These seem to me extremely helpful comments, along with the rights issue that Georgie flagged in her last message. Little of this subtlety seems to be in the Ofcom consultation, but we can certainly include it in our response!
 
Sonia Livingstone 

Professor, Department of Media and Communications
Project Director, EUKidsOnline, www.eukidsonline.net <http://www.eukidsonline.net/> 

 
Address: LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
Home page: [log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]> 
 
Upcoming LSE conference: [log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask] <[log in to unmask]" target="_blank">http:[log in to unmask]> 
New book: The International Handbook of Children, Media and Culture (edited with Kirsten Drotner, Sage, 2008).

________________________________

From: Peter Thompson [mailto:[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Fri 13/06/2008 04:56
To: Professor G E M Born; Communications & Cultural Studies Association (MeCCSA) - Policy Network Media; Sylvia Harvey; Patrick Barwise; Livingstone,S; [log in to unmask]; Jean Seaton
Subject: New funding agencies (Ofcom models 3 and 4): 'Arts Council ofthe Air': negative lessons from NZ



Dear Georgina and fellow media policy colleagues,

I've been trying to keep up to date with the policy developments in the UK, but my attention has largely been focused on major regulatory reviews going on here in New Zealand. I was therefore very interested to hear from Georgina and learn about your group's efforts to challenge the Ofcom plan to to-slice the BBC licence fee and develop new funding mechanisms, including, as I understand it, some form of biddable public service provision contract and perhaps a contestable programme funding system akin to the one we have here in NZ. 

I'm not sure how far my brief comments do justice to the complexity of the issues, and of course the institutional and regulatory arrnagements in one national media ecology are often a weak basis for inferring how well  they might translate into another (especially given the significant differences between the UK and New Zealand). However, if it's any help, a report my colleagues and I prepared for the NZ Ministry for Culture and Heritage a couple of years ago examined a range of public funding mechanisms in the OECD and some of the characteristics of various systems can, I think, be generalised. If you want to see the report, it's available at: http://www.cultureandheritage.govt.nz/publications/broadcast-funding/MCH-OECD-Funding-Report.pdf

I know you're pushed for time, and I don't wish to unnecessarily distract you, but I've generalised some of the issues of the main NZ funding mechanisms in the short document attached, FYI. These are based on my own  analysis of NZ broadcasting systems (and although I have conducted research for the government on funding issues, I've also done research for NZ On Air on measuring broadcasting quality, in addition to chairing the working party which revised the TVNZ Charter- so hopefully any institutional biases balance out!) I will also make some brief observations about the potential problems arising from public service contract models below. Please accept my apologies if these issues are already self-evident.

Contestable Public Service Contracts: Potential Problems

1) How can one validly assess the extent to which a contract has been (or will be) fulfilled? Obviously this requires specific measures to be developed, but the more specific and quantitative they are, the more there is a risk of the institutional response to those measures by the broadcaster becoming a box-ticking exercise designed to optimise the 'score' rather than fulfil the spirit of the contract. This concern is intensified when multiple parties are bidding to gain/ retain contracts, especially if substantial revenue is at stake. (And if measures are not transparent and objective, there may be legal disputation over decisions to change the broacasting contractor).

2) The development of specific, quantitative measures based on genre still may not encapsulate the qualitative principles that provide public service value. For example, where does one draw the line between reality-TV and serious documentary? Contracting a provider to supply x-number of hours of a particular genre does not guarantee the quality of that content within that genre category.

3) Public service broadcasting quality depends as much on the institutional commitment to a particular ethos of programme production as it does on the types of programming produced. Contestable public service contracts emphasise content as the definitive point of state intervention, but this is only part of the equation.

4) The uncertainty of funding surrounding the potential winning/losing of a lucrative public service contract make it more difficult for broadcasters to make commitments to developing the infrastructure and production teams needed to sustain high quality television. This is actually a major headache for broadcasters and distribution platforms proliferate and audiences and revenue streams fragment. It's not just a commercial issue, it affects the institutional climate, inhibiting long-term plans, inhibiting risk-taking, and making broacdasting employment itself increasingly contingent.
4b) Note also that if the hazards of losing a large-scale public service contract represent a threat to the very viability of a broadcaster, then the regulators may be reluctant to withdraw the contract except where the evidence of failure is abject. This would institutionalise mediocrity. Otherwise, if the scale of the public service contracts is  limited to shorter-terms involving funding for just a few programmes or a single series, then the shortcomings of the contestable model come into play (see attached comments).

5) The contestability of public service contracts raises the question of whether any private commercial broadcaster would be able to generate the same public service value- per-dollar as a public not-for-profit broadcaster. The need to maximise returns to the shareholder means that any commercial bidder will try and fulfil the conditions of the contract in the most cost-effective way possible. If the contract bidding includes quotations for anticipated expenses, then this could generate a 'race to the bottom', with all broadcasters trying to minimise investment expenses in order to secure the contract, fulfil the criteria on the cheap and then cream off some of the income as surplus value.

6) Concomitant with 5, commercial broadcasters will be incentivised to fulfil their contractual commitments without disrupting the overall commercial viability of the schedule. If the contract prevents relegating the requisite public service content to peripheral slots in the schedule, then there is a risk that the broadcaster will seek to prevent disruptions to 'audience flow' in prime time by fulfilling the ostensible genre obligations  in a manner that maximises audience appeal (thus documentaries become reality-tv shows and current affairs becomes infotainment- see point 2).


I hope this is of some use. Best of luck with your group's submission on the Ofcom proposals.
Regards.
Peter





Peter Thompson
Senior Lecturer
School of Communication Studies
Unitec NZ
Private Bag 92025
Auckland, NZ

phone: +64  (0)9- 8154321 ext. 8804
www.communication.unitec.ac.nz


>>> Professor G E M Born <[log in to unmask]> 12/06/2008 23:05 >>>
Dear Media Policy colleagues,

For our needs in terms of responding to the four Ofcom models, I've spent
the last few days trying to get a clear handle on the 'Arts Council of the
Air' model, ie the setting up of a new commissioning body which would
commission what is called 'public service content' or 'PS genres'. I asked
colleagues in New Zealand, specifically Dr Peter Thompson, who has worked a
great deal on this, for the collective judgement now on the NZ experience
of exactly this model for some years, 'NZ On Air'. Peter replied as
follows, and I hope you'll find, as I did, that his account is extremely
powerful in setting out the real problems that are likely to arise with
this model in the UK: Peter's words follow below.

However, of course, this does not seem to be the model being proposed.
Ofcom's models 3 and 4 speak of 'long-term' contracts and agreements being
awarded competitively by a new funding agency to the commercial PSBs and
other bodies for fulfilling specific briefs and absences in types of
content; this seems to be more like another version of Ofcom's / Ed
Richards's PSP - so perhaps this lesson from NZ is not relevant. However
this idea could easily morph into the 'Arts Council of the Air' and in that
case, the NZ experience becomes very relevant. I just thought it might be
useful to be aware of the pitfalls of the NZ experience, in case it is
resurrected. I hope this is helpful in drawing up a response.

Here are Peter Thompson's words -

'The problem with the NZ On Air model is that, by and large, the system
works very well for the local production industry and it's largely
politically uncontroversial. However the basic problem is that the range of
content it has funded tends to be constrained by the scheduling priorities
of the broadcasters who agree to screen the content it funds; [and this
links to the problem of getting the content that has been commissioned to
be scheduled by the broadcasters at all - quite a lot is not scheduled].
The broadcasters have often asked for funding for programmes that turn out
to be high-rating and therefore commercially viable, and although there is
some good material produced and broadcast, if it's not mass-appeal it gets
relegated to peripheral slots in the schedule or rejected as unattractive.

Here's a way to think about it: If you assume that public service
broadcasting encompasses a full range of programming including all genres
and including quality mass appeal and minority content, and that commercial
broadcasting encompasses only the mass appeal then draw a venn diagram of
the two, then there would be an overlap in the centre, and two distinct
zones that are mutually exclusive- i.e. high quality PSB genres such as
educational docos, investigative journalism and in-depth news and current
affairs on the one hand and the worst tabloid commercial reality tv junk on
the other. NZ On Air has ensured that some of the material in the otherwise
commercial schedules of broadcasters at least qualifies for the centre zone
of higher-quality mass appeal. *But it has not incentivised programming of
the higher-quality lower-appeal public service type.* So it achieves a
positive outcome in many respects, *but in important respects it sells the
wider conception of public service short* - and *the industry gets behind
this model out of self-interest and legitimates an impoverished conception
of public broadcasting.*

The other issues concern complex argument over intellectual property
rights, which has *recently resulted in a very generous deal to the
producers who will enjoy commercial gains from the sell-on of rights of
programmes commissioned with taxpayer money,* problems of evaluating
whether or not a programme extends the range of content beyond the
commercial mainstream, and structural problems of bureaucratic capture by
client interests.' [End of Peter Thompson's words.]

-----
 
Best wishes,

Georgina.

--

Georgina Born
Professor of Sociology, Anthropology and Music
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
University of Cambridge

Honorary Professor of Anthropology
University College London

Tel: +44 (0)1223 335063 / 740846
















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