Hi Ray,


>Hello Jim,
>
>Thanks for you explanation. Your thoughts on my "clarifications" below
>would be appreciated. I apologize for failing to cut the length, just
>afraid that I and perhaps you folks might lose the train of thought.
>

[snip]

>
>Ray here:
>Yes, my education and work experience informs the way I work on a
>problem. But I don't see my process as either one way or the other. It
>is a process that calls for both modes, I think.

You are surely right about this. And the comment about your academic
background leading you one way or another was sort of semi-ironic. It is
true that those accustomed to highly quantitative approaches to
problem-solving (e.g. engineers, social scientists) will seek a level of
precision, and demand a standard of "proof," that's just not available to
other areas of seeking knowledge. Ecology may never be like physics--which
often involves lots of deductive reasoning from known principles, and
subsequent working out of specific hypotheses to test in particular cases.
Ecology, on the other hand, is rarely such a predictive science; much of
ecology still operates on 19th century qualitative natural history basis.
Ecologists go out in the field, make lots of observations about lots of
specific things, and then try to draw some general conclusions from what
they see. But you're exactly right, the two modes of reasoning are not
mutually exclusive.


Ray:
>For example, if I were to try to answer your question to Dreamer, my first
>question to myself would be "what criteria do I use?". My process, as I
>see it, would be first to use, without even thinking about it, all my past
>experiences on such questions. I would ask myself what I used in each
>representative case. From that I would "list" tentative criteria. On
>that basis, I would review possible "uses of nature" to come to a first
>cut list of reasonable uses of nature. But, I think that those uses would
>be uniquely dependent on the conditions/situation within which the need
>for decision or choice was to be made. One of the considerations would
>be: "what compromises seem to be required and acceptable for the
>particular problem?" "And when, at what point, in the analytical/decision
>process do I have to compromise?"

Nope, that's fine. A more informal, seat-of-the-pants response would work
as well, also.

>I say "compromise" because, in my professional work, some *action* would
>most likely take place. (rarely a no-action decision). At that point,
>one would work to achieve the least "damage" in terms of the environmental
>issue under investigation. I can give you a concrete example, but don't
>think it worth it now.
>
>
>
>In short, I do not think that one can give you a considered answer to the
>question as you presented it. One can, in the abstract, give you only a
>list of *classes* of actions that should be subject to scrutiny.
>Determining those classes would, in itself require some preliminary
>determination of criteria for choice.

My question to Dreamer wasn't exactly *aiming* at a "considered answer."
Lots of times philosophy and ethics works by examining seat-of-the-pants,
everyday cases (like mowing grass, drinking milk, swatting flies) and
carefully teasing out relevant differences between them. It probably works
better if one *doesn't* bring a whole lot of considered theory to the
table, the point of the exercise being to first *discover* our moral
intuitions before going on to analyze them (much less debate them). Many
times such intuitions are wholly inchoate, and by forcing yourself into an
analytical thought process from the start you risk not examining the more
vague areas of your thinking. William James referred to the "fringe of
consciousness"--that shadowy area on the outskirts of our thinking,
comprising non-propositional attitudes, moods, emotions, etc. By trying to
force some of these more vague elements of our consciousness into the
light, so to speak, we often find out that we actually believe things we
didn't know we believed.


>The distribution of power is a very important factor in what is possible.
>
>-----------------------
>
>Jim again:
>
>Perhaps your formal academic background leads you to want to privilege one
>mode, the deductive, over the other--but that's just a guess. Much of
>philosophy operates under *inductive* regimes of reasoning . . . you
>should try it sometime, you might like it! <smile> Just kidding.
>Take care,
>
>Jim
>
>
>
>Jim, do you think I have used *inductive* reasoning in the illustration
>above? I think I am not really clear in my understanding of the
>distinctions. And what do you think of the conclusions I've drawn?

Hmmmm. . . . well, it looks to me like you're trying to reason from true
premises (i.e. "criteria") to arrive at conclusions about what is
permissible, which is still overall a deductive process. The inductive
inferences will probably enter into your thinking at the point where you
start thinking about specifics, e.g.:

 "But, I think that those uses would be uniquely dependent on the
conditions/situation within which the need for decision or choice was to be
made."

Again, it's not easy to clearly separate the two thought processes, nor is
it generally necessary--so I wouldn't worry about it too much. . . .



>As always, you stimulate my brain cells - the few that remain! :-)
>
>
>
>Ray

That's always nice to hear--and I'm sure you have PLENTY of brain cells
left, judging from what you write here. <g> Talk to you later,

Jim