Hello all
Dr María D. C. García-Alonso from the School of Economics at the University of Kent will be presenting:
"Parallel imports, drug innovation and international patent protection: a policy game"
Abstract:
We consider a policy game between a high-income country hosting a drug innovator and a low-income country hosting a drug imitator. The low-income country chooses whether to enforce an International Patent
Regime (strict IPR) or not (weak IPR) and the high-income country chooses whether to allow parallel imports (PI) of on-patent drugs or market based discrimination (MBD). We show that, for a moderately high imitation cost, both (Strict IPR, Parallel Imports) and (Weak IPR,MBD) emerge as the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) policy choices. For relatively smaller imitation costs, (Weak IPR, MBD) is the unique SPNE policy choice. The welfare properties reveal that although innovation may be higher at the (Strict IPR, PI), the market coverage and national welfare of the low-income country, and the total welfare areall lower. This opens up the efficiency issue of implementing TRIPS and at the same time allowing international exhaustion of patent rights.
Details:
Wednesday 13th October 2010, 12:00 – 13:00
Boardroom, level 1, Imperial college business school, South Kensington, London
Please contact me at [log in to unmask] or call 02075949173
Kind Regards
Pip
Philippa Egan
PA to Carol Propper / Group Secretary
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