First the most common form the tragedy of the commons take is that of
a common grazing pasture. In this case it is easy to introduce
property rights. One merely sells off parcels of the pasture to the
various herdsmen so that they own their own section and they have no
incentive to over graze.

Air pollution is a difficult externality problem since it is difficult
to assign property rights to the air. In this case internalizing the
externality may very well be impossible.

One scheme that has been talked about is the issuing of pollution
permits that firms could use to trade on some sort of exchange. The
idea is that those firm's that find retooling economical will do so
and sell their permits to those that do not. The idea is that the
cost of polluting would then be tied to production decisions and the
firm's would produce an amount that would be closer to an efficient
outcome. This idea is fine in theory, but there are many practical
difficulties in its implementation. Clearly determining the
"efficient amount of pollution" is probably not going to be agreed upon.

As for this problem being put forward by Hrdin, the idea of
externalities has been around longer than he has.

Steve



---Bryan Hyden <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
>
> steve wrote...
>
> >The primary reason for this is that the "tragedy of the commons" as
> >posited by Garret Hardin can be solved by the introduction of
property
> >rights.
>
> i don't really understand the implications of what you're saying here
> steve.... but nonetheless, i want to ask you how this would apply
to, say,
> air pollution.... in the spirit of the "tragedy of the commons"
argument,
> the atmosphere can be seen as the commons.... you have x number of
> factories, whether they're run by companies, governments, ect. and
each
> contributes to the total amount of pollution (not to mention
automobiles,
> run by individuals). the reasoning of the TOTC suggests that that
there is
> only so much pollution that the atmosphere can absorb until it becomes
> danerous, or at least unpleasant, to live in... now, any rational
person
> will acknowledge that this is a result of pollution.... however,
the trick
> is that even if we could determine that x amount of pollution from
a's car,
> or b's factory, or c's power plant is the maximum amount allowable
in order
> to not saturate the atmosphere past whatever amount is determined as
> unpleasant or harmful, even then, the reasoning of 'a' would be that
if i
> drive my car twice as far, it will benifit me twice as much, but it
will
> only harm the atmosphere a miniscule amount more, and by that
reasoning, it
> makes perfect sense to 'a' to do that driving.... and of course
when all
> polluters use this reasoning, we end up with an unpleasant or harmful
> atmosphere.... and that was just one example.... i could come up
with a
> thousand of them at least.... all showing how the TOTC is still
very much
> an issue....
>
> spirit
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Steve <[log in to unmask]>
> To: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]>
> Date: Tuesday, November 03, 1998 4:20 PM
> Subject: Re: Perceptions of sustainability
>
>
> >---Steven Bissell <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> >It sounds as if you've given emperical evidence to support Garret
> >Hardin's
> >"Tragedy of the Commons" theory. That in itself is significant
because
> >many
> >economists have said there is no "tragedy" at all.
> >--------
> >
> >The primary reason for this is that the "tragedy of the commons" as
> >posited by Garret Hardin can be solved by the introduction of
property
> >rights. The problem is that of an externality and the introduction
> >internalizes the externality and there is no problem.
> >
> >Steve
> >
> >
> >_________________________________________________________
> >DO YOU YAHOO!?
> >Get your free @yahoo.com address at http://mail.yahoo.com
> >
>
>
>
>

_________________________________________________________
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