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EAST-WEST-RESEARCH  August 2008

EAST-WEST-RESEARCH August 2008

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Subject:

The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy (Der Spiegel)

From:

"Serguei A. Oushakine" <[log in to unmask]>

Reply-To:

Serguei A. Oushakine

Date:

Sun, 31 Aug 2008 12:47:06 -0400

Content-Type:

text/plain

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Parts/Attachments

text/plain (351 lines)

Der Spiegel
August 25, 2008

ROAD TO WAR IN GEORGIA: The Chronicle of a Caucasian Tragedy
By SPIEGEL Staff

Many in the West were surprised by the outbreak  of war between Georgia and Russia. But there were 
plenty of signs that the conflict was  approaching. SPIEGEL reconstructs the road to violence.

The Sheraton Metechi Palace Hotel in the Georgian  capital Tbilisi has a sand-colored façade, dozens 
of floors and a bright atrium-style lobby. It is  an ideal base for guests working abroad who are eager not to attract attention.

A small group of American soldiers along with US  advisors in civilian clothes stand huddled around 
laptop computers, whispering with officers and  looking at images on the screen. As soon as a 
visitor walks over to see what they're up to,  they snap the computers shut. A man in his 
mid-30s, wearing a blue polo shirt, explains:  "We're the worst-informed people in Tbilisi. I 
can't even tell you what we're doing here."

As of the end of last week, the roughly 160  American military advisors still stood their 
ground in Georgia. They weren't the only foreign  soldiers in the country, though. Russia withdrew 
far more slowly than Russian President Dmitry  Medvedev had promised. And Moscow has likewise 
announced that some 500 soldiers will remain in  the country to secure a buffer zone between Georgia and South Ossetia.

It is, in short, a messy situation. But who is  actually responsible for this six-day war in the southern Caucasus?

Georgia President Mikhail Saakashvili criticizes  what he calls a "brutal Russian attack and 
invasion." In return, Russian Prime Minister  Vladimir Putin calls Saakashvili a "war criminal" 
and talks of the "genocide" committed against  Russian citizens. But what are the 
representatives of the Western community of  values saying? The fact is, they are still puzzled.

If They Only Looked

This is surprising, because the war that erupted  on the southern flank of the Caucasus Mountains 
was almost as inevitable as thunder after a  lightening strike. The dozens of witness 
statements and pieces of intelligence information  at SPIEGEL's disposal combine to form a chronicle 
of a tragedy that anyone could see coming -- if they only looked.

But a true reconstruction of events must begin  well before Aug. 7 -- the day when Georgian 
troops marched into South Ossetia. A war of words  had been raging between Moscow and Tbilisi since 
the beginning of the year and, before long, both  sides were conducting military maneuvers, which, 
in retrospect, can be seen as preparation for  actual conflict. A number of intelligence 
agencies had observed troop movements in Georgia  and South Ossetia, with satellites providing 
precise images of what was happening on the  ground. United States Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice became involved in shuttle  diplomacy, trying to appease Saakashvili on the 
one hand, while criticizing Putin, on the other.

In truth, the world should have been able to  predict what was about to happen in the southern 
Caucasus. Nevertheless, when the armed conflict  finally erupted, it was to great astonishment 
worldwide. No one had wanted a return to the Cold War.

Between Jan. 5, 2008, the day of Mikhail  Saakashvili's re-election as president of 
Georgia, and May 7, 2008, the last day of  Vladimir Putin's term in office as president of 
Russia, there was a great deal of movement along  the fronts in the conflict over South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, separatist Georgian provinces for the past 18 years.

It was as if the Caucasus populist Saakashvili  and the coolly calculating Russian Putin, facing 
the nominal end of his regency, had realized that  it was finally time for a showdown.

'Only Through the Force of Weapons'

Saakashvili wanted to bring his country into NATO as quickly as possible and was confident that he 
had the support of the West. Putin, who wanted to  establish his country as a hegemonial power in 
the southern reaches of the former Soviet empire,  relied on the skills he had acquired as an agent 
working for the KGB -- especially those involving  a careful analysis of the enemy.

The signals that Saakashvili was sending after  his re-election set off alarms in Moscow. The 
Georgian, who, since 2004, had been promising his  people that he would regain control over all of 
Georgian territory, was getting impatient. He  attempted to discuss a plan to invade Abkhazia 
with Washington, before Georgia, as a candidate  for NATO membership, came under more intense 
scrutiny. Meanwhile, SakarTVelo, a Georgian  military television station with the motto "We 
serve those who serve," was using a 1932  quotation attributed to Adolf Hitler to advertise 
for new recruits: "Only through the force of  weapons" could lost territory be regained.

Putin, meanwhile, watched and waited -- he wanted  to see how the Kosovo question would turn out. He 
made it clear that if the ethnic Albanian  province was granted the right to secede from 
Serbia, the West could not deny Abkhazia and South Ossetia the right to secede from Georgia. 
On Feb. 17, 2008, the United States, Great Britain and France recognized Kosovo's independence.

After Saakashvili's state visit to Washington on  March 19, when he clearly enjoyed his reception 
as the president of a key ally in the war on  terror, there was the NATO summit in Bucharest. 
In response to a German and French initiative,  the alliance denied Georgia and Ukraine its 
consent to their joining NATO, but promised membership at a later date.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko  promptly predicted that this decision would have 
"the gravest consequences for overall European  security." US President George W. Bush met with 
Putin at his Black Sea vacation home in an effort  to restore calm. But Bush apparently failed to 
take the Russian president's warnings as  seriously as they were intended. In retrospect, 
Western observers describe what happened in the ensuing few days in April as a "point of no 
return" for the Georgian-Russian war.

Ideologue of Expansionism

Twelve days after the NATO summit, Putin issued an order to upgrade Russia's relations with the 
separatist regimes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia almost to the point of recognition. On April 20, 
a Russian fighter jet shot down a Georgian reconnaissance drone over Abkhazia. According to 
observations by the International Crisis Group, Saakashvili then assembled 12,000 Georgian 
soldiers at the extremely well-fortified Senaki military base. It was still a good three months 
before the outbreak of hostilities.

In May and June, Moscow sent additional troops to the separatist regions, allegedly for 
"humanitarian purposes." They included 500 paratroopers and a maintenance team of 400 men, 
which arrived in Abkhazia on May 31 to repair segments of a railroad south of the capital 
Sukhumi. The work was necessary to prepare for transporting tanks and heavy military equipment.

By that time, Alexander Dugin had set up camp. Dugin is the bearded chief ideologue of those in 
favor of an expansionist Russia -- and an advisor to Putin's United Russia Party. He had come to 
the region to tour a tent camp set up by members of his youth movement about 25 kilometers (16 
miles) from the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali. Thirty army tents housed the 200 
attendees. The program included geopolitical seminars and paramilitary training. The 
pro-Russian forces in South Ossetia provided the group with Kalashnikovs and live ammunition for its field exercises.

"Here is the border in the battle of civilizations," said Dugin. "I think Americans 
are great. But we want to put an end to America's hegemony." It was a sentiment shared by the young 
men in the tent camp -- and Dugin's dreams did not end at the Russian-Georgian border. "Our 
troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and 
the Crimean Peninsula, which is historically part of Russia, anyway," he continued.

As Dugin's supporters were preparing for the worst, the situation along the borders between 
both South Ossetia and Abkhazia and the areas controlled by Tbilisi became increasingly tense. 
There were even exchanges of grenade fire between the two sides, all under the eyes of OSCE and United Nations emissaries.

Practicing for War

On July 3, an assassination attempt was made on the pro-Georgian head of the South Ossetian 
administration, Dmitry Sanakoyev. Sanakoyev had once served as the separatists' head of state and 
was then recruited by Saakashvili -- and he is widely considered to be one of the wild cards in 
the Caucasus region. His name rarely surfaces in the threat analyses prepared by Western 
intelligence agencies. And yet men like Sanakoyev hold key roles in the geopolitical jockeying for 
position in the Caucasus, where even village chiefs and minor Mafiosi occasionally manage to enter the global spotlight.

In mid-March Sanakoyev, Georgia's man on the Russian border, said: "If Moscow recognizes South 
Ossetia, there will be war." On July 3, his Nissan SUV hit a landmine and then came under 
machine-gun fire. Three bodyguards were seriously injured, but Sanakoyev miraculously survived.

Five days later, Russian fighter jets penetrated Georgian air space in what Moscow called a signal 
to the "hotheads in Tbilisi." The timing of this show of strength was carefully chosen, being only 
one day before Georgian President Saakashvili planned to meet with US Secretary of State Rice 
over dinner in Tbilisi. In retrospect, Saakashvili and Rice would interpret their 
conversations in different ways. Rice claims that she warned Saakashvili against military conflict 
with Russia, while Saakashvili recalls Rice's assurances of firm solidarity. Rice left Tbilisi 
28 days before the war broke out.

Combative Language

On July 10, Georgia recalled its ambassador to Russia, in protest over the violation of its 
airspace. At the same time, tensions were growing in the Black Sea republic of Abkhazia, where bomb 
attacks killed four people. There were even explosions in the nearby Russian resort of Sochi, 
the site of a future Olympic venue. Georgian nationals were suspected of committing the attacks.

Even as Russian tourists were enjoying their low-cost vacations on Abkhazian beaches, troops 
and military vehicles were being deployed to the breakaway region. Using combative language, 
Abkhazian leader Sergei Bagapsh told the Moscow magazine Ogonjok: "We are ready for war. But I am 
not about to stand here and tell you exactly how we have prepared ourselves."

On July 15, an unprecedented show of military strength began on both sides of the main ridge of 
the Great Caucasus Range. In the south, not far from Tbilisi, close to 1,000 Americans joined the 
Fourth Infantry Brigade of the Georgian army in a maneuver called "Immediate Response 2008."

On the same day, a maneuver called "Caucasus 2008," under the command of high-ranking General 
Sergei Makarov, the commander of the northern Caucasus military district, began on Russian 
territory north of the Caucasus ridge, between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. The exercise 
included 8,000 troops from all branches of the military. Troops with the 76th Air Landing 
Division, from Pskov, conducted their exercises openly on a military training ground in the 
Daryal Canyon, not far from the Roki Tunnel to South Ossetia -- the eye of the needle between Russia and Georgia.

According to claims coming from Moscow, Russia's troops in the field were prepared to "come to the 
aid of the Russian peacekeepers" stationed in South Ossetia. The government in Tbilisi was 
quick to respond, noting that it was unaware of a "right to conduct any actions on Georgian soil."

Western intelligence agencies observed that, after the July 30 end to the "Caucasus 2008" 
exercises ended, the dispatch channels set up by the Russians were kept in place, hardly the usual 
practice following military exercises. Furthermore, the 58th Army remained in a state of 
heightened readiness. For US intelligence, with its arsenal of spy satellites, reconnaissance 
aircraft and unmanned drones, this should have been a reason for concern.

48 Russians for each Georgian

More reasons for worry quickly followed. Following the military exercise on the Georgian 
side, President Saakashvili -- directly under the noses of the American military advisors -- sent 
parts of his army toward South Ossetia instead of ordering them to return to their barracks. The 
artillery brigade, for example, which would begin firing on the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali 
eight days later, on Aug. 7, is normally divided between two towns, Senaki and Gori. But after 
July 30, the brigade was concentrated in Gori.

The outbreak of the war was still seven days away. Two armies, both well-equipped but of 
unequal strength, were facing off across the border. In case of conflict, there would be 48 
Russian troops for each Georgian soldier. A tragedy was gradually taking shape, and yet the 
world public was still in the dark.

The skirmishes became more frequent in the final days leading up to all-out war. On Friday, Aug. 
1, five Georgian police officers were injured in a bomb attack in South Ossetia. A short time 
later, snipers shot and killed six people, most of them police officers with the pro-Russian 
separatist government, while they were fishing and swimming. Ossetians began sending their women 
and children to safety in Russia.

On Aug. 3, the Russian foreign ministry issued a final warning that an "extensive military 
conflict" was about to erupt. Officials in Europe's seats of government and intelligence 
agency headquarters had a sense of what the Russians were talking about. Saakashvili's plans 
for an invasion had been completed some time earlier. A first draft prepared in 2006, believed 
to be a blueprint of sorts for the later operation, anticipated that Georgian forces would 
capture all key positions within 15 hours.

A plan B -- in the event of failure -- did not exist.

Three days before the outbreak of the war, officials in Israel emphatically stated that the 
country had not sold offensive weapons to Georgia in months, and that "frantic requests" from 
Tbilisi, including those requests for Israeli-made Merkava tanks and new weapons, were 
rejected. From the perspective of the Israelis, Georgia and Russia were clearly on a collision course.

The People Would Pay the Price

Georgia had increasingly made headlines as a goldmine for Israeli arms dealers and veterans 
from the military and the Mossad, Israel's intelligence agency. According to reports in the 
Jerusalem media, cousins of Georgian Defense Minister David Kezerashvili, who himself lived in 
Holon near Tel Aviv and speaks Hebrew, acted as reliable contacts for Israeli arms dealers. And 
Temuri Yakobashvili, who, as Georgia's state minister for reintegration, is responsible for 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, said openly: "The training of our military units by Israelis makes me proud to be a Jew."

But did Georgia's young elite misinterpret the importance of their own country and misunderstand 
the motives of its allies, friends and trading partners? That conclusion seemed more and more 
likely as war approached. But it would be the people who would pay the price.

At about 10 p.m. on Aug. 5, teacher Sisino Javakhishvili, after bathing her granddaughter, 
went into the courtyard of her house in the Georgian village of Nikosi, three kilometers from 
the South Ossetian capital Tskhinvali, to fetch water. She had heard gunfire before, but suddenly 
she sensed that it was serious. "No one here issurprised by individual gunshots or even 
machine-gun fire, but this time it was truly massive," she says. "We had not noticed anything 
out of the ordinary in the days before then. The only thing we did notice were the television 
stories about Ossetian residents being taken out of Tskhinvali. We saw busses full of people 
departing for Russia. But my husband said that it was to intimidate us."

The evacuation of the women and children was complete by Aug. 6. In the Georgian-controlled 
villages of South Ossetia, skirmishes between Georgian army infantry and South Ossetian 
militias became more intense, erupting into nonstop artillery exchanges during the ensuing 
night. Georgian sources reported that Russian soldiers had entered the conflict on the Ossetian side.

According to Western observers, by the morning of Aug. 7 the Georgians had amassed 12,000 troops on 
the border to South Ossetia. Seventy-five tanks and armored personnel carriers were in position 
near Gori. In a 15-hour blitzkrieg, the tanks were to advance to the Roki Tunnel to seal it 
off. At that point, there were only 500 Russian soldiers and another 500 fighters with the South 
Ossetia militia armed and ready to defend Tskhinvali and the surrounding area. At 4:06 
p.m., the South Ossetian authorities reported that Tskhinvali had come under attack from 
grenade launchers and automatic weapons. Fifty minutes later, they reported "large-scale 
military aggression against the Republic of South Ossetia." According to Western intelligence 
sources, the Georgian artillery bombardment of Tskhinvali did not begin until 10:30 p.m. on that 
Thursday. It was orchestrated by 27 Georgian army rocket launchers capable of firing ordnance with 
a maximum caliber of 152 millimeters. At 11 p.m., Saakashvili announced that the goal of the 
operation was the "re-establishment of constitutional order in South Ossetia."

A Disastrous Decision

During his invasion, the Georgian president relied primarily on infantry units that had to 
advance along major roads. At 11:10 p.m., the Georgian side informed the general in charge of 
the Russian peacekeepers that they planned to use military force to re-establish "constitutional 
order" in the Tskhinvali Region, the Georgian term for South Ossetia. Half an hour later, a 
Georgian grenade struck the roof of a three-story building occupied by Russian troops, killing two soldiers on observation duty.

Salvos from multiple rocket launchers rained down on the complex. The peacekeepers' cafeteria was 
reduced to rubble and all of the buildings went up in flames. Eighteen Russian soldiers died in 
the attack. Four minutes before midnight, the South Ossetian authorities reported: "The 
Georgian armed forces' storm on Tskhinvali has begun."

Russian soldiers did offer resistance. According to Georgian reports, they included members of 
both the peacekeeping force and Ossetian militias. The Georgians, however, became bogged 
down during their attack and failed to advance beyond Tskhinvali. They were inexperienced -- the 
civilian casualties in Tskhinvali were high. The Georgian interior ministry -- instead of the 
defense ministry -- managed the campaign. The choice was consistent with international law, 
given the fact that South Ossetia nominally belongs to Georgia. From a military standpoint, 
however, the decision was disastrous.

Saakashvili Was Unavailable

In Russia, shortly before the war began, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin was 
sitting in his office on the seventh floor of a Stalin-era skyscraper in downtown Moscow. It was 
the evening of August 7, following a rainy, late-summer day. Karasin is in charge of managing 
Russia's strained relations with the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
including conflict zones on the territory of the Black Sea republic of Georgia.
In the past three years, says Karasin, hardly a day has gone by when he has not discussed South 
Ossetia and Abkhazia with European, American or Georgian officials.

But starting in early August, Karasin began receiving unsettling reports from Yuri Popov, the 
relevant special ambassador and commander of the Russian portion of the peacekeeping force. At 
approximately 9 p.m. on the evening of Aug. 7, Karasin was informed that Georgia was amassing 
troops along the South Ossetian border. The special ambassador reported counting five tanks, 
six armored personnel carriers, five howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, trucks and buses full 
of soldiers and officers on the road back to Tbilisi from Tskhinvali.

Karasin stayed in his office until after 10 p.m., and when he arrived at home he called Russian 
President Medvedev. It was one of seven conversations with the president conducted that 
night. Medvedev instructed Karasin to contact Saakashvili immediately, but the Georgian 
president was unavailable. Instead, Karasin called Dan Fried, his American counterpart, who 
told him that Washington was doing its best to get the situation under control. That was the 
extent of the conversations on that night.

By the next morning, it was too late for a peaceful solution. Starting at 2:06 a.m. on Aug. 
8, the tickers of international press agencies began running reports of Russian tanks in the 
Roki tunnel. Depending on the estimate, the Russians moved between 5,500 and 10,000 soldiers 
into South Ossetia through the Roki tunnel. Meanwhile, there were already between 7,000 and 
10,000 Russian soldiers at the Georgian-Abkhazian border, many of them brought there on ships from 
Russia. The "Moskva," a guided missile cruiser and flagship of Russia's Black Sea fleet, with 
the fleet commander himself on board, was patrolling off the Georgian coast.

Sukhoi and Tupolev combat aircraft, including the models Su-25, Su-24, Su-27 and Tu-22, were 
patrolling the air. For the people living in the Georgian villages in South Ossetia, Russian air 
superiority quickly became a nightmare.

'Explosions Every Few Seconds'

A 68-year-old mechanic from Kurta, a village northeast of Tskhinvali, couldn't believe his 
eyes. "It was terrible, when the planes came and shot at us. Every bomb didn't explode only once, 
but several times in succession, a little farther along each time, creating long strips of 
explosions; the planes made a droning noise as they approached. I hid in the cellar and looked 
at my watch. There were explosions every few seconds."

The Russian planes must have been using cluster bombs -- as did the Georgians, according to 
reports by observers with the organization Human Rights Watch. It was a war that was unleashed on 
the basis of archaic 20th-century geopolitics, but fought with 21st century technology. It was a 
war that caught the world policemen in a globalized community off-guard. And by the time 
the world noticed, it was already in full swing.

Alexander Stubb, the Finnish foreign minister and current chairman of the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), did not see the war coming: "The OSCE has always been involved 
here, since 1992. There were many reports about smaller conflicts. I received the first 
information about the major conflict in the night before Aug. 8. It took us by surprise. I spoke 
with my mission chief in Tbilisi on Aug. 7. She told me that it was very dangerous there, but 
that it was not a problem. The, in the night before Aug. 8, all hell broke loose."

The civilian dead have now been buried. No one knows the real death toll. Seventy-four Russian 
soldiers died (400, according to Georgian sources), and the Georgians lost 165 (4,000, say 
the Russians). But which of the countries truly won? Which can hope for a better outcome once the 
dust from this strange Caucasian war has settled? And how long will the new Cold War, which appears 
to have erupted between Russia and the West, last?

In recent days, President Saakashvili has tirelessly met with foreign dignitaries and 
relished the international spotlight. First Condoleezza Rice returned to Tbilisi, followed by 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel and British Foreign Minister David Miliband. Meanwhile, 
Poland signed a treaty with the United States for the development of the missile defense shield. 
Moscow responded by commenting that in doing so, Warsaw had also placed itself into Moscow's 
nuclear sights. In the UN Security Council, Russia and the West introduced resolutions that 
had no chance of approval, because the current and former superpowers were vetoing each other.

During all this, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Georgian soil dragged on into the night 
before last Saturday. The soldiers destroyed keybridges, railroad lines and roads. The military 
victor went to great lengths to humiliate the loser, which had allowed itself to be provoked into an attack.

It could take Georgia years to recover from this Six-Day War.

By Manfred Ertel, Uwe Klussmann, Susanne Koelbl, Walter Mayr, Matthias Schepp, Holger Stark and Alexander Szandar

Translated from the German by Christopher Sultan

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