-----Original Message-----
From: colin s. cavell <[log in to unmask]>
To: WORLD SYSTEMS NETWORK <[log in to unmask]>
Date: 09 April 1999 00:27
Subject: [fwd] Kosovo "Freedom Fighters" Financed by Organized Crime
For those asking "who are the good guys?", this article may be
helpful in letting you know who are NOT the good guys:
_________________________________________________________________
KOSOVO "FREEDOM FIGHTERS" FINANCED BY ORGANISED CRIME
by Michel Chossudovsky
Professor of Economics at the University of Ottawa and author of The
Globalization of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Reforms, Third
World Network, Penang and Zed Books, London, 1997.
C Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1999. All rights reserved.
Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial internet sites,
provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To
publish this text in printed and/or other forms contact the author at
[log in to unmask]
Heralded by the global media as a humanitarian peace-keeping
mission, NATO's ruthless bombing of Belgrade and Pristina goes far beyond
the breach of international law. While Slobodan Milosevic is demonised,
portrayed as a remorseless dictator, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) is
upheld as a self-respecting nationalist movement struggling for the rights
of ethnic Albanians. The truth of the matter is that the KLA is sustained
by organised crime with the tacit approval of the United States and its
allies.
Following a pattern set during the War in Bosnia, public opinion
has been carefully misled. The multibillion dollar Balkans narcotics trade
has played a crucial role in "financing the conflict" in Kosovo in
accordance with Western economic, strategic and military objectives. Amply
documented by European police files, acknowledged by numerous studies, the
links of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) to criminal syndicates in
Albania, Turkey and the European Union have been known to Western
governments and intelligence agencies since the mid-1990s.
"...The financing of the Kosovo guerilla war poses critical
questions and it sorely test claims of an "ethical" foreign policy. Should
the West back a guerilla army that appears to partly financed by organised
crime." 1
While KLA leaders were shaking hands with US Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright at Rambouillet, Europol (the European Police
Organization based in the Hague) was "preparing a report for European
interior and justice ministers on a connection between the KLA and
Albanian drug gangs."2 In the meantime, the rebel army has been skilfully
heralded by the global media (in the months preceding the NATO bombings)
as broadly representative of the interests of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo.
With KLA leader Hashim Thaci (a 29 year "freedom fighter")
appointed as chief negotiator at Rambouillet, the KLA has become the de
facto helmsman of the peace process on behalf of the ethnic Albanian
majority and this despite its links to the drug trade. The West was
relying on its KLA puppets to rubber-stamp an agreement which would have
transformed Kosovo into an occupied territory under Western
Administration.
Ironically Robert Gelbard, America's special envoy to Bosnia, had
described the KLA last year as "terrorists". Christopher Hill, America's
chief negotiator and architect of the Rambouillet agreement "has also been
a strong critic of the KLA for its alleged dealings in drugs."3 Moreover,
barely a few two months before Rambouillet, the US State Department had
acknowledged (based on reports from the US Observer Mission) the role of
the KLA in terrorising and uprooting ethnic Albanians:
"...the KLA harass or kidnap anyone who comes to the police, ...
KLA representatives had threatened to kill villagers and burn their homes
if they did not join the KLA [a process which has continued since the NATO
bombings]... [T]he KLA harassment has reached such intensity that
residents of six villages in the Stimlje region are "ready to flee." 4
While backing a "freedom movement" with links to the drug trade,
the West seems also intent in bypassing the civilian Kosovo Democratic
League and its leader Ibrahim Rugova who has called for an end to the
bombings and expressed his desire to negotiate a peaceful settlement with
the Yugoslav authorities.5 It is worth recalling that a few days before
his March 31st Press Conference, Rugova had been reported by the KLA
(alongside three other leaders including Fehmi Agani) to have been killed
by the Serbs.
Covert Financing of "Freedom Fighters"
Remember Oliver North and the Contras? The pattern in Kosovo is
similar to other CIA covert operations in Central America, Haiti and
Afghanistan where "freedom fighters" were financed through the laundering
of drug money. Since the onslaught of the Cold War, Western intelligence
agencies have developed a complex relationship to the illegal narcotics
trade. In case after case, drug money laundered in the international
banking system has financed covert operations.
According to author Alfred McCoy, the pattern of covert financing
was established in the Indochina war. In the 1960s, the Meo army in Laos
was funded by the narcotics trade as part of Washington's military
strategy against the combined forces of the neutralist government of
Prince Souvanna Phouma and the Pathet Lao.6
The pattern of drug politics set in Indochina has since been
replicated in Central America and the Caribbean. "The rising curve of
cocaine imports to the US", wrote journalist John Dinges "followed almost
exactly the flow of US arms and military advisers to Central America".7
The military in Guatemala and Haiti, to which the CIA provided
covert support, were known to be involved in the trade of narcotics into
Southern Florida. And as revealed in the Iran-Contra and Bank of Commerce
and Credit International (BCCI) scandals, there was strong evidence that
covert operations were funded through the laundering of drug money. "Dirty
money" recycled through the banking system--often through an anonymous
shell company-- became "covert money," used to finance various rebel
groups and guerilla movements including the Nicaraguan Contras and the
Afghan Mujahadeen. According to a 1991 Time Magazine report:
"Because the US wanted to supply the mujehadeen rebels in
Afghanistan with stinger missiles and other military hardware it needed
the full cooperation of Pakistan. By the mid-1980s, the CIA operation in
Islamabad was one of the largest US intelligence stations in the World.
`If BCCI is such an embarrassment to the US that forthright investigations
are not being pursued it has a lot to do with the blind eye the US turned
to the heroin trafficking in Pakistan', said a US intelligence officer.8
America and Germany join Hands
Since the early 1990s, Bonn and Washington have joined hands in
establishing their respective spheres of influence in the Balkans. Their
intelligence agencies have also collaborated. According to intelligence
analyst John Whitley, covert support to the Kosovo rebel army was
established as a joint endeavour between the CIA and Germany's Bundes
Nachrichten Dienst (BND) (which previously played a key role in installing
a right wing nationalist government under Franjo Tudjman in Croatia).9 The
task to create and finance the KLA was initially given to Germany: "They
used German uniforms, East German weapons and were financed, in part, with
drug money".10 According to Whitley, the CIA was, subsequently
instrumental in training and equipping the KLA in Albania.11
The covert activities of Germany's BND were consistent with Bonn's
intent to expand its "Lebensraum" into the Balkans. Prior to the onset of
the civil war in Bosnia, Germany and its Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich
Genscher had actively supported secession; it had "forced the pace of
international diplomacy" and pressured its Western allies to recognize
Slovenia and Croatia. According to the Geopolitical Drug Watch, both
Germany and the US favoured (although not officially) the formation of a
"Greater Albania" encompassing Albania, Kosovo and parts of Macedonia.12
According to Sean Gervasi, Germany was seeking a free hand among its
allies "to pursue economic dominance in the whole of Mitteleuropa."13
Islamic Fundamentalism in Support of the KLA
Bonn and Washington's "hidden agenda" consisted in triggering
nationalist liberation movements in Bosnia and Kosovo with the ultimate
purpose of destabilising Yugoslavia. The latter objective was also carried
out "by turning a blind eye" to the influx of mercenaries and financial
support from Islamic fundamentalist organisations.14
Mercenaries financed by Saudi Arabia and Koweit had been fighting
in Bosnia.15 And the Bosnian pattern was replicated in Kosovo: Mujahadeen
mercenaries from various Islamic countries are reported to be fighting
alongside the KLA in Kosovo. German, Turkish and Afghan instructors were
reported to be training the KLA in guerilla and diversion tactics.16
According to a Deutsche Press-Agentur report, financial support
from Islamic countries to the KLA had been channelled through the former
Albanian chief of the National Information Service (NIS), Bashkim
Gazidede.17 "Gazidede, reportedly a devout Moslem who fled Albania in
March of last year [1997], is presently [1998] being investigated for his
contacts with Islamic terrorist organizations."18
The supply route for arming KLA "freedom fighters" are the rugged
mountainous borders of Albania with Kosovo and Macedonia. Albania is also
a key point of transit of the Balkans drug route which supplies Western
Europe with grade four heroin. 75% of the heroin entering Western Europe
is from Turkey. And a large part of drug shipments originating in Turkey
transits through the Balkans. According to the US Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), "it is estimated that 4-6 metric tons of heroin
leave each month from Turkey having [through the Balkans] as destination
Western Europe."19 A recent intelligence report by Germany's Federal
Criminal Agency suggests that: "Ethnic Albanians are now the most
prominent group in the distribution of heroin in Western consumer
countries."20
The Laundering of Dirty Money
In order to thrive, the criminal syndicates involved in the
Balkans narcotics trade need friends in high places. Smuggling rings with
alleged links to the Turkish State are said to control the trafficking of
heroin through the Balkans "cooperating closely with other groups with
which they have political or religious ties" including criminal groups in
Albanian and Kosovo.21 In this new global financial environment, powerful
undercover political lobbies connected to organized crime cultivate links
to prominent political figures and officials of the military and
intelligence establishment.
The narcotics trade nonetheless uses respectable banks to launder
large amounts of dirty money. While comfortably removed from the smuggling
operations per se, powerful banking interests in Turkey but mainly those
in financial centres in Western Europe discretely collect fat commissions
in a multibillion dollar money laundering operation. These interests have
high stakes in ensuring a safe passage of drug shipments into Western
European markets.
The Albanian Connection
Arms smuggling from Albania into Kosovo and Macedonia started at
the beginning of 1992, when the Democratic Party came to power, headed by
President Sali Berisha. An expansive underground economy and cross border
trade had unfolded. A triangular trade in oil, arms and narcotics had
developed largely as a result of the embargo imposed by the international
community on Serbia and Montenegro and the blockade enforced by Greece
against Macedonia.
Industry and agriculture in Kosovo were spearheaded into
bankruptcy following the IMF's lethal "economic medicine" imposed on
Belgrade in 1990. The embargo was imposed on Yugoslavia. Ethnic Albanians
and Serbs were driven into abysmal poverty. Economic collapse created an
environment which fostered the progress of illicit trade. In Kosovo, the
rate of unemployment increased to a staggering 70 percent (according to
Western sources).
Poverty and economic collapse served to exacerbate simmering
ethnic tensions. Thousands of unemployed youths "barely out of their
Teens" from an impoverished population, were drafted into the ranks of the
KLA...22
In neighbouring Albania, the free market reforms adopted since 1992 had
created conditions which favoured the criminalisation of State
institutions. Drug money was also laundered in the Albanian pyramids
(ponzi schemes) which mushroomed during the government of former President
Sali Berisha (1992-1997).23 These shady investment funds were an integral
part of the economic reforms inflicted by Western creditors on Albania.
Drug barons in Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia (with links to the
Italian mafia) had become the new economic elites, often associated with
Western business interests. In turn the financial proceeds of the trade in
drugs and arms were recycled towards other illicit activities (and vice
versa) including a vast prostitution racket between Albania and Italy.
Albanian criminal groups operating in Milan, "have become so powerful
running prostitution rackets that they have even taken over the Calabrians
in strength and influence."24
The application of "strong economic medicine" under the guidance
of the Washington based Bretton Woods institutions had contributed to
wrecking Albania's banking system and precipitating the collapse of the
Albanian economy. The resulting chaos enabled American and European
transnationals to carefully position themselves. Several Western oil
companies including Occidental, Shell and British Petroleum had their eyes
rivetted on Albania's abundant and unexplored oil-deposits. Western
investors were also gawking Albania's extensive reserves of chrome,
copper, gold, nickel and platinum... The Adenauer Foundation had been
lobbying in the background on behalf of German mining interests. 25
Berisha's Minister of Defence Safet Zoulali (alleged to have been
involved in the illegal oil and narcotics trade) was the architect of the
agreement with Germany's Preussag (handing over control over Albania's
chrome mines) against the competing bid of the US led consortium of
Macalloy Inc. in association with Rio Tinto Zimbabwe (RTZ).26
Large amounts of narco-dollars had also been recycled into the
privatisation programmes leading to the acquisition of State assets by the
mafias. In Albania, the privatisation programme had led virtually
overnight to the development of a property owning class firmly committed
to the "free market". In Northern Albania, this class was associated with
the Guegue "families" linked to the Democratic Party.
Controlled by the Democratic Party under the presidency of Sali
Berisha (1992-97), Albania's largest financial "pyramid" VEFA Holdings had
been set up by the Guegue "families" of Northern Albania with the support
of Western banking interests. VEFA was under investigation in Italy in
1997 for its ties to the Mafia which allegedly used VEFA to launder large
amounts of dirty money.27
According to one press report (based on intelligence sources),
senior members of the Albanian government during the Presidency of Sali
Berisha including cabinet members and members of the secret police SHIK
were alleged to be involved in drugs trafficking and illegal arms trading
into Kosovo:
(...) The allegations are very serious. Drugs, arms, contraband
cigarettes all are believed to have been handled by a company run openly
by Albania's ruling Democratic Party, Shqiponja (...). In the course of
1996 Defence Minister, Safet Zhulali [was alleged] to had used his office
to facilitate the transport of arms, oil and contraband cigarettes.
(...) Drugs barons from Kosovo (...) operate in Albania with impunity, and
much of the transportation of heroin and other drugs across Albania, from
Macedonia and Greece en route to Italy, is believed to be organised by
Shik, the state security police (...). Intelligence agents are convinced
the chain of command in the rackets goes all the way to the top and have
had no hesitation in naming ministers in their reports.28
The trade in narcotics and weapons was allowed to prosper despite
the presence since 1993 of a large contingent of American troops at the
Albanian-Macedonian border with a mandate to enforce the embargo. The West
had turned a blind eye. The revenues from oil and narcotics were used to
finance the purchase of arms (often in terms of direct barter):
"Deliveries of oil to Macedonia (skirting the Greek embargo [in 1993-4]
can be used to cover heroin, as do deliveries of kalachnikov rifles to
Albanian `brothers' in Kosovo".29
The Northern tribal clans or "fares" had also developed links with
Italy's crime syndicates.30 In turn, the latter played a key role in
smuggling arms across the Adriatic into the Albanian ports of Dures and
Valona. At the outset in 1992, the weapons channelled into Kosovo were
largely small arms including Kalashnikov AK-47 rifles, RPK and PPK
machine-guns, 12.7 calibre heavy machine-guns, etc.
The proceeds of the narcotics trade has enabled the KLA to rapidly
develop a force of some 30,000 men. More recently, the KLA has acquired
more sophisticated weaponry including anti-aircraft and antiarmor rockets.
According to Belgrade, some of the funds have come directly from the CIA
"funnelled through a so-called "Government of Kosovo" based in Geneva,
Switzerland. Its Washington office employs the public-relations firm of
Ruder Finn--notorious for its slanders of the Belgrade government".31
The KLA has also acquired electronic surveillance equipment which
enables it to receive NATO satellite information concerning the movement
of the Yugoslav Army. The KLA training camp in Albania is said to
"concentrate on heavy weapons training - rocket propelled grenades, medium
caliber cannons, tanks and transporter use, as well as on communications,
and command and control". (According to Yugoslav government sources.32
These extensive deliveries of weapons to the Kosovo rebel army
were consistent with Western geopolitical objectives. Not surprisingly,
there has been a "deafening silence" of the international media regarding
the Kosovo arms-drugs trade. In the words of a 1994 Report of the
Geopolitical Drug Watch: "the trafficking [of drugs and arms] is basically
being judged on its geostrategic implications (...) In Kosovo, drugs and
weapons trafficking is fuelling geopolitical hopes and fears"...33
The fate of Kosovo had already been carefully laid out prior to
the signing of the 1995 Dayton agreement. NATO had entered an unwholesome
"marriage of convenience" with the mafia. "Freedom fighters" were put in
place, the narcotics trade enabled Washington and Bonn to "finance the
Kosovo conflict" with the ultimate objective of destabilising the Belgrade
government and fully recolonising the Balkans. The destruction of an
entire country is the outcome. Western governments which participated in
the NATO operation bear a heavy burden of responsibility in the deaths of
civilians, the impoverishment of both the ethnic Albanian and Serbian
populations and the plight of those who were brutally uprooted from towns
and villages in Kosovo as a result of the bombings.
NOTES
1. Roger Boyes and Eske Wright, Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels
The Times, London, Monday, March 24, 1999.
2. Ibid.
3. Philip Smucker and Tim Butcher, "Shifting stance over KLA has
betrayed' Albanians", Daily Telegraph, London, 6 April 1999
4. KDOM Daily Report, released by the Bureau of European and Canadian
Affairs, Office of South Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of
State, Washington, DC, December 21, 1998; Compiled by EUR/SCE
(202-647-4850) from daily reports of the U.S. element of the Kosovo
Diplomatic Observer Mission, December 21, 1998.
5. "Rugova, sous protection serbe appelle a l'arret des raides", Le
Devoir, Montreal, 1 April 1999.
6. See Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia Harper
and Row, New York, 1972.
7. See John Dinges, Our Man in Panama, The Shrewd Rise and Brutal Fall of
Manuel Noriega, Times Books, New York, 1991.
8. "The Dirtiest Bank of All," Time, July 29, 1991, p. 22.
9. Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999; see also Michel Collon, Poker
Menteur, editions EPO, Brussels, 1997.
10. Quoted in Truth in Media, Phoenix, 2 April, 1999).
11. Ibid.
12. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4
13. Sean Gervasi, "Germany, US and the Yugoslav Crisis", Covert Action
Quarterly, No. 43, Winter 1992-93).
14. See Daily Telegraph, 29 December 1993.
15. For further details see Michel Collon, Poker Menteur, editions EPO,
Brussels, 1997, p. 288.
16. Truth in Media, Kosovo in Crisis, Phoenix, 2 April 1999.
17. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, March 13, 1998.
18. Ibid.
19. Daily News, Ankara, 5 March 1997.
20. Quoted in Boyes and Wright, op cit.
21. ANA, Athens, 28 January 1997, see also Turkish Daily News, 29 January
1997.
22. Brian Murphy, KLA Volunteers Lack Experience, The Associated Press, 5
April 1999.
23. See Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3, see also Barry
James, In Balkans, Arms for Drugs, The International Herald Tribune
Paris, June 6, 1994.
24. The Guardian, 25 March 1997.
25. For further details see Michel Chossudovsky, La crisi albanese,
Edizioni Gruppo Abele, Torino, 1998.
26. Ibid.
27. Andrew Gumbel, The Gangster Regime We Fund, The Independent, February
14, 1997, p. 15.
28. Ibid.
29. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No. 35, 1994, p. 3.
30. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 66, p. 4.
31. Quoted in Workers' World, May 7, 1998.
32. See Government of Yugoslavia at
http://www.gov.yu/terrorism/terroristcamps.html.
33. Geopolitical Drug Watch, No 32, June 1994, p. 4.
Michel Chossudovsky
Department of Economics,
University of Ottawa,
Ottawa, K1N6N5
Voice box: 1-613-562-5800, ext. 1415
Fax: 1-514-425-6224
E-Mail: [log in to unmask]
C Copyright by Michel Chossudovsky, Ottawa, 1999. All rights reserved.
Permission is granted to post this text on non-commercial internet sites,
provided the essay remains intact and the copyright note is displayed. To
publish this text in printed and/or other forms contact the author at
[log in to unmask]
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