http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/mary-dejevsky/mary-dej
evsky-russia-the-bad-guys-who-are-the-west-trying-to-kid-897498.html

Mary Dejevsky: Russia the bad guys? Who are the West trying to kid?

Friday, 15 August 2008 

As Russian forces started to hand over control of the Georgian town of
Gori yesterday, you could detect a note of surprise, even
disappointment, in many media reports. So the all-out Russian invasion
of plucky little democratic Georgia might not be going to happen after
all. Could it be that the bear was drawing in his claws? 

Well, Russia did not have long to worry about losing its reputation as
backyard bully. Within hours, the United States envoy to Georgia was
spinning a whole new myth to the BBC about how it was only decisive US
intervention - by which he presumably meant the warplanes laden with
humanitarian aid by then ostentatiously parked at Tbilisi airport - that
the mighty erstwhile Red Army had been turned back. 

The many Georgians who had counted on more timely and robust assistance
from their US protector surely laughed a bitter laugh. But there were
signs, with the arrival of the US Secretary of State in Georgia, that
this version was gaining hold. The story of this war, it seems, will be
that the US faced down a snarling, expansionist Russia, and forced it to
limp back to its lair. 

This is a travesty. But it is only the latest and most glaring in a
series of Western misrepresentations and misreadings of Russian
intentions throughout this sorry episode. They began with the repeated
references to Russian "aggression" and "invasion", continued through
charges of intended "regime change", and culminated in alarmist reports
about Russian efforts to bomb the east-west energy pipeline. None of
this, not one bit of it, is true. 

Take "aggression" and "invasion". Georgia declared itself to be in a
state of war with Russia. War, regrettably, is war, and a basic
objective is to reduce, or destroy, the enemy's military capability.
This is what Russia was doing until it accepted the ceasefire. The
positions it took up inside Georgia proper can be seen as defensive, not
offensive. Gori houses the Georgian garrison on South Ossetia's border. 

And anyway, how did hostilities begin? Georgia sent troops into South
Ossetia. The status of that region - which declared unilateral
independence - is anomalous. It is inside Georgia's borders, but outside
its control. But one reason why the dispute has not been solved is that
the "fudge" over independence brought with it a degree of stability.
Georgia's action upset that stability. But did anyone describe it as
"aggression"? Trying to explain Russian "aggression", many reports went
further, observing a "new" mood of Russian aggressive nationalism.
Today's Russia, they reasoned, was uniquely liable to lash out, because
energy wealth had fuelled new national ambitions. Where, though, is the
evidence that Russian national pride is automatically malign? 

If you exclude Chechnya, which Russians have always regarded as part of
Russia, then neither Putin, nor Medvedev, had sent troops outside
Russian borders before this point. As for the idea that Putin wants to
restore the Soviet Union - derived from his remark about the Soviet
collapse being "among the greatest catastrophes" of the 20th century -
nothing could be further from what he did. Far from hankering after a
lost empire, Putin used his years as president systematically to fix
Russia's post-Soviet borders, signing treaties with every neighbouring
country that would agree - including, last month, China. Of course,
Russia does not like the idea of another Nato member on its borders. But
this is not the same as wanting to restore "ex-Soviet space". It
reflects Russia's view of its legitimate security interests. 

Perhaps the most pernicious assumption over the past week, however, is
that Russia wanted to effect "regime-change". Russian officials
categorically denied this, insisting that they had no business
overthrowing an elected leader. You might scoff, but Russia has done
nothing that would contradict this. The Kremlin would probably be
delighted if Georgians eventually punished their President for his
misguided enterprise, but Russia seems to accept that Georgians decide
what happens in Georgia. 

Why was it so difficult for outsiders to believe that Moscow wanted
precisely what its leaders said they wanted: a return to the situation
that had pertained before Georgia's incursion into South Ossetia - and
does it matter that its intentions were so appallingly misread? Yes it
does. If outsiders impute to Moscow motives and objectives it does not
have, they alienate Russia even further, and make a long-term solution
of many international problems that more difficult. It is high time we
treated Russia's post-Soviet leaders as responsible adults representing
a legitimate national interest, rather than assuming the stereotypical
worst.

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