... After all, we Americans, with our Monroe Doctrine and violent
reaction to Russian military penetration into Cuba or any other region
of the American continent, should well understand Moscow's reaction to
NATO initiatives along its borders.
* The Wall Street Journal
* AUGUST 24, 2009, 9:23 A.M. ET
Pride and Power
Russia is caught between continents and haunted by its past. Richard
Pipes on the need to convince a nation to dial back its aggressive
tendencies and join the West.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405297020355060457435873379041899
4.html
By RICHARD PIPES
Russia is obsessed with being recognized as a "Great Power." She has
felt as
one since the 17th century, after having conquered Siberia, but
especially
since her victory in World War II over Germany and the success in
sending
the first human into space. It costs nothing to defer to her claims to
such
exalted status, to show her respect, to listen to her wishes. From this
point of view, the recent remarks about Russia by Vice President Joe
Biden
in an interview with this newspaper were both gratuitous and harmful.
"Russia has to make some very difficult calculated decisions," he said.
"They have a shrinking population base, they have a withering economy,
they
have a banking sector that is not likely to be able to withstand the
next 15
years."
These remarks are not inaccurate but stating them publicly serves no
purpose
other than to humiliate Russia. The trends the vice president described
will
likely make Russia more open to cooperating with the West, Mr. Biden
suggested. It is significant that when our secretary of state tried
promptly
to repair the damage which Mr. Biden's words had caused, Izvestiia, a
leading Russian daily, proudly announced in a headline, "Hillary Clinton
acknowledges Russia as a Great Power."
Russia's influence on world affairs derives not from her economic power
or
cultural authority but her unique geopolitical location. She is not only
the
world's largest state with the world's longest frontier, but she
dominates
the Eurasian land mass, touching directly on three major regions:
Europe,
the Middle East and the Far East. This situation enables her to exploit
to
her advantage crises that occur in the most populous and strategic areas
of
the globe. For this reason, she is and will remain a major player in
world
politics.
Opinion polls indicate that most Russians regret the passing of the
Soviet
Union and feel nostalgia for Stalin. Of course, they miss not the
repression
of human rights which occurred under Communism nor the miserable
standards
of living but the status of their country as a force to be reckoned
with: a
country to be respected and feared. Under present conditions, the
easiest
way for them to achieve this objective is to say "no" to the one
undeniable
superpower, the United States. This accounts for their refusal to deal
more
effectively with Iran, for example, or their outrage at America's
proposal
to install rocket defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic. Their media
delight in reporting any negative news about the United States,
especially
the dollar, which they predict will soon be worthless (even as their
central
bank holds $120 billion or 30% of its reserves in dollar-denominated
U.S.
securities).
One unfortunate consequence of the obsession with "great power" status
is
that it leads Russians to neglect the internal conditions in their
country.
And here there is much to be done. To begin with: the economy. The
Russian
aggression against Georgia has cost it dearly in terms of capital
flight.
Due to the decline in the global prices of energy, which constitute
around
70% of Russian exports, exports in the first half of 2009 have fallen by
47%. The stock market, which suffered a disastrous decline in 2008, has
recovered, and the ruble has held steady, but the hard currency reserves
are
melting and the future does not look promising: The latest statistics
indicate that Russia's GDP this year will fall by 7%. It is this that
has
prompted President Dmitry Medvedev recently to demand that Russia carry
out
a major restructuring of her economy and end her heavy reliance on
energy
exports. "Russia needs to move forward," he told a gathering of
parliamentary party leaders, "and this movement so far does not exist.
We
are marking time and this was clearly demonstrated by the crisis... as
soon
as the crisis occurred, we collapsed. And we collapsed more than many
other
countries."
One of the major obstacles to conducting business in Russia is the
all-pervasive corruption. Because the government plays such an immense
role
in the country's economy, controlling some of its most important
sectors,
little can be done without bribing officials. A recent survey by
Russia's
Ministry of the Interior revealed, without any apparent embarrassment,
that
the average amount of a bribe this year has nearly tripled compared to
the
previous year, amounting to more than 27,000 rubles or nearly $1,000. To
make matters worse, businesses cannot rely on courts to settle their
claims
and disputes, and in extreme cases resort to arbitration.
The political situation may appear to a foreigner inculcated with
Western
values as incomprehensible. Democratic institutions, while not totally
suppressed, play little role in the conduct of affairs defined by the
leading ideologist of the regime as "sovereign democracy." Indeed,
President
Medvedev has publicly declared his opposition to "parliamentary
democracy"
on the grounds that it would destroy Russia.
A single party, One Russia, virtually monopolizes power, assisted by the
Communists and a couple of minor affiliates. Parliamentary bodies duly
pass
all bills presented to them by the government. Television, the main
source
of news for the vast country, is monopolized by the state. One lonely
radio
station and a few low-circulation newspapers are allowed freedom of
expression in order to silence dissident intellectuals. And yet, the
population at large seems not to mind this political arrangement-an
acquiescence which runs contrary to the Western belief that all people
crave
the right to choose and direct their government.
The solution of the puzzle lies in the fact that during their 1,000-year
old
history of statehood, the Russians have virtually never been given the
opportunity to elect their government or to influence its actions. As a
result of this experience, they have become thoroughly depoliticized.
They
do not see what positive influence the government can have on their
lives:
They believe that they have to fend for themselves. Yes, they will
gladly
accept social services if offered, as they had been under the Soviet
government, but they do not expect them. They hardly feel themselves to
be
citizens of a great state, but confine their loyalties to their
immediate
families and friends and the locality which they inhabit. From opinion
polls
it emerges that they believe democracy everywhere to be a sham, that all
governments are run by crooks who use their power to enrich themselves.
What
they demand of the authorities is that they maintain order: when asked
what
is more important to them-"order" or "freedom"-the inhabitants of the
province of Voronezh overwhelmingly expressed preference for "order."
Indeed, they identify political freedom, i.e., democracy, with anarchy
and
crime. Which explains why the population at large, except for the
well-educated, urban minority, expresses no dismay at the repression of
its
political rights.
One aspect of the "great power" syndrome is imperialism. In 1991, Russia
lost her empire, the last remaining in the world, as all her colonies,
previously disguised as "union republics" separated themselves to form
sovereign states. This imperial collapse was a traumatic experience to
which
most Russians still cannot adjust themselves. The reason for this lies
in
their history. England, France, Spain and the other European imperial
powers
formed their empires overseas and did so after creating national states:
As
a result, they never confused their imperial possessions with the mother
country. Hence, the departure of the colonies was for them relatively
easy
to bear. Not so in the case of Russia. Here, the conquest of the empire
occurred concurrently with the formation of the nation-state:
Furthermore,
there was no ocean to separate the colonies. As a result, the loss of
empire
caused confusion in the Russians' sense of national identity. They have
great difficulty acknowledging that the Ukraine, the cradle of their
state,
is now a sovereign republic and fantasize about the day when it will
reunite
with Mother Russia. They find it only slightly less difficult to
acknowledge
the sovereign status of Georgia, a small state that has been Russian for
over two centuries. The imperial complex underpins much of Russia's
foreign
policy.
These imperial ambitions have received fresh expression from a bill
which
President Medvedev has submitted in mid-August to parliament. It would
revise the existing Law of Defense which authorizes the Russian military
to
act only in response to foreign aggression. The new law would allow them
to
act also "to return or prevent aggression against another state" and "to
protect citizens of the Russian Federation abroad." It is easy to see
how
incidents could be provoked under this law that would allow Russian
forces
to intervene outside their borders.
How does one deal with such a difficult yet weighty neighbor, a neighbor
who
can cause no end of mischief if it becomes truly obstreperous? It seems
to
me that foreign powers ought to treat Russia on two distinct levels:
one,
which takes into consideration her sensitivities; the other, which
responds
to her aggressiveness.
We are right in objecting strenuously to Russia treating her one-time
colonial possessions not as sovereign countries but dependencies lying
in
her "privileged zone of influence." Even so, we should be aware of their
sensitivity to introducing Western military forces so close to her
borders.
The Russian government and the majority of its citizens regard NATO as a
hostile alliance. One should, therefore, be exceedingly careful in
avoiding
any measures that would convey the impression that we are trying
militarily
to "encircle" the Russian Federation. After all, we Americans, with our
Monroe Doctrine and violent reaction to Russian military penetration
into
Cuba or any other region of the American continent, should well
understand
Moscow's reaction to NATO initiatives along its borders.
This said, a line must be drawn between gentle manners and the hard
realities of politics. We should not acquiesce in Russia treating the
countries of her "near abroad" as satellites and we acted correctly in
protesting last year's invasion of Georgia. We should not allow Moscow a
veto over the projected installation of our anti-rocket defenses in
Poland
the Czech Republic, done with the consent of their governments and meant
to
protect us against a future Iranian threat. These interceptors and radar
systems present not the slightest threat to Russia, as confirmed
publicly by
Russian general Vladimir Dvorkin, an officer with long service in his
country's strategic forces. The only reason Moscow objects to them is
that
it considers Poland and the Czech Republic to lie within its "sphere of
influence."
Today's Russians are disoriented: they do not quite know who they are
and
where they belong. They are not European: This is attested to by Russian
citizens who, when asked. "Do you feel European?" by a majority of 56%
to
12% respond "practically never." Since they are clearly not Asian
either,
they find themselves in a psychological limbo, isolated from the rest of
the
world and uncertain what model to adopt for themselves. They try to make
up
for this confusion with tough talk and tough actions. For this reason,
it is
incumbent on the Western powers patiently to convince Russians that they
belong to the West and should adopt Western institutions and values:
democracy, multi-party system, rule of law, freedom of speech and press,
respect for private property. This will be a painful process, especially
if
the Russian government refuses to cooperate. But, in the long run, it is
the
only way to curb Russia's aggressiveness and integrate her into the
global
community.
Richard Pipes is Frank B. Baird Jr. professor of history, emeritus, at
Harvard University. In 1981 and 1982 he served as Director of East
European
and Soviet Affairs in President Reagan's National Security Council.
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