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From: ESRCs East West Programme [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
On Behalf Of Serguei A. Oushakine
Sent: Monday, April 19, 2010 8:11 PM
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Subject: "You always smashed the teeth of the lions and tigers who sought to
attack you": M. Hindley reviews D. Lieven's "Russia Against Napoleon".

Lieven calls "mostly nonsense" the idea, posited by Napoleon and his
admirers, that the brutal Russia winter destroyed the French army. The
Grandee Armée, exhausted from marching across Europe and living on poor
rations, was in bad shape even before the fighting began. Indeed, most of
the army had perished by December when the weather became unusually fierce.
As Lieven writes: "The basic point, however, is that Russian Novembers are
cold, especially for exhausted men who sleep in the open, without even a
tent, with very inadequate clothing, and with little food." What crippled
the Grande Armée was a poor supply line.

 
<http://bnreview.barnesandnoble.com/t5/Reviews-Essays/Russia-Against-Napoleo
n/ba-p/2359> 


 April 13, 2010
Russia Against Napoleon
By DOMINIC LIEVEN 

Reviewed by Meredith Hindley 

"Brave descendents of courageous Slavs! You always smashed the teeth of the
lions and tigers who sought to attack you. Let everyone unite: with the
Cross in your hearts and weapons in your hands no human force will defeat
you." With these words, Tsar Alexander I appealed to the Russian people to
join the fight against Napoleon's Grande Armée, which began pouring into
Russia at the end of June 1812.

Much has been written about how and why Napoleon came to lose more than a
half-million men in the Russian invasion. Hitler and his generals even
studied the ill-fated campaign hoping to avoid making similar mistakes. But
missing from western scholarship on the Napoleonic Wars is a full-fledged
account of how Russia came to smash Napoleon. With Russia Against Napoleon:
The True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace, Dominic Lieven, one of the
preeminent scholars of nineteenth-century Russia, aims to fill the void,
tackling not only the French invasion of 1812, but also the battles of
1813-1814. What sets Lieven's book apart from the handful of other accounts
is his prolific use of Russian sources, particularly regimental histories
available to western researchers only since 1991.   

After Napoleon destroyed the Russian army at Austerlitz in 1805 and drove
the Russians out of Poland, it was only a matter of time before another
showdown occurred between the two powers. Russia was unhappy about losing
Poland and being compelled to adhere to the Continental System, which
circumscribed Russia's ability to trade, to the detriment of its economy.
Faced with economic collapse, Tsar Alexander I decided to ignore France's
blockade against Britain. Napoleon, who abhorred disloyalty, vowed to make
Russia see the error of its ways.

Intelligence collected by Russian agents working in Paris in 1810, as well
as military intelligence gathered in 1811, suggested that Napoleon wanted a
quick, decisive victory. Alexander and Minister of War Mikhail Barclay de
Tolly refused to give Napoleon the war he wanted. Instead, they made plans
for a long defensive war -- one that would last at least two years or more.
Initially avoiding a big battle, the Russian army would systematically
retreat further into Russia, drawing out and weakening French supply lines.
As Alexander explained to Prussia's Frederick William III: "This system is
one which has brought victory to Wellington in wearing down the French
armies, and it is the one which I have resolved to follow." Adopting this
strategy also meant forsaking Austrian and Prussian support. Russia would
have to go it alone.

The Grande Armée began crossing the Neman River into Russia in late June
1812, but it would take Napoleon more than two months to force engagement
with the retreating Russians. At the Battle of Borodino on September 7,
Napoleon won the day, but failed to destroy the Russian army. As Russia's
forces retreated, Alexander faced the choice of defending Moscow or saving
the army. He chose the army. After installing himself in the Kremlin,
Napoleon made what Lieven regards as a "fatal mistake" by dallying in Moscow
for six weeks. The Emperor foolishly believed that Alexander would accept
his peace overtures. He also thought he could manipulate the Cossacks into
revolting or, failing that, ignite the Russian peasants into dethroning
their tsar for forsaking Moscow. After a month it became clear that Napoleon
was the one who had been duped; he had no choice but to retreat.

Lieven calls "mostly nonsense" the idea, posited by Napoleon and his
admirers, that the brutal Russia winter destroyed the French army. The
Grandee Armée, exhausted from marching across Europe and living on poor
rations, was in bad shape even before the fighting began. Indeed, most of
the army had perished by December when the weather became unusually fierce.
As Lieven writes: "The basic point, however, is that Russian Novembers are
cold, especially for exhausted men who sleep in the open, without even a
tent, with very inadequate clothing, and with little food." What crippled
the Grande Armée was a poor supply line.

For the first half of his book, Lieven wages a surreptitious war with Leo
Tolstoy's War and Peace, which has shaped cultural and historical
perceptions of the Russian war against Napoleon. Tolstoy the novelist
celebrates the patriotism of the Russian peasant, while heaping scorn on the
feeble brains of the professional soldiers. Lieven shows that
professionalism and planning -- along with patriotism -- carried the Russian
army through to the end. The Russians stored six months worth of food at
strategic points. They made sure that each battalion was properly outfitted.
The Russian army that met the Grand Armée wasn't a rag-tag peasant force,
but a rationally-planned fighting machine.

While Tolstoy finishes his tale in 1812, Lieven believes the real story
doesn't end until 1814, when the Russian army marches triumphant into Paris.
The experiences of 1812 resulted in a better-trained Russian army, prepared
to fight the campaigns of 1813-1814. Consider the logistical accomplishment
alone: 500,000 Russian soldiers were regularly fed and clothed as they
fought and marched to Paris and back.

Lieven attributes the omission of the battles of 1813-1814 from Russia's
grand military narrative to the fact they were fought to restore the
European balance of power. Alexander understood that defeating Napoleon and
his French empire -- thereby securing Russia's future security -- required
helping Prussia and Austria shake off the Napoleonic yoke as well. If you're
constructing a patriotic mythology, it is much easier to celebrate the
sacrifices of the men who fought at Borodino to defend Russian soil than to
laud the Russian contributions to the battles at Kulm, Leipzig, and Craonne,
which were fought in Prussia as part of a coalition.

Lieven also throws another wrench into Russian patriotic mythology by
singling out the pivotal role played by the horse. "In many ways the
greatest hero of the Russian war effort in 1812-14 was not a human being but
the horse," he writes. The "enormous superiority" of the Russian light
cavalry, which he regards as the most disciplined in Europe, prevented
Napoleon from getting food or rest as he retreated from Moscow. In 1814, the
cavalry intercepted French dispatches detailing Napoleon's plans and the
weak spots in Paris's defense.

In addition to the corrective provided to Napoleonic military history, the
book is an achievement in another regard. Lieven paints a vivid portrait of
the Russian home front, which takes the book beyond the realm of military
affairs and into social history. In order to fight Napoleon, Alexander
appealed to the people's patriotism, religious sentiment, and xenophobic
fears. Such appeals were important when roughly one million men were drafted
between 1812 and 1814. Alexander also adeptly courted the support of the
nobility, who controlled most of the food, fodder, horses, and manpower
required by the army. Lieven is also at his best when describing the
organization of a Russian regiment and the bonds that formed between the
men.

Having waged a long campaign with the Russians, Lieven deserves accolades
for crafting an insightful and sometimes mischievous book. It will be
difficult in the future to discuss the sweep of the Napoleonic Wars or
debate what country deserves credit for defeating Napoleon without giving
Russia its due. In many ways, Lieven's book is akin to the works on the
Eastern Front in the Second World War that have provided a corrective to the
dominant Anglo-American narrative. Hopefully, this is the first of more to
come.