I think a conversation like this cannot proceed without a careful definition
of terms. What do we mean by machine? If we mean something that is, by
definition, manufactured or artificial then to regard ourselves as machines
brings up not ontological arguments but metaphysical ones (eg: if we are
machines then who/what made us?). As a confirmed atheist I cannot even begin
to contemplate this scenario (although with all the creation myths that
surround us it is clear that most people find this agreeable). However, if
we are to understand the term Omachine¹ in a broader sense (as a discrete
system that is ultimately understandable) then we can have a discussion
premised on the ontological.
However, I have two problems with this latter definition of the machine.
Firstly, it appears too broad to me. I think it is fair to make a
distinction between the natural world (things that are there, a priori human
activity) and the artificial world (those parts of the world we have made).
I accept these are not black and white categories (few things are that
simple). This is why reductivist approaches to knowledge rarely deliver
anything more sophisticated than soundbites.
Secondly, although the fashionable debate at the moment is about questioning
mind/body dualism (expressed in terms such as embodied cognition) to me, for
a long time, the more interesting question has concerned the self/other
debate. The mind/body debate is premised on the assumption that we are
individual organisms and beings. I would argue that this assumption may not
be correct and that we might not exist as individuals but rather as
instances of being. I do not mean by this some sort of Platonic holism,
where we are each an instance of some sort of ideal, but rather that we
exist primarily as social and cultural beings, where we are brought into
being through our social relations. This position assumes that a physical
self (including the brain) is a requirement for life but that the sort of
sentience we possess is a function of a social order we are what we are
because of how we communicate, represent, encode, make, consume and remember
(through our abstract systems, such as language, books, computers,
possessions, etc). Assuming this sort of position leads to a pretty messy
scenario, where the delicate probings of the anthropologist are probably
more useful than those of the engineer. Again, a mechanistic approach to
this world-view would be too simplistic.
I would argue that to consider ourselves to be machines invokes more
immediately the creationist debates Paul feels his posiiton avoids (see my
first argument above, about machines requiring a maker).
As such I completely disagree (with respect) with Paul¹s position and would
ask him to define what he means by machine.
My 2p.
Regards
Simon
On 4/12/08 18:16, "Paul Brown" <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> I'm not sure that I understand your statement that a dualistic point
> of view leads to seeing ourselves as machines. I am artist in
> residence at one of the worlds largest artificial life research
> centres (the CCNR at Sussex). The work there is founded on
> embodiment, interactionism and connectionism yet most of my colleagues
> (and I) would see ourselves as machines. Very sophisticated machines
> with aspects that may not be deducible/reducible but machines
> nevertheless. Surely the only alternative is to invoke some agency
> like creationism or 'intelligent design' which I for one (and I
> suspect most of my colleagues) would certainly reject as superstition.
>
> Paul
>
>
> On 4 Dec 2008, at 17:25, Kristina Höök wrote:
>
>> > In fact, in our work, we try to implement what we name an
>> > interactional approach to emotion in human-machine interaction. An
>> > interactional approach to design:
>> >
>> > 1. Recognizes affect as an embodied social, bodily and cultural
>> > product
>> > 2. Relies on and supports interpretive flexibility
>> > 3. Is non-reductionist
>> > 4. Supports an expanded range of communication acts
>> > 5. Focuses on people using systems to experience and understand
>> > emotions
>> > 6. Designs systems that stimulate reflection on and awareness of
>> > affect
>> >
>> > (see academic papers on this by Höök et al.,2008 or Boehner et al.
>> > 2005).
>> >
>> > That is we are not tring to make machines that interpret, but to
>> > reflect data back to users so that they can make their own stories
>> > or dreams about themselves. And we are not only showing biodata but
>> > also other kinds of data, putting together for a collage of scraps
>> > and bits of your life - but as a user you have to create the story
>> > that joins all those parts. It is not the system that does this.
>> >
>> > But my question was perhaps more to do with how our culture has
>> > enforced a dualistic point of view for centuries and how this has,
>> > perhaps, been internalised with our own understanding of our selves
>> > so strongly that anything the "measures" some aspect of your body is
>> > something that we will immideately use to look at our bodies as
>> > objects or machines? Is it possible to design something that bridges
>> > that gap and makes people see themselves a wholes?
>> >
>> > Kia
>> >
>>> >>
>> >
>>> >> This seems to me to be an important question, but once again should
>>> >> we not first be asking whether it is possible to map this data so
>>> >> that it represents emotion? It strikes me that we often take time
>>> >> to work out the emotions that we are experiencing ourselves, why is
>>> >> it that a series of data streams looking at things such as heart
>>> >> rate and galvanic skin response should reveal these things more
>>> >> quickly? I don't know if there was ever a robotic psychoanalyst in
>>> >> a Woody Allen movie but this seems to me what is being suggested
>>> >> here. Emotions alter qualitatively and wrap themselves around
>>> >> things and each other, emotion can colour a day and make me view
>>> >> the world differently. There also seems to be an assumption of a
>>> >> teleological trajectory here, emotion affects bio function, which
>>> >> can be mapped via its data. I have days when things such as my
>>> >> health affects my mood, here we might claim emotion 'maps'
>>> >> physiology....
>>> >>
>> >
>> > Kristina Höök
>> > [log in to unmask]
>> >
>> > Professor at Stockholm University
>> > Lab manager at SICS
>> > Leads Mobile Life center: www.mobile-life.org
>
> ====
> Paul Brown - based in the UK Aug-Dec 2008
> mailto:[log in to unmask] == http://www.paul-brown.com
> UK Mobile +44 (0)794 104 8228 == USA fax +1 309 216 9900
> Skype paul-g-brown
> ====
> Visiting Professor - Sussex University
> http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/ccnr/research/creativity.html
> ====
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> ====
> Paul Brown - based in the UK Aug-Dec 2008
> mailto:[log in to unmask] == http://www.paul-brown.com
> UK Mobile +44 (0)794 104 8228 == USA fax +1 309 216 9900
> Skype paul-g-brown
> ====
> Visiting Professor - Sussex University
> http://www.cogs.susx.ac.uk/ccnr/research/creativity.html
> ====
Simon Biggs
Research Professor
edinburgh college of art
[log in to unmask]
www.eca.ac.uk
www.eca.ac.uk/circle/
[log in to unmask]
www.littlepig.org.uk
AIM/Skype: simonbiggsuk
Edinburgh College of Art (eca) is a charity registered in Scotland, number SC009201
|