm under the
agreement, could join the police units.

But, in reality, neither the Kosovo police, the KLA nor the Yugoslav
federal forces would be the basic state apparatus under Rambouillet:
That function would be reserved for NATO. A 28,000-strong NATO
occupation army, known as the KFOR, would be authorized to "use
necessary force to ensure compliance with the Accords." 

As has been reported in the mainstream media, the Yugoslav government
indicated its willingness to accept the autonomy part of the
agreement, but rejected other sections, including the occupation of
Kosovo by NATO, as a violation of its national sovereignty and
independence. 

Many key aspects of the accord have been given very little or no
coverage in the corporate media.

Chapter 4a, Article I -- "The economy of Kosovo, shall function in
accordance with free market principles." Kosovo has vast mineral
resources, including the richest mines for lead, molybdenum, mercury
and other metals in all of Europe. The capital to exploit these
resources, which are today mainly state-owned, would undoubtedly come
from the U.S. and western European imperialists.

Chapter 5, Article V -- "The CIM shall be the final authority in
theater regarding interpretation of the civilian aspects of this
Agreement, and the Parties agree to abide by his determinations as
binding on all Parties and persons." The CIM is the Chief of the
Implementation Mission, to be appointed by the European Union
countries.

Chapter 7, Article XV -- "The KFOR [NATO] commander is the final
authority in theater regarding interpretation of this Chapter and his
determinations are binding on all Parties and persons." "This Chapter"
refers to all military matters. The NATO commander would almost
certainly be from the U.S.

Together, the CIM and the NATO commander are given total dictatorial
powers, the right to overturn elections, shut down organizations and
media, and overrule any decisions made by the Kosovar, Serbian or
federal governments regarding Kosovo.

At the end of three years of this arrangement, the "final status" of
Kosovo would be resolved through an unspecified process (Chapter 8,
Article I, Section 3). In reality, Yugoslav sovereignty over the
region would end the day the agreement was signed.

The Rambouillet accord would have turned Kosovo into a colony in every
respect, a colony of the United States, the dominant power in NATO.
But it also would have gone a long way toward subordinating all of
Yugoslavia. 

APPENDIX B

Appendix B, the "Status of the Multi-National Military Implementation
Force," includes extraordinarily intrusive provisions for Yugoslavia
as a whole.

Section 6a. "NATO shall be immune from all legal process, whether
civil, administrative, or criminal."

Section 6b. "NATO personnel, under all circumstances and at all times,
shall be immune from the Parties, jurisdiction in respect of any
civil, administrative, criminal or disciplinary offenses which may be
committed by them in the FRY (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia)." 

Section 7. "NATO personnel shall be immune from any form of arrest,
investigation, or detention by the authorities in the FRY."

Together, Sections 6 and 7 comprise the old, hated, colonial concept
of "extraterritoriality," under which the colonizers were immune from
being tried by the courts of the colonized country, even if they
committed -- as they often did -- rape, murder and mayhem.

Section 8: "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,
vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and
unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and
territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the
right of bivouac, maneuver, billet and utilization of any areas or
facilities as required for support, training, and operations."

Section 11: "NATO is granted the use of airports, roads, rails, and
ports without payment of fees, duties, dues, tolls, or charges
occasioned by mere use."

Section 15: "The Parties (Yugoslav & Kosovo governments) shall, upon
simple request, grant all telecommunications services, including
broadcast services, needed for the Operation, as determined by NATO.
This shall include the right to utilize such means and services as
required to assure full ability to communicate and the right to use
all of the electromagnetic spectrum for this purpose, free of cost."

Section 22: "NATO may, in the conduct of the Operation, have need to
make improvements or modifications to certain infrastructure in the
FRY, such as roads, bridges, tunnels, buildings, and utility systems."

The stationing of  28,000 U.S./NATO troops in Kosovo, a province of
Yugoslavia would, by itself, be a gross violation of the country's
sovereignty. 

But the Rambouillet accord requires that Yugoslavia allow NATO
unfettered access to any and all parts of the country's territory,
with all costs to be borne by the host country!

The accord blatantly violates Yugoslavia's sovereignty in so
provocative a manner that it cannot have been accidental. It is not
difficult to imagine a working group in the State Department charged
with the task of thinking up the most intrusive and insulting clauses
possible to insert into the agreement.

Clearly, U.S. policymakers never intended for Yugoslavia's leadership
to sign this document. It was just another step in the preparation for
war. The role of Rambouillet in this process was to put the onus,
unfairly, on the Yugoslav side for the failure to achieve a peaceful
resolution, in order to justify the massive bombing of the entire
country.

The Rambouillet Accord was, in truth, a declaration of war disguised
as a peace agreement.


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