Dear Mr. Haeggman,

In response to your recent comments re. A Brief History of
Modern China" (1954), I would like to add the following:

I have not come across any later edition of the 1954 publication;
however, one way of analysing a situation is by looking at state
practice.

Though being one of the oldest map-producing countries,
viewed from the outside, maps issued by China have been a
problem throughout its long history. Beside the wide-spread
practice of states issuing 'advantageous' maps to further their
cause, the Chinese case might partly also be explained by its
perception of sovereignty, which until recently still resembled
somewhat that of earlier centuries, namely alluding rather to
actual or perceived "spheres of influence" than to what is
understood in contemporary international law under territorial
sovereignty. Only since the 1970s has there been a gradual
change.

I have discussed that subject in my book "The Contested
Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of Malaysia", inter alia,
with regard to the publication you mentioned, but also with
regard to Chinese maps concerning maritime claims and the
admissibility of maps issued by a claiming country as proof of
territorial title.

There exist e.g. a semi-official publication of 1991 that shows
the outer limits of the PRC-claimed "Nansha archipelago"
(Spratly Islands), defined by coordinates that include, inter alia,
the islands of Labuan and Banggi, which are indisputable
Malaysian territories.

There also exist some maps which show the so-called "U-Line"
in the South China Sea, starting near the coast off Vietnam's Da
Nang, leading south to James Shoal off the Malaysian coast and
continuing north again to the Bashi Channel (south of Taiwan).
Some scholars interpret these maps as the PRC's claim to
"historic waters". However in this case, the Government itself
has never officially pressed any such claim, nor does any
national legislation exist to support it.

Although China has, in general, been sceptical of international
law due to its inherent western origin and the fact that it did not
contribute to its codification, the PRC Government has in recent
years changed its attitude towards a greater acceptance of
international law as laid down in conventions and customary
rules. See e.g. the PRC's first signing/ratification of any law of
the sea conventions in 1982/96.

This, however, does not mean that the PRC adheres to all
agreed principles and rules. See e.g. the innocent
passage/warship clause in its Declaration attached to its
UNCLOS III ratification. Or the rejection of the otherwise
generally acknowledged principle to base proof of territorial
title on state succession, a principle the PRC Government has
not yet fully accepted, especially not when it runs contrary to its
own interest.

On the other hand, the PRC is a member of the UN and is
therefore party to its Charter, which stipulates that all member
states are ipso facto party to the Statutes of the ICJ which lay
down the sources of international law for dispute resolution.
These are based, inter alia, on "international custom, as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law" and "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized [i.e. peace-loving]
nations".

Although the PRC does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ (not many countries do), it has not questioned the
Court's competence and/or authority of which it is a permanent
member for more than two decades. Furthermore, the PRC has
not rejected the application of international law for settling
international disputes. It has neither questioned its binding
force, nor challenged the international law sources mentioned
above. It can be presumed, therefore, that the PRC acquiesces,
in general, in the application of the presently established rules of
international law.

Whether this will include the Court's repeated rulings on the
in/admissibility of maps has not been tested. Historically, the
PRC has shown - for obvious reasons - preference of solving
disputes (including territorial ones) on a bilateral level. Though
it seems presently more than unlikely that the PRC will
challenge Philippine sovereignty e.g. over the Sulu Islands, the
protracted dispute over the (relatively) nearby Spratly Islands
has been the cause of bilateral tensions for some time now.

While the preambles of the last three constitutions (which all
only refer to Taiwan and to no other territorial claim) state that
"Taiwan is part of the sacred territory of the People's Republic
of China" and Macao's integration is less than 4 months away, it
remains to be seen what will happen in the future (especially
with the regions along the Pakistan and Indian borders), and
whether - as you said in your "Historical World Rhythms and
China" article - "with economic strength comes military
aggressiveness".

Dr. R. Haller-Trost
The Contested Maritime and Territorial Boundaries of Malaysia
An International Law Perspective
Kluwer Law International
1998



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