Good question, Alan. I'll go for A and C.

As  Gill says, systems are pretty much always open in usual circumstances. Where they differ is that some systems and not others are amenable to artificial closure by means of experimentation. Bhaskar accepted that in his realist theory of science, he erroneously extrapolated from experimental physics and chemistry (with their capacity for closure) to natural sciences in general, thus ignoring all those sciences (such as cosmology, as you mention) where experimental closure is not a viable control on theory.

If we then look at the social sciences, we can detect a similar continuum. Bhaskar is right that macro-social structures or systems are not amenable to being examined by the experimental method. But if we look at the other end of the spectrum, we can see the possibility of quite tight social psychology experiments. I have argued that evaluation science sits between these two poles.

So I think we should get on with our lives by trying to find the best ways to develop empirical controls on theory for the area of the world we are looking at. For social scientists that means dealing with the problem that our subject matter consists of cunning little devils that do things for their own reasons. For me, it is the issue of choice and volition that is the main demarcation line between natural and social sciences, rather than closed / open systems (though of course there are connections between the two).

All the best, Sam


Sam Porter
Professor of Nursing Sociology
Head of Department of Social Sciences and Social Work
Bournemouth University


From: "Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>> on behalf of Gill Westhorp <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Reply-To: "Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>, Gill Westhorp <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Date: Saturday, 11 March 2017 at 09:32
To: "[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>" <[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>>
Subject: Re: Open and closed system consequences

Hi Alan
I think the ascribing you describe happens a lot in health, because some of the kinds of science involved is done in (artificially) closed systems.

Bhaskar (and as far as I know all other realists) argued that all systems, natural and social, are open.  So I think the answer is A: No difference.

Cheers
Gill

From: Realist and Meta-narrative Evidence Synthesis: Evolving Standards [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Alan Taylor
Sent: Saturday, 11 March 2017 8:28 PM
To: [log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Open and closed system consequences

Dear All,

For some time I have been concerned about the question of open and closed systems. As a physical science person come over to the dark side, although I lack a PhD in Cosmology I observe that:


  1.  It is mostly social scientists who ascribe closed, experimentally exact, theoretically provable characteristics to the physical sciences, but ....
  2.  School physics is often a case of A = B + C + Fudge factor (never cited)
  3.  No one knows where the universe finishes, and it has certainly never been put in a closed lab.
  4.  Action and interactions at the quantum level seem to be unpredictable, capable of breaching any closed system .... (just look at neutrino detectors buried underground)

So my question is:

What would the implications for the realist versions of the social sciences if the physical world were recognised to be as open a system as the social world?

Answers:


  1.  No difference
  2.  Everything falls over
  3.  We can get on with our lives and stop worrying about trying to imitate "physics" and predict stuff.

BTW this post was prompted by the other current and very interesting discussion, from which I have extracted the paragraph below:

<<Bhaskar was very sceptical about the possibility of social sciences ever being able to generate the sort of predictive knowledge that the natural sciences can (a predictive knowledge that depth realists see as identification of tendencies rather than constant conjunctions). He argued that while the experimental method in natural science can effect closure so that the powers of specific natural mechanisms can be examined, because the social world is intractably open, social science cannot progress much beyond post hoc  explanation. I think that the major contribution of realist evaluation is that it has shown how it is possible for social science to identify how things will tend to occur in the future in certain given circumstances.>>

Regards,

Alan Taylor Associate Lecturer,  CEng MIET, RPEng (IT&T).
Flinders University
Tel: +61 412 032 576
Only look on the bright side of life!

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