While I remain distressed about what happened on the list after I responded
in a friendly way to John Wilko's attempt to set me up as a "gender test
case" (there really is a problem here), I'd like to move forward.

Randolph has given us some juicy quotes from the Boundary publication, among
which:

Quote: The destitution of the essence of poetry largely results from our
excessive attention to the phenomenal part of poetry. And most of us who
are now interested in form have arrived at this interest by way of a
revision of the past, when the content was overemphasized. The art of
poetry, if standing on either side of the extremes, cannot possibly develop
in any significant way. To me, as a poet devoted to the revolution of form,
with mature conditions and enough talent, I would transcend the phenomena
of poetry and march directly toward the essence. Unquote Che Qianzi

This raises for me a whole bundle of puzzles, not least the idea of
"overemphasizing content", which could only be a formal question too. Also
the notion of "essence" (a more interesting matter than modern philosophy or
science will let it be)* seems introduced here as if it somehow resided in
formal revolution alone.

I am puzzled about other implications too: our seemingly inevitable current
opposition of phenomenon to form (I doubt that that can entirely be an
opposition even with the most extreme dislocative writing techniques, since
form is also presented phenomenologically to us or it would have no impact);
and phrases like "cannot possibly develop in any significant way" which seems
to be special pleading of that familiar kind which would outlaw in advance
any other approach.

Let me clear the ground. I am not attacking Qianzi's remarks, not least
because he is being quoted out of context. I myself never oppose one kind of
poetic technique to another so as to create hierarchies and power positions.
Also, I am not proposing essentialism as a transcendental category to the
struggle to apprehend the real world. (I have a complicated personal
philosophy on these questions which is not absolutist like that.)

But I don't think poets should let puzzling things just whizz by them with
open mouths uttering "Ah!" We have a form-content question here which is
different, please, from the usual form-content identity which we can assume
we all know about. Here we are talking about emphases and essences: and I
don't see how both those notions climb into the same bed.

* Essences are interesting precisely because of the quantum physicists'
belief that they have, by describing the lack of foundation for essences --
symbolised, let's say, as non-existent point positions for particles --
described the whole problem whatsoever. We can't oppose "essence" to quantum
uncertainties but we can question what mathematical description actually
"does". We can also reflect that no description can rule out "origin": a
description can't describe its own lack of origin, because that argument
can't transcend the contradictions about origin that lie within the very act
of describing. But that doesn't mean we can easily rescue either "origin" or
"essence": it simply means we should not be arrogant about our descriptive
capacities. And phew and phew.

If I have time I'll return later to the Charles Bernstein quotation that
Randolph cites, as that, too, is interesting and I feel this whole question
about "identity politics" needs further discussion as it is not unrelated to
the issues I raise about Qianzi.


Doug


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